Preamble

The House met at half-past Two o'clock

PRAYERS

[Mr. SPEAKER in the Chair]

PETITION

Queen Charlotte's Maternity Hospital

Mr. Richard: I beg to ask the leave of the House, Mr. Speaker, to present a Petition signed by 70,000 residents of the United Kingdom, who, unfortunately, have signed the Petition form not in accordance with the Rules of the House; but it will in due course be delivered to the Secretary of State.
This Petition is:
on behalf of the undersigned, being residents of the United Kingdom
who show that they are profoundly shocked that Queen Charlotte's Maternity Hospital may be closed, and state that the worldwide reputation of Queen Charlotte's Hospital is based on the faith and confidence of generations of patients.
Wherefore your petitioners pray that Queen Charlotte's Maternity Hospital may be retained and its development plan be allowed to proceed.

To lie upon the Table.

Oral Answers to Questions — SOCIAL SERVICES

Unemployment Benefit

Mr. Prentice: asked the Secretary of State for Social Services when he expects to announce the outcome of the Government's current consideration of the proposal of the Donovan Commission to allow unemployment benefit to workers laid off by reason of a trade dispute at their place of employment, but who were neither participating in nor directly interested in the dispute.

The Secretary of State for Social Services (Sir Keith Joseph): I have no statement to make at present.

Mr. Prentice: Would the Secretary of State confirm that it is now virtually the universal view that this rule ought to be changed, and that if the Government persist in this out-dated rule they are only really doing so to effect the strike situation by trying to put pressure on strikers through the hardship on non-strikers' families? Is not that a pretty unworthy way of conducting an industrial relations policy?

Sir K. Joseph: I undertook, in Standing Committee, to consider discussing with my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Employment later in the year, and that undertaking, of course, stands.

Mrs. Shirley Williams: The right hon. Gentleman showed a great unease about this in Committee and, indeed, on Second Reading, because he knows that what was already a rather unfair provision has now become doubly unfair because of the Government's proposed legislation in this field. I wonder whether he would treat this with some urgency, since the Act will come into force in the immediate future.

Sir K. Joseph: I think the hon. Lady is doing me an injustice in using the word "unease". I freely and voluntarily agreed that there were strong arguments on both sides of this case. I think "unease" is unfair.

Mr. Ralph Howell: asked the Secretary of State for Social Services if he


is aware that when unemployment pay is disallowed because an employee has left employment of his own accord or because of misconduct, he can receive more in social security benefit than he would have received in unemployment benefit; and if he will take steps to remedy the situation.

Sir K. Joseph: Anyone who becomes unemployed, whatever the reason, is entitled to supplementary benefit to bring his income up to his requirements as defined in the 1966 Act. If he is not paid unemployment benefit for the reasons given, he is paid less for up to six weeks than the normal amount of his supplementary benefit requirements. The difference now is 75p. After the Social Security Bill has become law, the maximum difference will be £2·30 a week or £13·80 for the full six weeks.

Mr. Howell: Is my right hon. Friend aware that in certain instances people who are on social security can receive as much as £2 more if they have lost unemployment as a result of misconduct?

Sir K. Joseph: It is a difficult question to debate in this way, but I am simply assuring my hon. Friend that someone who loses unemployment benefit for the reason he has instanced suffers a penalty, which is being increased under the Social Security Bill, in supplementary benefit for up to six weeks.

Mr. Merlyn Rees: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that in an area such as Norfolk, which I visited politically the other day, it is brought to one's notice from all quarters that the problem is that it is a low-wage area? It was put to me frankly by my friends there that people in authority seemed more interested in cows than people.

Sir K. Joseph: The East Anglian claim for F.I.S. is at about the same level as in other mainly agricultural areas. I believe that the F.I.S. will help many people working on farms.

Family Income Supplement Scheme

Mr. McCrindle: asked the Secretary of State for Social Services if he will consider amending the requirement under the Family Income Supplement Scheme that the beneficiary must be in full-time employment when such beneficiary is a widowed or divorced woman.

Sir K. Joseph: I am keeping a close watch on the progress and effectiveness of the scheme particularly as it affects women who are bringing up children on their own. I will bear my hon. Friend's suggestion in mind.

Mr. McCrindle: I am sure that my right hon. Friend will be anxious that this unique scheme should have the maximum effect, and I would like to suggest to him that a number of the women described in the Question are debarred for no better reason than that they go out to work for only a limited period whereby to look after their children. Will my right hon. Friend bear in mind in a future review that these people should be allowed as categories included in any extension of the scheme?

Sir K. Joseph: I will certainly bear that point in mind. The House may like to know that about 25 per cent. of the awards so far given are to single-parent families.

Mr. Dalyell: Has the close watch revealed, since the last time we had Questions to the Secretary of State, why so many families should not be claiming?

Sir K. Joseph: I think there are Questions on the Order Paper to which the answer would be more appropriately given on that subject.

Mr. O'Malley: Since there seems to be considerable confusion both in this House and outside as to what constitutes full-time employment under the terms of the Act, could the right hon. Gentleman explain exactly what full-time employment is under the terms of the Act?

Sir K. Joseph: Under the Regulations under the Act, 30 hours per week.

Mr. Skinner: asked the Secretary of State for Social Services what plans he now has to increase the number of successful applications for family income supplement.

Sir K. Joseph: The publicity campaign is continuing. The number of successful applications is continuing to increase.

Mr. Skinner: Is the Minister aware that the figure of 20,000 successful applicants divided into the number of constituencies represents about 32 apiece, in


my case two in each parish, and they take some finding? Does he also realise that an average payment of £2 per week per person comes to about £2 million instead of the £8 million which he was bragging about this time last year? What will he do about this, apart from paying the cost of television advertising?

Sir K. Joseph: I do not think that I have bragged about anything connected with this scheme. It will put much-needed money into the households of the very poorest wage earners. It will take time to acquaint the under 1 per cent. of the working population involved of their rights, and the Government have just embarked on the second stage of advertising for that purpose.

Mr. Speaker: Mr. Allaun.

Mr. Arthur Lewis: How much is Mrs. Proops paid?

Sir K. Joseph: With permission, Mr. Speaker, since that question seeks to impugn an individual, I must say that Mrs. Proops had every right to ask for a fee for her advertising, but she voluntarily forwent a fee and is doing the service for nothing.

Hon. Members: Withdraw !

Mr. Arthur Lewis: On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. I am being asked to withdraw. I made an interjection and asked how much, but the Minister did not say how much the fee was.

Mr. Speaker: Order. This just shows the trouble the House gets into from sedentary interruptions.

Mr. Frank Allaun: Coming to more informed matters, why has only one in four of the 160,000 applications expected actually been made, whether successful or not? Does not this indicate that the flaw in this and similar schemes of the Government is that they are based on the assumption that there are large numbers of people ready to hold out their hands for anything? This just is not true. There are many poor people who are too proud to do this, and that is the weakness in all these Government schemes.

Sir K. Joseph: I do not think that conclusion can be drawn; 50,000 people have already applied, about half of whom have been allotted awards. Until today

no payments have been made. Until last week no advertising was done by television. We shall need several months—and it may be perhaps well into next year—before we can judge how successful this scheme is in reaching those for whom it is intended. So far I am not discouraged by the response.

Sir B. Rhys Williams: Will my right hon. Friend give further consideration to the possibility that the Inland Revenue department might automatically provide the names of people eligible for this supplement?

Sir K. Joseph: I think that raises very dangerous possibilities that my hon Friend might not wish to pursue. Perhaps my hon. Friend might wish to pursue this, but many hon. Members on both sides of the House might not support him in that.

Mr. Lane: asked the Secretary of State for Social Services if he will now give his latest estimate of the number of families who will be entitled to benefit from the Family Income Supplement Scheme.

Sir K. Joseph: The number given on Second Reading was nearly 190,000; this may be on the high side.

Mr. Lane: Would it not be helpful if hon. Members opposite, instead of denigrating a novel scheme which the previous Government did not manage to introduce, were to take every opportunity in their many speeches during the recess to publicise the scheme among their constituents?

Sir K. Joseph: Yes, certainly, and I am sure that hon. Members in their surgeries are drawing attention to these benefits.

Mrs. Shirley Williams: Of course we are, but we think the scheme is a bad one. May I remind the right hon. Gentleman that on Second Reading of the Family Income Supplements Bill he said:
The finances presume that we shall have an 85 per cent. take-up. I will do my best to do that, and better ".—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 10th November, 1970; Vol. 806, c. 227.]
We on this side of the House replied that we did not for one moment believe that the take-up would be anything like as high as this. If we show ourselves to be right within the next six months, will the


right hon. Gentleman withdraw this abortive scheme and replace it with a decent scheme of family allowance increases?

Sir K. Joseph: I shall certainly draw the lessons that can be sensibly drawn from our experience over the next months and year. It was my duty to give Parliament the best estimate I could of the likely cost, and I had to base that on an estimate and an aim as to the take-up. That is where the figures come from.

Mr. William Hamilton: asked the Secretary of State for Social Services what is the latest number of applicants for family income supplement; how many have been accepted and how many rejected; and what is the average award.

Mr. Meacher: ask the Secretary of State for Social Services what are the latest figures for successful applications for the family income supplement, and of this total, how many have been awarded a grant of £4 per week.

Sir K. Joseph: Up to 27th July 56,229 claims for family income supplement had been received; of the decisions so far given 23,152 were favourable and 23,301 unfavourable. In addition, over 20,000 families on supplementary benefit but wage-stopped will benefit automatically when the F.I.S. Scheme starts. As regards the average award, I have no figure later than that which I gave in my reply to the hon. Members for Oldham, West (Mr. Meacher), Manchester, Gorton (Mr. Marks) and West Lothian (Mr. Dalyell) on 13th July. At that time we estimated that about 8 per cent. of awards are in the range £3·60 to £4 a week.—[Vol. 821, c. 191–4.]

Mr. Hamilton: In view of the derisory results of this scheme—[An HON. MEMBER: "Derisory?"]—yes, because the right hon. Gentleman himself said that he was not satisfied with the results up to date—will the right hon. Gentleman now give an assurance, which he did not give to my hon. Friend the Member for Hitchin (Mrs. Shirley Williams), that if in 12 months' time the results do not come up to the estimate which he made on Second Reading, he will undertake to have another look

at the desirability of returning to the election pledge and solve this problem by family allowances—including, we hope, family allowances for the first child?

Sir K. Joseph: I should be very reluctant to commit myself to withdraw the benefit from families with only one child, which is what that would involve. I cannot believe that an increased income as from this week to some 43,000 families, as a result of one phase of advertising occurring before any payment had ever been made, is so discouraging. I believe that 43,000 households from this week will be very glad that this scheme has been introduced.

Mr. Meacher: Will the Secretary of State not acknowledge that this miserable figure of 11 per cent. take-up means that the Government's whole anti-poverty strategy is stillborn? Will he note for future policy-making the stark contrast between the 100 per cent. take-up of his over-80 pensions, because people take those benefits as of right, and the wretched 11 per cent. take-up of family income supplement?

Sir K. Joseph: The hon. Member is not quite right. Part of the over-80 benefit had to be applied for, and the high take-up was the result of a quite large advertising campaign. I should not like the hon. Gentleman's wrong calculation to get on record. So far 23 per cent. of the estimated number entitled are from this week receiving benefit.

Mr. McCrindle: Would not my right hon. Friend agree that the best advertising agent he could employ is likely to be the man who from this week will receive the extra money?

Sir K. Joseph: Yes, and that is why the latest advertising campaign emphasises those who are already in receipt of it. Hon. Gentlemen on both sides of the House should not under-estimate that for the first time an effective step is being taken to relieve those on the wage-stop.

Mr. Dalyell: Has any pilot study been undertaken in any area of the country to discover the reasons why people are not taking up benefit?

Sir K. Joseph: One is to be undertaken in September.

Mr. Dalyell: Where?

Sir K. Joseph: I cannot give the hon. Gentleman the answer at the moment. I am taking advice about a thoroughly typical area.

Captain W. Elliot: Would my right hon. Friend agree that if the Government identify an area of want, provide the resources to help the people in it and give the matter the maximum publicity, there is very little more they can do? Will he resist a request from the other side to plaster the whole area with money, which will only mean that those in real need will not get enough?

Sir K. Joseph: I am sure my hon. and gallant Friend is right. These families by hypothesis are people in work, despite the fact that the benefits for being out of work are higher than their household income. They are very good people, but they need education by advertising and personal help on how to obtain what is now their right.

Mrs. Shirley Williams: If that scheme does not reach those intended, it is a bad scheme and should be withdrawn? We have asked whether the right hon. Gentleman will consider in six months' or a year's time what the take-up then is and whether he will be honest enough, if that take-up is below the majority, to withdraw the scheme and admit he is wrong?

Sir K. Joseph: I am as anxious as the hon. Lady to get the money into the hands that need it. Obviously, if it fails to reach the majority of those entitled to it, the Government will have to find better methods of helping those people. I doubt whether it will mean withdrawing the scheme, but may mean refining it.

Population Statistics

Sir D. Renton: asked the Secretary of State for Social Services whether the Registrar General supplies the British Broadcasting Corporation and the Independent Television Authority with his quarterly returns of population statistics.

Sir K. Joseph: Yes, Sir.

Sir D. Renton: As knowledge of how much its population may be increasing is about the most important thing that a nation can know about itself, will my right hon. Friend take every step that he can to see that this knowledge is made widely and regularly known to our people?

Sir K. Joseph: I do not think that that arises directly from the Question. The B.B.C. and the I.T.A. do not come within my field. They are, in so far as they are anybody's responsibility, within that of my right hon. Friend the Minister of Posts and Telecommunications.

Redditch (New Hospital)

Mr. Terry Davis: asked the Secretary of State for Social Services whether he will announce the proposed catchment area for the new hospital at Redditch; and the date when the new hospital will be started.

The Under-Secretary of State for Health and Social Security (Mr. Michael Alison): The new hospital is being planned to serve Redditch and Bromsgrove urban districts, most of Bromsgrove rural district about half of Alcester rural district and a small part of Droitwich rural district. Detailed planning has been commenced by the Birmingham Regional Hospital Board but it is too soon yet to say when construction will start.

Mr. Davis: Has the Birmingham Regional Hospital Board decided on a date for starting to build this hospital? If the board has not decided on a date, will the Minister tell us when he expects it to do so? If the board has decided on a date, even tentatively, will he explain why this information cannot be given to us in the House of Commons and to the people of Redditch?

Mr. Alison: The regional hospital board fixes dates tentatively some years ahead for planning purposes, but it is not the custom to publish dates more than a year in advance in case for some reason there is a slippage.

Remand Home Vacancies (North-West)

Mr. Blaker: asked the Secretary of State for Social Services whether the


Children's Regional Planning Committee for the North-West will be paying special attention to the deteriorating position regarding remand home vacancies for girls and boys in the region; and when he expects to receive the committee's proposals for improving this situation.

Mr. Alison: The regional planning committee consists of representatives of local authorities, with which the responsibility for the provision of remand facilities rests. The committee is required to include provision for such facilities in the regional plan it is at present preparing, and will be reviewing its needs accordingly. Its plan is due to be submitted to my right hon. Friend by the end of the year.

Mr. Blaker: While the position regarding vacancies for both boys and girls remains unsatisfactory, is my hon. Friend aware that the difficulties of the non-providing authorities in the North-West in securing vacancies for boys have got much worse since the beginning of this year, when part of the Children and Young Persons Act, 1969, came into effect? Will he undertake to consider the report urgently with the Home Office when it is received?

Mr. Alison: My hon. Friend will know that half the advantage of these new regional plans is that they will, we hope, show up local shortages where they exist. If we felt that the plans put forward were not adequate, my right hon. Friend would send them back for further consideration.

Maternity Facilities (Liskeard)

Mr. Hicks: asked the Secretary of State for Social Services if he is now in a position to make a statement on the provision of maternity facilities in the Liskeard district.

Mr. Alison: Maternity facilities for the Liskeard district are provided by the local health authority, general practitioners and the regional hospital board. Facilities for hospital confinement are provided at Plymouth, Launceston, Tavistock and St. Austell. I have decided that the Trebarras Maternity Home should be permanently closed. The regional hospital board has

considered the provision of alternative facilities in Liskeard, but has concluded that it is impracticable to provide them. I am writing to my hon. Friend.

Mr. Hicks: Is the Minister aware that his announcement today will bring great disappointment to the growing population of the Liskeard catchment area since during the three years in which Trebarras has been closed people have had to travel considerable distances to the alternative hospitals which the Minister has announced? I hope he will reconsider his decision, especially as there appears to be an alternative scheme in conjunction with the local practitioner hospital.

Mr. Alison: The local general practitioner scheme to which my hon. Friend referred has not, I am afraid, proved practicable, because it would involve the taking on of three domiciliary nurses for a total number of deliveries of no more than two or three a week. It is simply uneconomic to provide a comprehensive service locally for so few deliveries.

Keresley Hospital (Sale)

Mr. Leslie Huckfield: asked the Secretary of State for Social Services whether he is satisfied with the procedures attending the sale of Keresley Hospital; and whether he will make a statement.

Mr. Alison: Yes, Sir; and I have written again today to the hon. Member for Nuneaton (Mr. Leslie Huckfield).

Mr. Huckfield: Will the hon. Gentleman accept that I am most grateful that he feels he has to write to me yet again? Will he accept that this hospital ought to have been put on sale with at least outline planning permission for possible hotel development, particularly when local planning officers had already indicated this would be the case? Would he accept that the hotelier in question got a very cheap bargain and that the hon. Gentleman's Department, through its own negligence, got a very bad one?

Mr. Alison: I shall always write to the hon. Gentleman when he writes to me. So far as the bad bargain is concerned, a reserve price was set by the


district valuer at the auction, and that price took into account the possibility of the development of the building as a hotel.

Sick Persons (Services)

Mr. Ashley: asked the Secretary of State for Social Services what proposals he has to improve services available to the aged sick who are not in hospital.

Mr. Alison: We are currently holding a series of regional conferences specifically to encourage local health authorities to continue developing their services, including services for the elderly, in the period before reorganisation of the National Health Service.

Mr. Ashley: I appreciate that reply, but, in view of the general lack of information about old people, the different kinds of welfare, domiciliary care and sheltered housing facilities, would the hon. Gentleman institute a special inquiry into the circumstances of old people, on the same lines as the inquiry which has just been undertaken into the problems of disabled people?

Mr. Alison: No doubt the hon. Gentleman is aware that Section 45 of the Health Services and Public Health Act, 1968, which gives local authorities specific powers to make arrangements for the welfare of the elderly, was brought into force on 1st April. In connection with this we are issuing a circular which advocate comprehensive experiments in limited areas in the first instance, and many authorities will no doubt conduct surveys in such areas covering all elderly people.

Dr. Stuttaford: Although his reply is quite satisfactory, is the Minister aware that in a written reply to me he said that he considered it adequate nursing care to leave a totally paralysed woman of nearly 70 lying in her own bed for six days attended only by a district nurse and unattended for some 16 hours during the day? Would my hon. Friend like one of his own constituents, or one of his own family, to be treated in this way?

Mr. Alison: I had hoped that the extremely encouraging and conciliatory letter I sent my hon. Friend today would have pre-empted that rather sharp supplementary question. I do not believe the lady in question has suffered to the extent he has suggested.

Dr. Stuttaford: I do.

Mr. Alfred Morris: Is the hon. Gentle man aware that, although there have been some excellent achievements, progress in implementing the Chronically Sick and Disabled Persons Act, 1970, in the localities is still decidedly uneven? What does he now propose to do to ensure the full and humane implementation of the Act as it affects the elderly and home-bound sick? In what terms and with what guidance to local authorities will Section 1 of the Act be implemented in October this year?

Mr. Alison: I cannot comment about the alleged unevenness, although this is a risk inherent in the delegation of powers to local authorities. My right hon. Friend intends shortly to give guidance to local authorities on carrying out their duties under Section 1, which will come into force on 1 st October, and on development of services under Section 2.

Mr. Crawshaw: Would the Minister agree that every aged person who wishes to remain at home ought to be allowed to do so provided he can get the basic services? Having regard to the economic aspects, surely every pound spent on giving help which will keep a person out of hospital in the long run will save money.

Mr. Alison: I take the point. Local authorities possess adequate powers to supply all the required services to people in their homes.

Retirement Pensions

Mr. Thomas Cox: asked the Secretary of State for Social Services how many letters his Department has received on the increase in state pensions, which is to take place in September.

The Under-Secretary of State for Health and Social Security (Mr. Paul Dean): This information is not available.

Mr. Cox: In spite of the fact that the information is not available, I am sure that the hon. Gentleman is aware of the deep concern which many retired people are expressing about the continued fall in their living standards. Unfortunately, because of the continual rise in the cost of living, with more in the pipeline, the pension increase next September will do very little to improve their situation. Therefore, will the hon. Gentleman give a pledge to retired people that early in the New Year there will be a full review by the Department of the real value of the pension which people are then in receipt of?

Mr. Dean: The hon. Gentleman is being far too pessimistic. The increase in the pension of £1 is the largest increase ever. It will more than restore the purchasing power of the pension. No fewer than 10 million people will benefit next month to the tune of an additional £600 million.

Mr. Alfred Morris: rose—

Mr. Speaker: Order. The Question related to the number of letters received and the answer was, "None". I think I was in error in calling the hon. Member for Wandsworth, Central (Mr. Cox) for a supplementary question.

Hospital Casualty Units

Mr. Hugh Jenkins: 

Mr. Alison: We do not have information on which to base a detailed comparison of this kind, but my right hon. Friend is fully aware of the need for improvement both in premises and in staffing. Hospital boards have been asked to aim at faster progress in improving accident and emergency services, and my Department is discussing medical staffing problems with the profession.

Mr. Jenkins: The answer indicates a proper awareness that there is a serious

problem here. In order to bring about some correction and to give added urgency to the improvements of which the hon. Gentleman has indicated the need, would it not be desirable to have some more facts? If that information were to disclose that the situation of the treatment of casualties is getting worse, that there are long delays between people having an accident and receiving treatment, would not this be a good reason to look into the matter with even greater urgency than the hon. Gentleman has indicated?

Mr. Alison: We are looking into the matter with great urgency. The switch in emphasis towards well-equipped and highly-developed central accident and emergency centres often means that, although delay may arise, more people are dealt with more satisfactorily and fully in those centres.

General Medical Practitioners

Dr. Miller: 

Mr. Alison: As the reply consists of a table of figures, I will, with permission, circulate it in the OFFICIAL REPORT.

Dr. Miller: I shall read the figures with great anticipation. As these payments are intended for practitioners to supply and be able to employ assistants in order to give their patients better services, will the hon. Gentleman encourage the grouping together of doctors so that they can increase the services which they provide for patients? What steps is he taking to encourage group practice and to further the building of health centres for this purpose?

Mr. Alison: The hon. Gentleman is right in pinpointing the question of health centres as one of the most important factors. Substantially increased expenditure, as he knows, is forecast for their development over the next few years. This is only one of the aspects of encouragement that we are giving to the development of


group practices, the number of which is growing steadily.

DIRECT PAYMENTS MADE TO GENERAL MEDICAL PRACTITIONERS IN ENGLAND AND WALES IN RESPECT OF ANCILLARY ASSISTANCE


Year ended 31st March (i)

Total payments £m. (ii)
Number of practices claiming† in quarter ended 30th September (iii)
Column (ii) Column (iii) £ (iv)
Total unrestricted principals providing general medical services‡ 1st October (v)
Column (ii) Column (v) £ (vi)


1966–67
…
…
0·8§
*
*
19,832
40§


1967–68
…
…
3·7
6,851
540
19,837
185


1968–69
…
…
4·7
7,080
665
19,957
235


1969–70
…
…
5·8
7,297
795
20,133
290


1970–71
…
…
70
7,354
950
20,357
345


1971–72
…
…
8·11||
*
*
20,529¶
395


* Figure not available.


† Information about the number of principals in these practices is not available.


‡ This column includes principals who do not employ ancillary staff.


§ Represents one quarter's payment only.


|| Estimated figure.


¶ At 1st April. 1971

De-toxification Units

Mr. Fowler: 

Mr. Alison: We hope to arrange for two or three experimental centres to be set up as part of the hospital service. Hospital boards have been invited to put forward proposals. So far, four proposals have been received and are being considered by my Department.

Mr. Fowler: While I thank my hon. Friend for that reply, I want to stress the urgency of this situation. Does he not agree that such treatment units could make a considerable contribution in tackling the problem of drunken offenders? Would it not as well take the burden off the prisons which at the moment have to deal with them?

Mr. Alison: I take the point, but we are bound to hasten slowly in this because the establishment of a de-toxification centre requires considerable planning locally, including the provision of hostels and other associated services.

Welfare Foods and Milk

Dr. Stuttaford: 

Following is the information:

Sir K. Joseph: The number of persons in England entitled to free welfare milk and vitamins, apart from those in receipt of supplementary benefit, was increased under the Welfare Food Order. 1971, from an estimated 327,000 to an estimated 420,000. About 230,000 persons receiving supplementary benefit also have an entitlement.
On present evidence it is estimated that the number not receiving supplementary benefit who are taking up their entitlement has increased by about one-third from an estimated 166,000 to an estimated 220,000. The grand total of persons taking up their entitlement, including those receiving supplementary benefit but after making a deduction to allow for the fact that some of these have an entitlement as large families, is estimated at 420,000 out of an estimated number entitled of 650,000.

Dr. Stuttaford: Is my right hon. Friend aware that these figures are very satisfactory but that he must continue his publicity efforts and even increase them, as nourishment obtained in these early years is among the factors which determine the future stature and health of the adult? Although one is pleased by the present take-up, will he continue his publicity efforts so that the number still further increases?

Sir K. Joseph: We want to raise the proportion, but I remind my hon. Friend that all those on the family income supplement with children below school age


will be entitled, and their number will have to be added to the figures I have just given him.

Prescription Charges

Dame Irene Ward: 

Sir K. Joseph: I assume that my hon. Friend is referring to people other than the approximately 23 million people covered by the wide automatic exemptions for children under 15; people aged 65 and over; people receiving supplementary benefit or family income supplement; patients suffering from specified medical conditions; expectant and nursing mothers; and war pensioners for their accepted disablements. The number of exemption certificates issued in Great Britain in the 13 weeks ended 22nd June, 1971, to people who applied for them—[HON. MEMBERS: "TOO long."]—I apologise for the length of the reply, but the Question requires a full answer and it cannot be given quickly—on grounds of income was about 44,000, more than 10 times as many as during the preceeding three months. No reliable estimate can be made of the number of people who, during any period, both need prescriptions and are eligible for exemptions on income grounds.

Dame Irene Ward: Does my right hon. Friend agree—I am sure that he does—that it is a difficult estimate to make, in view of all the difficulties which his Department seems to have, which is understandable, in finding all the people whom we are anxious to help? Would it not be rather a good idea to ask the Prime Minister's think tank—[HON. MEMBERS: "Sink tank!"]—which probably has much more time than my right hon. Friend, to look into the matter of estimating and finding those who are in need, because we certainly want to help them far more than all those odd people sitting opposite?

Sir K. Joseph: I take all my hon. Friend's suggestions very seriously indeed. But we are here faced with the problem which the Labour Government had, of trying to get into the hands of minorities the help which hon. Members on both sides

of the House want to get to them. This is a question of persisting in our efforts.

Dr. Summerskill: Will the right hon. Gentleman assure the House that he has now repented for the sin of his plans for the infamous cost-related prescription charge scheme, that those plans have now been permanently abandoned, and that he will not attempt to replace them by an increase in the basic prescription charge?

Sir K. Joseph: That does not arise immediately from the Question. I am still considering the outcome of the rational dialogue which I undertook to have with the professions.

Occupational Pensions

Sir B. Rhys Williams: 

Mr. Dean: I can assure my hon. Friend that we are planning to publish our proposals for the preservation of occupational pension rights as soon as possible.

Sir B. Rhys Williams: Will my hon. Friend bear in mind that, while Parliament delays, people changing jobs are losing their pension rights at the rate of £100,000 every working day? While we look forward to the Government's White Paper on the future conduct of occupational pension schemes, does he agree that where existing accrued rights in these schemes are concerned there is no reason for action not being taken at once?

Mr. Dean: Yes. I am glad that my hon. Friend has drawn attention to that matter. We hope that the growing number of firms providing for this already will continue to do so.

Mr. O'Malley: As each year that passes without legislation means that thousands of people are being deprived of future income in retirement, why do not the Government show a little more urgency on this matter?
On the question of the protection of pension rights, do not the Government believe that the time has now arrived when there should be legislation to insist that private occupational pension


schemes, many of which are bad and provide little dependency cover, should have minimum standards as defined by the Government rather than provide the bad schemes we see too often today?

Mr. Dean: I assure the House that, unlike the Labour Government, this Government will not take five years to produce their plans.

War Widows' Pensions

Mrs. Kellett-Bowman: 

Mr. Dean: Increases in war widows' pensions of at least £1·30 a week will be paid to about 100,000 war widow pensioners this September.

Mrs. Kellett-Bowman: I thank my hon. Friend for that reply. As there is a war memorial village in my constituency, I have more than the average number of widows in this category who will be particularly grateful for this assistance.

Mr. Dean: I am obliged to my hon. Friend. I am sure that she is aware that we are also introducing two new improved aspects of benefits for war widows in September.

National Health Service Reorganisation

Mr. Arthur Lewis: 

Sir K. Joseph: 19th July; the letter contained comments on my proposals for reorganising the National Health Service, with particular reference to London; 27th July; consideration of the comments was promised and the Council's attention was drawn to the existence of the Consultative Group under the chairmanship of my noble Friend the Minister of State which is considering reorganisation in London.

Mr. Lewis: I thank the right hon. Gentleman for that detailed reply. Is

he aware that this council, which is one of the most progressive in the country, has great doubts about the consultative document? Will he assure the House that before taking any action he will give serious consideration to this and any other council's opinions on this subject?

Sir K. Joseph: I share the hon. Gentleman's respect for many of the aspects of Newham's services. I assure him that I shall consider comments received even after the end of July.

Mrs. Shirley Williams: Since the Secretary of State has been reported at least once as having said that on all aspects of the consultative document he has made up his mind, will he assure the House that it is still open for consultation on all the major points which were put before the public?

Sir K. Joseph: Except for what is in summary called unification and the date of unification, that is so.

Oral Answers to Questions — CENTRAL POLICY REVIEW STAFF

Mr. Lipton: 

The Prime Minister (Mr. Edward Heath): The annual salary cost is £98,000. There are twenty-four staff, including 11 secretarial and other supporting grades.

Mr. Lipton: In order to enable us to know whether we are getting value for money, will the Prime Minister go a bit further and list the names of the persons employed, the salaries that they are drawing, and the extent to which the work they are doing could equally well be done by the Permanent Under-Secretaries in the various Departments?

The Prime Minister: The answer to the last part of the hon. Gentleman's supplementary question is "No". The unit was created for a specific purpose as part of the Cabinet Office, and it is carrying out that work. As to the members and the salaries that they are paid, the names of the senior appointments were announced as they were made, as were the salaries that they were to receive.


Details of the rest of the appointments will appear in the standard works of reference.

Mr. Hugh Jenkins: As we are told that the work of this unit includes examining the feasibility of the Concorde project, what is so secretive about it? Why cannot the right hon. Gentleman tell us a little more about what it is doing? If it is true that it is proposing to recommend against Concorde, will he guarantee that that recommendation will be published?

The Prime Minister: The advice given by Departments to Ministers is never published. As this unit is part of the Cabinet Secretariat, it would be quite wrong if the advice which it gives to Ministers were made public. Ministers must take responsibility for decisions, and the advice which the unit gives them will be taken into account together with other advice.

Oral Answers to Questions — FOREIGN SECRETARY (SPEECH)

Mr. Joel Barnett: 

The Prime Minister: Yes, Sir: and in particular that part which read:
A vote for the Socialists now would mean S.E.T. back again—the reductions in taxation cancelled—the Industrial Relations Bill taken off the Statute Book and Mr. Wilson on our backs again as Prime Minister. Let us banish such nightmares and get on with the business of restoring the nation's fortunes.

Mr. Barnett: Is the Prime Minister aware that economic experts other than the Foreign Secretary are unable to interpret the Government's changes in policy quite so easily? For example, do the Government intend to pursue a prices and incomes policy to sustain the 3 to 3½ per cent. growth in the March Budget or the 4 to 4½ per cent. growth planned in the July mini-Budget?

The Prime Minister: The C.B.I, has taken its own initiative on prices, and any initiative which the T.U.C. may take in response to that will be warmly welcomed.

Oral Answers to Questions — EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY

Mr. Skinner: 

The Prime Minister: About 5,000 since the General Election.

Mr. Skinner: Is the Prime Minister aware that he has now been urged by one of his colleagues to write a letter calling for a General Election on the Common Market? Does he realise that if he did this he would be carrying out the pledges given in the Tory General Election manifesto, that he would be carrying out the wishes of the vast majority of the British people and that, what is more important, he would also be carrying out the wishes of many hon. Members on this side, including the National Executive Committee of the Labour Party, who believe that a General Election should be called?

The Prime Minister: If I wanted any inducement, the last part of the hon. Gentleman's question is the last thing I should want.

Mr. Tom Boardman: Have a number of those letters confirmed that industry as a whole welcomes entry into the Common Market and that it recognises that the larger market will produce great benefits to all sections of the nation in terms of employment and otherwise?

The Prime Minister: The views expressed in the letters vary, but the C.B.I. has expressed its support, from the side of industry, for entry into Europe, and I notice that the chairmen and directors of many firms have publicly stated that that is their position, too.

Dr. Gilbert: 

The Prime Minister: After the Ministerial negotiating meeting with the European Economic Community in Luxembourg at the end of June, President


Nixon sent me a message of congratulations. In it he referred to the long and consistent support of the United States for enlargement of the Community, and to his belief that the historic decisions reached reflected a determination on the part of all concerned to lead Western Europe to that unity which will permit it to play its proper rôle in world affairs.

Dr. Gilbert: I thank the right hon. Gentleman for that detailed reply. May I ask whether he has noticed the recent ominous growth in protectionist sentiment in the United States, in the Administration, in Congress, and in the trade union and management sides of industry? Would he therefore consider calling, if not a full formal conference, at least for informal conversations with our major trading partners to ensure that these developments are reversed as soon as possible?

The Prime Minister: I think the hon. Gentleman's remarks are too wide-sweeping. There has been an increase in protectionist sentiment in certain parts of the United States. This arose in the first instance from the problems of textiles and shoes, not from trade with the Community. The amount of agricultural trade which the United States has with the Community has almost doubled in the last 10 years. I accept that one must do everything that one can to prevent protectionist sentiment from growing. The Community takes the view that after enlargement it would be right to have discussions on this matter, and I think that that is the best way of going about it.

Mr. Selwyn Gummer: Would my right hon. Friend agree that it would be greatly to the benefit of Anglo-American relationships if Great Britain were to make every effort to ensure that she was a strong partner within the unification of Europe?

The Prime Minister: I think that that is not only our view but the view of the President and the Administration.

Mr. Harold Wilson: We have supported the right hon. Gentleman, as he supported us, on all matters affecting the development of industrial protectionism in the United States, but is he aware of the growing feeling in the United States, expressed by members of the United States Cabinet, and most recently in Britain by Senator Humphrey, a former

Vice-President, about American reactions to the degree of protectionism in Europe in agricultural matters? Has the right hon. Gentleman studied the statement made by Senator Humphrey in London last Friday, and has he any comments to make on it?

The Prime Minister: I saw the statement by Senator Humphrey. When he was Vice-President, he and the Administration supported the enlargement of the Community. He therefore, as I understand it, has always supported the policy which we are trying to carry through, just as much as does the present Administration. As to protectionism in agriculture, I have stated the increase in American sales to the Community. In the last 10 years, 1961 to 1971 they have just about doubled. The United States also has interests in agriculture and in agricultural support. What one requires is an open association recognising this between the United States and the enlarged Community.

Mr. Harold Wilson: In the message which the Prime Minister received from President Nixon, having regard to recent statements on this question by members of President Nixon's Cabinet, does the President accept the degree of protectionism against the third world, the outside world, be it New Zealand or the United States, which is implicit in the negotiations and is the result of the negotiations for which the right hon. Gentleman is responsible?

The Prime Minister: In the message, the contents of which I have given to the House, there is full support for the enlargement of the Community, and no detailed questions were raised about its agricultural policy. When the right hon. Gentleman talks about the protectionism of the Community, he should remember that its common tariff is lower than our tariff, and that the help that it gives to associated countries is much greater than the help that we are able to give. As far as agricultural protection is concerned, we do it through support prices, and the Community does it through the levy system.

Mr. Meacher: 

The Prime Minister: About 5,000 between the General Election and when I answered Question No. 3: but a few more may have arrived since then.

Mr. Meacher: What credible assurances can the Prime Minister give to retirement pensioners and low-paid workers about the cost to them of entry into Europe when the Government's whole pension increase at present is being eroded by price rises even before it is received and when the family income supplement today is worth precisely 4p per week per person entitled?

The Prime Minister: We have given a specific pledge on social service benefits in the White Paper, and it will be dealt with in the biennial review. That review is due to take place in the spring of 1973. Price increases in food resulting from entry into the Community will not be taking place until the spring and summer of 1973.

Oral Answers to Questions — GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS (SECURITY)

Mr. William Hamilton: 

Mr. Leslie Huckfield: 

The Prime Minister: I have nothing to add to my statement of 17th June.

Mr. Hamilton: As the right hon. Gentleman has confirmed the report in The Guardian of 26th July that four people had been arrested, can he say whether any of those four were associated with activities within foreign embassies, and to what extent foreign embassies are being investigated by Scotland Yard in this connection?

The Prime Minister: It has been publicly announced that arrests have been made, and charges made, too. In that respect these matters are sub judice, and I think the hon. Gentleman will agree that it would be improper for me to comment on any aspects of the activities of those concerned.

Mr. Huckfield: Is the Prime Minister aware that there is increasing evidence

that information from Government Departments—and this includes information on private individuals—is finding its way into the hands of private firms, local authorities and all sorts of people who have no right to that information? Is it not about time that certain changes in practice were instituted, and when is the right hon. Gentleman going to do something about it?

The Prime Minister: I have announced to the House the changes that we have made in practice. If the hon. Gentleman—or any other hon. Member—gives me information of the kind that he has cited it will immediately be inquired into. When the matters were raised by The Guardian immediate action was taken, and, as a result of police inquiries, further legal action has been taken. I cannot now comment on that, or take further action until the cases have been disposed of.

Mr. Harold Wilson: Will the Prime Minister recognise that no one will expect him to make any statement on matters that are sub judice, but should there be any further development as a result of the Government's investigation, following the statement in The Guardian, will he undertake to keep the House informed while we are sitting, and during the recess, if there is anything about which he thinks the House ought to be informed, will he use the methods available to him to make a public statement so that hon. Members can know what the situation is?
Further, while the Prime Minister cannot comment on any individual cases before the courts now, or on any further cases that there may be, should he decide that it is desirable to make further changes in the machinery of Government to deal with this problem, will he make an early statement, even if the House is not sitting?

The Prime Minister: I am prepared to give all those assurances. If anything emerges either from the tribunal that is now sitting or as a result of the cases to be heard in the courts we can act immediately to prevent any recurrence of it, and I shall state publicly exactly what we have done.

Mr. Biggs-Davison: On a security matter which is no longer sub judice, may I ask the Prime Minister whether he is satisfied that his predecessor did justice


in the case of Colonel Lohan, and has he any further inquiry in mind?

The Prime Minister: I have no comment to make on that.

Oral Answers to Questions — UNEMPLOYMENT (DEPARTMENTAL CO-ORDINATION)

Mr. Ashley: 

The Prime Minister: Yes, Sir. There is already close co-ordination between all Departments concerned with the problems of unemployment.

Mr. Ashley: Is the Prime Minister aware that 829,000 people in the dole queue today will receive that reply with unalloyed rapture? But, if the coordination is so marvellous, can the right hon. Gentleman explain why only 17,000 of those people are receiving any kind of Government-sponsored retraining?

The Prime Minister: I am anxious that more retraining should be accepted. There is space available. On 20th July my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Employment announced further measures to increase the amount of Government training. In particular, he announced that the training allowance would be substantially increased from 27th September. Employers in every region have been asked directly to use any spare capacity in their factories for the retraining of workers.

Mr. Idris Owen: Would my right hon. Friend be prepared to receive a deputation from the North-West Industrial Development Association to discuss the subject of unemployment in the North-West?

The Prime Minister: As I have told the House, the association has been in communication with me. It has sent me a memorandum, which we have studied carefully, and I have replied to the association that I should be delighted to meet it to discuss this issue on the next occasion that I am in the Northwest.

Mr. Loughlin: Will the Prime Minister recognise that his lethargic nonchalance is of no value to the 829,000 people now unemployed?

The Prime Minister: The hon. Gentleman's remarks bear no relationship to reality. The whole purpose of my right hon. Friend's measures, and those of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, was to inject greater demand into the economy and to improve employment.

Mr. Loughlin: Stick to your yacht !

CHARTER FLIGHTS

Mr. Mason (by Private Notice): Mr. Mason (by Private Notice) asked the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry if he will make a statement about the inquiry that he has ordered into illegal charter flight operations and the reported compliance with such operations by his officials.

The Minister for Trade (Mr. Michael Noble): I have been informed that a general allegation has been made against an officer of the Department. It is now being investigated by one of our senior inspectors. Naturally, I take any such allegation—from whatever source it may come—seriously, but the right hon. Gentleman will appreciate that it is very easy to make mischief by allegation of this kind. The allegation is of a general character and I have not the slightest reason to believe that there is any truth in it.

Mr. Mason: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that I sincerely hope that the allegation is without foundation? However, if, as he says, there is no truth in it, why did not he take steps immediately to squash the leading Press story which has placed so many of his officials under a cloud of suspicion? Why has it taken nearly four days before he has made any statement?
Secondly, when this inquiry is concluded, will the right hon. Gentleman be making a public report or a public statement?
Finally, has the right hon. Gentleman instituted any inquiry at all into these illegal charter flight operations and the possible collusion between ticket shops and operators?

Mr. Noble: The answer to the first of the right hon. Gentleman's supplementary questions is that it is impossible to deal immediately with any allegation that may appear in the Press or elsewhere, especially when it is of a very general nature, as the right hon. Gentleman now knows this was.
On his second question, if the inquiry produces evidence on which action should be taken, the appropriate action will immediately be taken. If there is no such evidence, quite clearly no report should be made in this House or elsewhere.
On the third question, our enforcement officers continue to check charter flights. Recently we have had some successful prosecutions, and we shall continue our checks so long as these undesirable features of charter operations continue.

Mr. Kenneth Lewis: In view of a report that appeared at the weekend, it is clear that these allegations were quite disgraceful and should never have been made in the first place. However, in order to ease the public's mind on the obvious chaotic situation that exists at the moment with these clubs and charter flights, will my right hon. Friend seek an early opportunity to indicate what his Ministry's policy will be on this matter? Does he agree that it is better to keep on prosecuting the maximum number of these clubs—in order to make it clear to them that they cannot continue this kind of operation—than to allow the matter to drift?

Mr. Noble: That is a rather wider question, but I can tell my hon. Friend that we are certainly continuing both with the checks and with discussions with our international colleagues in the aviation business. It is clearly essential that approximately the same rules should apply at both ends of a flight.
As for prosecutions, we shall bring forward as many as we can, consistent with obtaining proper evidence. That is as far as I can go at the moment.

Mr. Leslie Huckfield: Does the right hon. Gentleman agree that the noise and pandemonium which these regulations are causing is reducing our airports to secondhand knackers' yards? Will he not now agree that these sets of rules and regulations cannot be continually

enforced? Will he therefore set about negotiating a decent bilateral charter agreement with the United States which will give the ordinary man in the street his chance to fly to some far-away places?

Mr. Noble: Questions on this subject are already on the Order Paper, and I shall be answering them in due course. Certainly we shall continue to discuss vigorously with other countries—as we are at the moment—ways of stopping the trouble that is arising.

Mr. Adley: I do not wish to be associated with any of the wild charges that have been made, but does not my right hon. Friend agree that the problem arises from the domination of I.A.T.A. by American carriers? That is the source of the problem. In view of the possible enlargement of the European Community, will he give serious consideration to the creation of a European Air Transportation Association?

Mr. Noble: In this matter I am prepared to consider anything. My hon. Friend is quite right in saying that agreement in I.A.T.A. is an essential first step in getting this situation put right.

PERSONAL STATEMENT

Mr. Benn: Mr. Speaker, at the end of the debate last night, I raised a point of order to give notice that I should be seeking an amendment of one word attributed to me in the OFFICIAL REPORT in the debate on the Consolidated Fund which I believed to be a misprint. The word printed was "merit" instead of "meaning", which I believed that I had said.
This may have led to a complete misunderstanding of the sense of my remarks, which I have since sought to correct elsewhere. However, the shorthand writer's note being clear for "merit", you have not felt able to accede to my request for correction, and I absolutely accept your decision.
Since I may, quite unintentionally and in good faith, have misled you by my point of order, I should like to apologise unreservedly to you and the House.

Mr. Speaker: I am grateful to the right hon. Member.

Orders of the Day — INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS BILL

[4TH ALLOTTED DAY]

Lords Amendments considered.

3.38 p.m.

Mrs. Barbara Castle: On a point of order, Mr. Speaker, at the outset of these proceedings, which are on the last day but one that the Bill will be before the House, I should like to raise with you a serious matter arising from the debates in another place. This relates to an Amendment which the Government have made de facto to the Bill without any written Amendment being in front of us to enable us to discuss it. I am referring to the provision to fine the trade union movement a sum of up to £5 million for failure to register as a result of the withdrawal of tax reliefs from their provident funds.
In Committee in the House my hon. Friends and I put forward an Amendment to deal with that situation. We were assured by the Secretary of State that such an Amendment was not necessary. He also assured us that if the Amendment were necessary it would be made. It is clear from the discussion in another place that that is the effect of the present provisions of the Bill. I see that the right hon. Member opposite nods.
It is now clear that the trade union movement has been advised on the highest legal authority that that will be the effect that non-registration will have on their provident funds and that tax relief will not be available to them, as the right hon. Gentleman assured the House it would.
As the right hon. Gentleman's honour is involved, and as, no doubt, unwittingly, the House of Commons was misled on this matter, may I appeal to him through you, Mr. Speaker, to seize this last opportunity to put this matter right before the discussions on the Bill are completed?

The Secretary of State for Employment (Mr. Robert Carr): The right hon. Lady gave me no prior warning that she intended to raise this point. In my belief,

the guidance that I gave did not mislead the House. I still believe that there is no insuperable obstacle to a trade union separating off its provident fund activities into a separate activity, and that therefore what I said was correct. But, as I say, I have had no warning of this, so I have had no chance to look at it again.

Mrs. Castle: Further to that point of order. I have given the right hon. Gentleman two days' warning, in the sense that we still have two days of debate on the Bill. May I therefore appeal to him again, through you, Mr. Speaker, to consider this matter further, taking further advice, and, if he finds that there is any doubt about the value of the assurances that he gave the House in Committee, to put the matter right in the time left to us?

Mr. Speaker: The right hon. Lady having said that, it all seems highly irregular.

Clause 22

FAIR AND UNFAIR DISMISSAL

Lords Amendment: No. 48, in page 17, leave out lines 3 to 7 and insert—
'(1) In determining for the purposes of this Act whether the dismissal of an employee was fair or unfair, it shall be for the employer to show—

(a) what was the reason (or, if there was more than one, the principal reason) for dismissal, and
(b) that it was a reason falling within the next following subsection, or some other substantial reason of a kind such as to justify the dismissal of an employee holding the position which that employee held.
(1A) In subsection (1)(b) of this section the reference to a reason falling within this subsection is a reference to a reason which'.

Order read for resuming adjourned debate on Question proposed [2nd August] on consideration of the Lords Amendments, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.

Question again proposed.

3.42 p.m.

The Solicitor-General (Sir Geoffrey Howe): When the House rose last night, I was replying to the debate on this


Amendment and had not sought the leave of the House to make that reply. Therefore, with the permission of the House, perhaps I may now continue my reply to the debate.
I had almost finished answering the point raised by my hon. Friend the Member for Tynemouth (Dame Irene Ward) and I had explained that, under the Bill, an employer will not be able, by dismissal, to do anything to compel membership of a union of his choice or of the union's choice except under the conditions laid down, where the approved closed shop has been established on the conditions specified in Schedule 1, or where an agency shop has been established and then only if the worker refuses to contribute to the agency union.
This means that, if a particular union has persuaded the Commission on Industrial Relations to approve a unit as one which it should seek to represent, and if that union has secured the support of the workers in the union, so that an agency shop has been established, then a non-member of the successful union can be required to contribute to the agency union, but cannot—this answers the point of the right hon. Member for Blackburn (Mrs. Castle)—be required to belong to that union and remains free to remain a member of the union of his own choice.
I welcome the recognition of the hon. and learned Member for Leicester, North-West (Mr. Greville Janner) of the importance of these provisions. He discussed a number of difficulties inherent in any unfair dismissal scheme—difficulties which were considered by both the present Government and our predecessors, difficulties which, if they exist, are common to both schemes, which are on similar lines, and which I am sure the House would feel should not stand in the way of the introduction of these proposals.
The hon. and learned Gentleman suggested that it was regrettable that it was only after a two-year qualifying period that a worker should be entitled to take advantage of the unfair dismissal provisions, but that is the preliminary stage. The qualifying period may be shortened hereafter, once the size of the case load has been ascertained. There was a similar provision in the Bill introduced by the

right hon. Lady at the end of the last Parliament.
The hon. and learned Gentleman mentioned the possibility that dismissals might take place just before the expiry of the two-year period in order to escape the provisions of the Bill. If that is so—it should not be assumed that it is—it is in line with the provisions already operating under the redundancy payments scheme, and there is no evidence that it has been taken advantage of in that way.
The hon. and learned Member also suggested that documented cases to justify unfair dismissal might prove cumbersome before the industrial tribunals, and implied that this might be encouraged by the availability of legal aid. But, as he will remember—I think that he raised the point in an earlier debate—legal aid would be available not before the industrial tribunals, under this or under the previous Bill, but before the Industrial Relations Court.
In fact, of course, if an employer, in order to justify a dismissal, has to produce a documented statement setting out what he is complaining of and why he is seeking to dismiss an employee, that is, on the whole, regarded in industry as to the good, because it means that he cannot merely launch bland assertions with which to justify his dismissal.
The hon. and learned Gentleman also suggested that a settlement as a result of conciliation of an unfair dismissal claim was not admissible under Clause 153. That point is fair in relation to the Bill as it left this House in March, but has been taken into account by the provisions of Lords Amendment No. 259.
Going back to some extent over old ground, the hon. and learned Member also argued that it would be possible for an employer to get away with the dismissal of a troublemaker and to buy him off for a maximum of £4,000. But of course, that is a great deal better than the present position, under which the "troublemaker" unfairly dismissed has no claim to compensation or benefit at all. In other words, the scales are now tilted against the employer even in this situation.

Mr. Greville Janner: Is the position now to be that


a settlement will be permitted only if it has the blessing of the conciliation officer concerned, or will the settlements, in the hon. and learned Gentleman's view, be permitted where there is no such blessing? My understanding of this is that, even as the provision is amended, the conciliation officer will have to approve of any settlement.

The Solicitor-General: I think that the conciliation officer will have to have been brought into it in the sense that he will have had to be notified. It is the object of the scheme that any claim of this kind should be notified to the conciliation officer. There were similar provisions in the last Government's Bill relating to the notification of a conciliation officer. Everyone is anxious to see that claims of this kind particularly should be resolved by conciliation rather than by litigation if at all possible.
The last point that the hon. Gentleman raised relates to the first point raised by the hon. Member for Manchester, Black-ley (Mr. Rose), about the extent to which it is possible that an employer might be tempted to dismiss summarily in order to show that he was dismissing on good and substantial grounds, and thereby avoid the softer option of dismissal on notice.
One cannot dispute that, under this scheme or under the arrangements contained in the last Government's Bill, that would be a theoretical possibility. The essence of the protection provided for the worker there, as in every other dismissal situation from now on, is that he would be able to challenge such a summary dismissal and secure a remedy from the industrial tribunal.
The effectiveness of that remedy depends, of course, upon the extent to which he can establish his claim before the tribunal. That is where we come to the point which is common to both hon. Members—about the adequacy of the provisions in relation to the reasonableness or unreasonableness of the dismissal. The hon. Member for Blackley, I think, suggested that the provision of Lords Amendment No. 48 required the employer only to establish the fact or existence of a reason and did not give the tribunal notice of the extent to which the sufficiency of the reason had also to be considered. In fact, one must look at

Amendment No. 48 with Amendment No. 50. The employer has to show what was the reason and that it was one of the listed reasons; and then, under Amendment No. 50, once the existence of the reason has been established, the tribunal still has to consider
whether in the circumstances he "—
the employer—
acted reasonably or unreasonably in treating it as a sufficient reason for dismissing the employee.
That is intended to meet the same point as was met by Clause 35(3) of the Labour Government's Bill, save for the fact that in that case the dismissal was not held to be unfair unless the tribunal was satisfied that the employer acted unreasonably in dismissing the employee. Under those provisions unreasonableness rested with the employee to establish, whereas under Amendment No. 50 the burden of proof is left open, so that, if anything, it is easier for the dismissed worker to establish that the employer acted unreasonably in dismissing him.
We cannot go as far as the hon. Member for Manchester, Blackley would wish in maintaining the presumption of redundancy in the case of a mixed claim—a claim on the ground of redundancy and/or unfairness of dismissal; and Amendment No. 326, which requires the tribunal to decide one way or the other without the existence of a presumption, is in line almost exactly with Clause 50(3) of the Labour Government's Bill.

Mr. Paul B. Rose: I think the hon. and learned Gentleman has misunderstood me. I asked him whether he would apply the principle that applies to redundancy payments to the case of unfair dismissal, and thereby create a rebuttable presumption.

The Solicitor-General: I appreciate the distinction which the hon. Gentleman has in mind, and that is the object of the clarification of the burden of the proof that we have undertaken. Once an employee goes before the tribunal and shows that he has been dismissed, it is then for the employer to show the existence of a reason under Amendment No. 48. This puts the employee beyond first base without having the additional complication which was in Clause 35(1) of the Labour Government's Bill.
The next point raised by the hon. Member for Blackley was whether "reasonableness" would be assessed fairly and by objective standards relative to the employee and the job he was doing. I refer the hon. Gentleman to the provisions in Amendment No. 48(1)(b). If the employer is relying on a substantial reason outside those listed in the Clause as it stands, then that must be a
substantial reason of a kind such as to justify the dismissal of an employee holding the position which that employee held".
In other words, rather than being assessed subjectively, the matter must be related to the work that he was doing and considered objectively. In addition, Amendment No. 50 leaves the burden of proof open rather than placing it on the employee in showing whether it was reasonable or unreasonable.
The hon. Gentleman then suggested that a wide area of discretion will exist here. If one looks at Clause 22(1)(a) of the Bill and then at Clause 22(b), one has the position set out. In the first instance, one of the admissible reasons for dismissal may be
related to the capability or qualifications of the employee for performing work of the kind which he was employed by the employer to do.
Subsection (6) defines "capability". The hon. Member for Blackley expressed anxiety lest that might be regarded as too wide. I answer him in a not very aggressive spirit, and I hope in a modestly defensive one, by saying that those two provisions are taken verbatim from Clause 35(2)(a) and Clause 35(5) of the Labour Government's Bill.

Mr. Rose: Is the hon. and learned Gentleman aware that that Measure was a Bill in draft, had not passed through its Committee and Report stages in this House, had not been through the House of Lords, had not returned to this place and, therefore, had not had the benefit of being amended? Will he please answer the point and not keep fobbing me off with reference to an earlier Bill which did not have the benefit of a thorough consideration by Parliament, with the possibility of being improved?

The Solicitor-General: Dear, oh dear! I am sorry that the hon. Gentleman is so sensitive about this. In the spring of

1969 that Bill was in prospect from the then Labour Government.

Mr. Rose: But only in prospect.

The Solicitor-General: In June 1969, the prospect of that Bill was brought to an end and, thereafter, one assumed that for the next 10 months the Labour Government gave the closest consideration to a Bill which they would introduce, which they did, before the General Election. Indeed, the hon. Member for Liverpool, Walton (Mr. Heffer) in earlier debates when attempting to repudiate my arguments on this topic, in which I had referred to "In Place of Strife", described that Measure as one which had had the support of the entire Labour Movement.
I dare say that the Bill was capable of improvement and that it would have been subjected to a mass of amendments both in this House and another place. I am, nevertheless, entitled to make the point that these provisions are in line with the fruits of the deliberations, lasting almost 12 months, of the Labour Government, leading to the publication of these proposals in their Bill.
However, that is not the only defence I offer. The proposals themselves are sensible and acceptable. The employer must show that he is relying on the ground that the dismissal can be justified because it can be
related to the capability or qualifications of the employee for performing work of the kind which he was employed … to do
and "capability" is defined in Clause 22(6)(a)
Of course, the working of these provisions as with the working of any provisions providing a remedy for unfair dismissal, will depend on the objectivity with which the tribunal applies the test of reasonableness as contained in the Bill, as it was contained in the Labour Measure.
I suggest that these provisions are entirely workable, are entirely fair and that the obligations in respect of the burden of proof in this matter are now clearly set out in response to the wishes expressed in another place and in this House by way of the group of Amendments now under consideration.

Question put and agreed to.

Subsequent Lords Amendments agreed to.

Clause 24

DISMISSAL IN CONNECTION WITH A STRIKE OR OTHER INDUSTRIAL ACTION

Lords Amendment: No. 51, in page 19, leave out lines 35 to 40.

Mr. R. Carr: I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.

This Amendment was moved by the Opposition in another place and accepted by the Government. I hope, therefore, that as well as proving non-controversial, it will be welcomed by hon. Gentlemen opposite. A brief explanation of its purpose may be all that is necessary.

Clause 24 lays down that in the event of making dismissals during a strike or irregular industrial action, the employer shall not be liable for a claim for unfair dismissal unless he acts against some of the workers in the group in a discriminating way compared with the rest of the workers in the group, and also unless his reason, or at least his principal reason, for taking dismissal action was on account of the trade union membership activity of the people dismissed prior to the strike or irregular industrial action starting.

The effect of the Amendment is to remove that proviso about the protection only being available to trade union activities prior to the strike beginning. We believe that this is right and that those taking part in a genuine trade union activity should be protected in this way.

I believe that the right hon. Lady and her hon. Friends admit the need, in the event of a strike, of employers having more protection against the charge of unfair dismissal than they have in normal circumstances. Our Clause is more comparable to the equivalent Clause in the right hon. Lady's Bill. Initially, in the right hon. Lady's Bill she, too, had the condition that the trade union action was protected only if it took place before the strike. We understand why she made that provision, just as to begin with we felt that we had to, but I am glad that, on further consideration and as a result of the case put to us in another place, we have felt able to remove this proviso from the Bill. I therefore hope that the Amendment will commend itself to the House.

4.0 p.m.

Mr. Harold Walker: We on this side are getting a little weary of having thrown at us the contents of a Bill which was not debated in the House and which, if it had been debated, would have been subjected to the winnowing and harrowing processes of Parliament. Further, the provision to which the right hon. Gentleman has referred was in an entirely different context. Our unfair dismissal procedure was in no way linked with Clause 5.
However, I welcome the Amendment. The Secretary of State really should not drape himself in virtue as he appears to be doing. He should acknowledge that it was the action of the workers' representatives at the I.L.O. General Conference in June, 1971, which was the principal influence in bringing about this change in another place. It is an odd and cutting criticism of the Bill, which the right hon. Gentleman so often presents to the House as a Bill to protect and extend workers' rights, that in the same month as he presents that argument in the House of Commons in London the I.L.O. in Geneva proves that it is exactly the contrary and moves in the opposite direction by passing a recommendation which obliges the right hon. Gentleman to ask the House to agree with this Amendment.

Mr. R. Carr: I am not quite sure that I understand the point that the hon. Gentleman makes. I am sometimes accused of not being prepared to consult, which is not true. Then it is somehow wrong when, although the unions refuse to confer with me, I, having listened to views which have been expressed, act upon them. I do not feel in any way ashamed of listening to advice from workers' representatives or from anybody else, provided that it is good advice and worthy of being taken seriously.

Mr. Norman Buchan: I seek a little clarification. It cannot be said that I have intervened frequently during the proceedings on the Bill. I do not know if the right hon. Gentleman is right in saying that this matter would have been the subject of previous legislation. In my few excursions into these debates that seems to have been said on almost every occasion. What I am sure of is that any legislation produced by my right hon. and hon. Friends would not


be couched in the way that this Clause is.

The Amendment helps by removing something from the Clause. I cannot see any trade unionist being able to understand what the Clause as it stands means. This is related to Clause 22(2) which provides that
the dismissal of an employee by an employer shall be regarded as having been unfair if the reason for it … was that the employee had exercised, or had indicated his intention to exercise, any of the rights conferred on the employee by section 5(1) … .

Clause 5(1) is the basic establishment of trade union rights, providing that a worker has the right to choose membership of a trade union, to take part in the activities of a trade union, and so on. So far, so good.

Following Clause 22(2) we come on to Clause 24(2) and (3) and to the proviso which is to be deleted. Subsection (2) provides:
If the reason or principal reason for the dismissal was that the claimant took part in the strike or other industrial action, the dismissal shall not be regarded as unfair … .

Those three lines as they stand run counter to Clause 22(2), at any rate in formulation. It is then bound up with the extraordinary proposition in subsection (2)(a)—that is, unless other employees were not so dismissed.

This will not make sense to the trade unionist. If there is a provision as to someone else not having been dismissed, it will seem to a trade unionist that he is being singled out for unfair treatment. I believe that this will lead to a great deal of anxiety on the part of trade unionists. As it stands, the very condition relating to others not being dismissed will seem to a trade unionist to be the very condition which will impose it as being the cause of the action.

Therefore, it is not only that the language of Clauses 5, 22 and 24 is very complex. It is also that the concept which seems to emerge may well cause a great deal of anxiety among trade unionists. It does not by any means make it sufficiently clear merely to cut off one leg from the proviso at the end. All that this does is to narrow the area of confusion.

Mr. R. Carr: By leave of the House, I will seek to reply to the hon. Member

for Renfrew, West (Mr. Buchan). I think that I have understood the point which is worrying him and, if I have, I think that I can put it at rest.
The difference between the situation in Clause 22 and that in Clause 24 is caused by a reason which I thought that I made clear in my brief remarks in introducing the Amendment, namely, that we recognise, as I believe that the Labour Party does, that the situation when industrial action is taking place is different from the situation when it is not. That is why Clause 24 is admittedly different from the other Clauses.
I also apologise for the fact that, because we have all got into the habit of talking, I think rightly, about an action for unfair dismissal, we also talk about things not being unfair rather than their being fair and thus become involved in double negatives which make matters confusing.
I assure the hon. Gentleman that Clause 24 makes it absolutely clear that, if an employer were to discriminate by dismissing in the course of a strike one or more members of a group but not the whole group, he would indeed be open to an action for unfair dismissal. That is absolutely certain. The other thing we say here is that an employer will be open to a claim for unfair dismissal if the principal reason for dismissal is on account of trade union activity. The Clause as originally drafted rendered all this applicable only if the trade union activity took place before the strike began. Now we are deleting that proviso. Trade union activity during the course of the industrial action will also be protected.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 25

EXCLUDED CLASSES OF EMPLOYMENT

Lords Amendment: No. 52, in page 20, line 17, leave out from "employees" to second "at" and insert:
who had been continuously employed for a period of not less than thirteen weeks, whether they are or had been all employed at the same place or are or had been employed".

The Under-Secretary of State for Employment (Mr. Dudley Smith): I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.
This is a small but logical Amendment. It provides that in calculating the aggregate of employees in an undertaking for the purposes of exclusion from the unfair dismissal provisions only employees who have been continuously employed for 13 weeks or more would be taken into account. This would exclude most casual or temporary seasonal workers from the aggregate. The Government consider that only regular workers should be taken into account.
Subsection 1(a) excludes from the right to appeal against unfair dismissal employees in undertakings where there are fewer than four employees at the time of a dismissal. However, representations were made to the Government that under the provision in the Bill regular full-time employees in certain sectors which employed large numbers of casual or seasonal type labour would be excluded for the greater part of the year but would acquire a right of appeal during a comparatively short season where casual workers were employed.
We had an odd situation where protection against unfair dismissal depended in some industries on the vagaries in the weather. If the weather was good and casuals were employed there would be protection for full-time employees, but if the weather was bad there would be no protection afforded for the regular employees. In the Government's view, this is most unsatisfactory and therefore we consider that only regular employees should be taken into account for the purposes of this exclusion and that it would be wrong for casual and temporary seasonal workers to be taken into account.

The Amendment, therefore, excludes from the calculation employees who had not been employed continuously for 13 weeks or more at the time of the dismissal in question. The period of 13 weeks corresponds with the new qualifying period in Clause 17 for an employee's entitlement to a week's notice. We consider that this arrangement is fair and reasonable. It was pressed upon us in another place; after due consideration the Amendment was made and that is why it is before us this afternoon.

Mr. Harold Walker: I shall detain the House only briefly. First, I express my gratitude to the Under-Secretary for not

invoking, for a change, the contents of my right hon. Friend's Bill. Of course, he could not do so this time, because whilst my right hon. Friend's Bill made provision for exclusions, which in this Bill can be varied by order of the Secretary of State, one purpose of this exclusion of establishments employing fewer than four people is to enable the Government to assess the initial case load. It was not intended in my right hon. Friend's Bill to introduce any such qualification as is now proposed.
I recognise the argument that the hon Gentleman has presented. Of course, there are people on the fringe who present problems, and I do not think this point would have gone unrecognised if it had not been drawn to our attention. However, it works both ways. The hon. Gentleman might argue that the purpose of the Amendment is to ensure that the excluded category is kept to the size originally intended and that it is for this reason that action is being taken to prevent any such alteration arising from seasonal factors as those to which he has referred.
I agree that it is an odd sort of justice which hinges on the weather at the time of a man's dismissal. However, as I say, it works both ways. The Government say that it is anomalous that a person who, under the provisions of the Bill, may be denied access to the tribunal for 50 weeks of the year should have the door opened for a fortnight or three weeks, whatever the period is, for, say, hop-picking or the pea harvest, and I can see the sense of that argument.
The hon. Gentleman refers in general terms to cases where the work load fluctuates, causing corresponding swings in the labour force, but where there is a small nucleus of permanent workers, and he says that that situation should be taken into account. But he ignores the other situation where the work load may remain constant but where the labour force may vary considerably. There may be a steady nucleus but there may be a transient labour force operating, as for example in the building and construction industry, the distributive trades and the transport industry. One thinks, for example, of a small haulier employing six lorry drivers, three of whom are constant and steadfast in their allegiance to the employer, the other three being replaced.
The steadfast and loyal drivers in that situation, under the provisions of this Bill, can lose out. If the hon. Gentleman wants to help those who would not in the normal course of events be given access to the tribunal he should give access to those who might be unfairly excluded. He should either tackle both of the problems or leave the thing alone. At the moment he is only tackling half the problem.

I said that there may well be fringe problems. It seems to us illogical and inequitable to select part of the problem and deal with it in isolation. That we cannot accept.

Question put, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.

The House divided: Ayes 264, Noes, 223.

Division No. 454.]
AYES
[4.15 p.m.


Adley, Robert
Elliot, Capt. Walter (Carshalton)
Kershaw, Anthony


Allason, James (Hemel Hempstead)
Elliott, R. W. (N'c'tle-upon-Tyne, N.)
Kilfedder, James


Archer, Jeffrey (Louth)
Emery, Peter
King, Evelyn (Dorset, S.)


Astor, John
Eyre, Reginald
King, Tom (Bridgwater)


Atkins, Humphrey
Farr, John
Kinsey, J. R.


Awdry, Daniel
Fell, Anthony
Kirk, Peter


Baker, Kenneth (St. Marylebone)
Fenner, Mrs. Peggy
Kitson, Timothy


Baker, W. H. K. (Banff)
Fidler, Michael
Knox, David


Balniel, Lord
Finsberg, Geoffrey (Hampstead)
Lambton, Antony


Barber, Rt. Hn. Anthony
Fookes, Miss Janet
Lane, David


Batsford, Brian
Foster, Sir John
Langford-Holt, Sir John


Beamish, Col. Sir Tufton
Fowler, Norman
Legge-Bourke, Sir Harry


Bennett, Sir Frederick (Torquay)
Fox, Marcus
Lewis, Kenneth (Rutland)


Berry, Hn. Anthony
Fraser, Rt. Hn. Hugh (St'fford & Stone)
Lloyd, Ian (P'tsm'th, Langstone)


Biffen, John
Fry, Peter
Longden, Gilbert


Biggs-Davison, John
Galbraith, Hn. T. G.
Loveridgc, John


Blaker, Peter
Gardner, Edward
Luce, R. N.


Boardman, Tom (Leicester, S.W.)
Gibson-Watt, David
McAdden, Sir Stephen


Body, Richard
Gilmour, Ian (Norfolk, C.)
MacArthur, Ian


Boscawen, Robert
Gilmour, Sir John (Fife, E.)
McCrindie, R. A.


Bossom, Sir Clive
Glyn, Dr. Alan
McLaren, Martin


Bowden, Andrew
Godber, Rt. Hn. J. B.
Maclean, Sir Fitzroy


Boyd-Carpenter, Rt. Hn. John
Goodhew, Victor
Macmillan, Maurice (Farnham)


Braine, Bernard
Gorst, John
McNair-Wilson, Michael


Bray, Ronald
Gower, Raymond
McNair-Wilson, Patrick (NewForest)


Brewis, John
Grant, Anthony (Harrow, C.)
Maddan, Martin


Brinton, Sir Tatton
Gray, Hamish
Madel, David


Brocklebank-Fowler, Christopher
Green, Alan
Maginnis, John E.


Brown, Sir Edward (Bath)
Grieve, Percy
Marten, Neil


Bruce-Gardyne, J.
Grimond, Rt. Hn. J.
Mather, Carol


Bryan, Paul
Grylls, Michael
Maude, Angus


Buchanan-Smith, Alick (Angus, N&M)
Gummer, Selwyn
Mawby, Ray


Buck, Antony
Gurden, Harold
Maxwell-Hyslop, R. J.


Bullus, Sir Eric
Hall, Miss Joan (Keighley)
Meyer, Sir Anthony


Burden, F. A.
Hall, John (Wycombe)
Mills, Peter (Torrington)


Butler, Adam (Bosworth)
Hall-Davis, A. G. F.
Mitchell, David (Basingstoke)


Carlisle, Mark
Hamilton, Michael (Salisbury)
Moate, Roger


Carr, Rt. Hn. Robert
Hannam, John (Exeter)
Molyneaux, James


Channon, PaulHarrison, Col. Sir Harwood (Eye)
Money, Ernie


Chapman, Sydney
Haselhurst, Alan
Monks, Mrs. Connie


Chichester-Clark, R.
Havers, Michael
Monro, Hector


Churchill, W. S.
Hayhoe, Barney
Montgomery, Fergus


Clark, William (Surrey, E.)
Hicks, Robert
More, Jasper


Clarke, Kenneth (Rushcliffe)
Higgins, Terence L.
Morgan-Giles, Rear-Adm.


Clegg, Walter
Hiley, Joseph
Morrison, Charles (Devizes)


Cockeram, Eric
Hill, John E. B. (Norfolk, S.)
Mudd, David


Cooke, Robert
Hill, James (Southampton, Test)
Murton, Oscar


Coombs, Derek
Holt, Miss Mary
Neave, Airey


Corfield, Rt. Hn. Frederick
Hooson, Emlyn
Noble, Rt. Hn. Michael


Cormack, Patrick
Hordern, Peter
Normanton, Tom


Costain, A. P.
Hornby, Richard
Nott, John


Critchley, Julian
Hornsby-Smith, Rt. Hn. Dame Patricia
Onslow, Cranley


Crouch, David
Howe, Hn. Sir Geoffrey (Reigate)



d'Avigdor-Goldsmid, Sir Henry
Howell, David (Guildford)
Oppenheim, Mrs. Sally


d'Avigdor-Goldsmid, Mal.-Gen. James
Howell, Ralph (Norfolk, N.)
Orr, Capt. L. P. S.


Dean, Paul
Hunt, John
Osborn, John


Dixon, piers
Hutchison, Michael Clark
Owen, Idris (Stockport, N.)


Dodds-Parker, Douglas
Iremonger, T. L.
Page, Graham (Crosby)


Douglas-Home, Rt. Hn. Sir Alec
James, David
Page, John (Harrow, W.)


Drayson, G. B.
Jessel, Toby
Parkinson, Cecil (Enfield, W.)


du Cann, Rt. Hn. Edward
Johnson Smith, G. (E. Grinstead)
Peel, John


Dykes, Hugh
Joplin, Michael
Percival, Ian


Eden, Sir John
Kaberry, Sir Donald
Pink R. Bonner


Edwards, Nicholas (Pembroke)
Kellett-Bowman, Mrs. Elaine
Pounder, Rafton




Powell, Rt. Hn. J. Enoch
Skeet, T. H. H.
van Straubenzee, W. R.


Prior, Rt. Hn. J. M. L.
Smith, Dudley (W'wick & L'mington)
Vaughan, Dr. Gerard


Proudfoot, Wilfred
Soref, Harold
Vickers, Dame Joan


Pym, Rt. Hn. Francis
Speed, Keith
Waddington, David


Quennell, Miss J. M.
Spence, John
Walder, David (Clitheroe)


Raison, Timothy
Sproat, Iain
Walker, Rt. Hn. Peter (Worcester)


Rawlinson, Rt. Hn. Sir Peter
Stewart-Smith, Geoffrey (Belper)
Walker-Smith, Rt. Hn. Sir Derek


Redmond, Robert
Stodart, Anthony (Edinburgh, W.)
Walters, Dennis


Reed, Laurance (Bolton, E.)
Stoddart-Scott, Col. Sir M.
Ward, Dame Irene


Renton, Rt. Hn. Sir David
Stokes, John
Weatherill, Bernard


Rhys Williams, Sir Brandon
Stuttaford, Dr. Tom
Wells, John (Maidstone)


Ridley, Hn. Nicholas
Sutcliffe, John
White, Roger (Gravesend)


Ridsdale, Julian
Tapsell, Peter
Whitelaw, Rt. Hn. William


Roberts, Wyn (Conway)
Taylor, Sir Charles (Eastbourne)
Wiggin, Jerry


Rodgers, Sir John (Sevenoaks)
Taylor, Edward M. (G'gow, Cathcart)
Wilkinson, John


Rossi, Hugh (Honnsey)
Tebbit, Norman
Wolrige-Gordon, Patrick


Rost, Peter
Temple, John M.
Wood, Rt. Hn. Richard


Russell, Sir Ronald
Thatcher, Rt. Hn. Mrs. Margaret
Woodhouse, Hn. Christopher


St. John-Stevas, Norman
Thomas, John Stradling (Monmouth)
Woodnutt, Mark


Scott, Nicholas
Thomas, Rt. Hn. Peter (Hendon, S.)
Worsley, Marcus


Scott-Hopkins, James
Thorpe, Rt. Hn. Jeremy
Wylie, Rt. Hn. N. R.


Sharples, Richard
Tilney, John



Shaw, Michael (Sc'b'gh & Whitby)
Trafford, Dr. Anthony
TELLERS FOR THE AYES:


Shelton, William (Clapham)
Trew, Peter
Mr. Paul Hawkins and


Simeons, Charles
Tugendhat, Christopher
Mr. Tim Fortescue.


Sinclair, Sir George
Turton, Rt. Hn. Sir Robin





NOES


Albu, Austen
Duffy, A. E. P.
Johnson, Walter (Derby, S.)


Alaun, Frank (Salford, E.)
Eadie, Alex
Jones, Barry (Flint, E.)


Allen, Scholefield
Edelman, Maurice
Jones, Dan (Burnley)


Archer, Peter (Rowley Regis)
Edwards, Robert (Bilston)
Jones, Gwynoro (Carmarthen)


Armstrong, Ernest
Edwards, William (Merioneth)
Jones, T. Alec (Rhondda, W.)


Ashley, Jack
Ellis, Tom
Kaufman, Gerald


Ashton, Joe
English, Michael
Kelley, Richard


Atkinson, Norman
Evans, Fred
Lambie, David


Bagier, Gordon A. T.
Faulds, Andrew
Latham, Arthur


Barnett, Guy (Greenwich)
Fernyhough, Rt. Hn. E.
Lawson, George


Barnett, Joel (Heywood & Royton)
Fisher, Mrs. Doris (B'ham, Ladywood)
Leadbitter, Ted


Beaney, Alan
Fletcher, Ted (Darlington)
Lee, Rt. Hn. Frederick


Benn, Rt. Hn. Anthony Wedgwood
Foley, Maurice
Leonard, Dick


Bennett, James (Glasgow, Bridgeton)
Foot, Michael
Lewis, Arthur (W. Ham N.)


Bidwell, Sydney
Ford, Ben
Lewis, Ron (Carlisle)


Bishop, E. S.
Forrester, John
Lipton, Marcus


Blenkinsop, Arthur
Fraser, John (Norwood)
Loughlin, Charles


Boardman, H. (Leigh)
Freeson, Reginald
Lyon, Alexander W. (York)


Booth, Albert
Galpern, Sir Myer
Lyons, Edward (Bradford, E.)


Bottomley, Rt. Hn. Arthur
Garrett, W. E.
Mabon, Dr. J. Dickson


Boyden, James (Bishop Auckland)
Gilbert, Dr. John
McBride, Neil


Bradley, Tom
Ginsburg, David
McCartney, Hugh


Brown, Hugh D. (G'gow, Provan)
Golding, John
McGuire, Michael


Brown, Ronald (Shoreditch & F'bury)
Gordon Walker, Rt. Hn. P. C.
Mackenzie, Gregor


Buchan, Norman
Gourlay, Harry
Maclennan, Robert


Buchanan, Richard (G'gow, Sp'burn)
Grant, John D. (Islington, E.)
McMillan, Tom (Glasgow, C.)


Butler, Mrs. Joyce (Wood Green)
Hamilton, James (Bothwell)
McNamara, J. Kevin


Callaghan, Rt. Hn. James
Hamilton, William (Fife, W.)
Mallalieu, J. P. W, (Huddersfield, E.)


Cant, R. B.
Hamling, William
Marks, Kenneth


Carmichael, Neil
Hannan, William (G'gow, Maryhill)
Marquand, David


Castle, Rt. Hn. Barbara
Hardy, Peter
Marsden, F.


Clark, David (Colne Valley)
Harper, Joseph
Marshall, Dr. Edmund


Cocks, Michael (Bristol, S)
Harrison, Walter (Wakefield)
Mason, Rt. Hn. Roy


Conlan, Bernard
Hart, Rt. Hn. Judith
Meacher, Michael


Corbet, Mrs. Freda
Hattersley, Roy
Mellish, Rt. Hn. Robert


Cox, Thomas (Wandsworth, C.)
Healey, Rt. Hn. Denis
Mendelson, John


Crawshaw, Richard
Heffer, Eric S.
Millan, Bruce


Cunningham, G. (Islington, S.W.)
Horam, John
Miller, Dr. M. S.


Dalyell, Tam
Houghton, Rt. Hn. Douglas
Milne, Edward (Blyth)


Darling, Rt. Hn. George
Howell, Denis (Small Heath)
Mitchell, R. C. (S'hampton, Itchen)


Davidson, Arthur
Huckfield, Leslie
Molloy, William


Davies, G. Elfed (Rhondda, E.)
Hughes, Mark (Durham)
Morris, Alfred (Wythenshawe)


Davies, Ifor (Gower)
Hughes, Robert (Aberdeen, N.)
Morris, Charles R. (Openshaw)


Davies, S. O. (Merthyr Tydvil)
Hughes, Roy (Newport)
Morris, Rt. Hn. John (Aberavon)


Davis, Clinton (Hackney, C.)
Hunter, Adam
Moyle, Roland


Davis, Terry (Bromsgrove)
Irvine, Rt. Hn. Sir Arthur (Edge Hill)
Mulley, Rt. Hn. Frederick


de Freitas, Rt. Hn. Sir Geoffrey
Janner, Greville
Murray, Ronald King


Delargy, H. J.
Jay, Rt. Hn. Douglas
Ogden, Eric


Dell, Rt. Hn. Edmund
Jeger, Mrs. Lena (H'b'n & St.P'cras, S.)
O'Halloran, Michael


Dempsey, James
Jenkins, Hugh (Putney)
O'Malley, Brian


Doig, Peter
Jenkins, Rt. Hn. Roy (Stechford)
Oram, Bert

Douglas, Dick (Stirlingshire, E.)
John, Brynmor
Orme, Stanley


Douglas-Mann, Bruce
Johnson, Carol (Lewisham, S.)
Oswald, Thomas


Driberg, Tom
Johnson, James (K'ston-on-Hull, W.)
Owen, Dr. David (Plymouth, Sutton)







Paget, R. T.
Rose, Paul B.
Torney, Tom


Palmer, Arthur
Sandelson, Neville
Urwin, T. W.


Pannell, Rt. Hn. Charles
Sheldon, Robert (Ashton-under-Lyne)
Varley, Eric G.


Parker, John (Dagenham)
Shore, Rt. Hn. Peter (Stepney)
Wainwright, Edwin


Parry, Robert (Liverpool, Exchange)
Short, Mrs. Renée (W'hampton, N.E.)
Walker, Harold (Doncaster)


Peart, Rt. Hn. Fred
Silkin, Hn. S. C. (Dulwich)
Wallace, George


Pendry, Tom
Silverman, Julius
Watkins, David


Pentland, Norman
Skinner, Dennis
Weitzman, David


Perry, Ernest G.
Small, William
Wells, William (Walsall, N.)


Prentice, Rt. Hn. Reg.
Smith, John (Lanarkshire, N.)
Whitehead, Phillip


Prescott, John
Spearing, Nigel
Willey, Rt. Hn. Frederick


Price, J. T. (Westhoughton)
Spriggs, Leslie
Williams, Alan (Swansea, W.)


Probert, Arthur
Stallard, A. W.
Williams, Mrs. Shirley (Hitchin)


Reed, D. (Sedgefield)
Stoddart, David (Swindon)
Wilson, Alexander (Hamilton)


Rees, Merlyn (Leeds, S.)
Strang, Gavin
Wilson, Rt. Hn. Harold (Huyton)


Rhodes, Geoffrey
Summerskill, Hn. Dr. Shirley
Wilson, William (Coventry, S.)


Richard, Ivor
Taverne, Dick
Woof, Robert


Roberts, Albert (Normanton)
Thomas, Rt. Hn. George (Cardiff, W.)



Roberts, Rt. Hn. Goronwy (Caernarvon)
Thomas, Jeffrey (Abertillery)
TELLERS FOR THE NOES:


Robertson, John (Paisley)
Thomson, Rt. Hn. G. (Dundee, E.)
Mr. Alan Fitch and


Rodgers, William (Stockton-on-Tees)
Tinn, James
Mr. Donald Coleman.


Roper, John
Tomney, Frank

Clause 29

EXCLUSION IN RESPECT OF PROCEDURE AGREEMENT

Lords Amendment: No. 53, in page 22, line 12, at end insert:
("() that every organisation of workers which is a party to the procedure agreement is an independent organisation.")

Mr. R. Carr: I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.
It has been the intention of everyone on both sides who has for some time now supported the concept of a statutory right of appeal in respect of unfair dismissal that we should at the same time encourage the continuation and, indeed, the spread of voluntary procedure agreements coping with dismissal, and that, provided that such voluntary agreements met the necessary standards, those who entered into them should be able to get them exempted from the statutory procedure.
I believe that to be common ground. As at present drafted, however, Clause 29(1) might permit an application for exemption of a voluntary dismissal procedure by an employer and a non-independent organisation of workers. This is not the Government's intention. The present Amendment, therefore, would provide that an employer could be joined in an application for exemption of a voluntary dismissal procedure only by a trade union or an independent organisation of workers. By the exclusion of non-independent organisations—house unions—as parties to a joint application, em-

ployees would be safeguarded against removal of their statutory right of appeal in favour of a management-dominated voluntary procedure. I hope, therefore, that the Amendment will readily commend itself to both sides.
I take the opportunity afforded by the Amendment to add that I very much hope that the two sides of industry will make extensive use of the provision in Clause 29 for the exemption of voluntary procedure agreements in respect of dismissal. It is common ground on both sides of the House that it was high time we legislated, as other countries have done, to provide safeguards against unfair dismissal, but I feel that it would do great credit to our system of industrial relations if over a wide area of industry the safeguards were made in voluntary agreements jointly agreed, which must, of course, be up to the standard laid down in the statutory provisions.
Furthermore, if there is, as I hope, widespread exemption of voluntary procedures, this will relieve the burden of the case load falling on industrial tribunals and will enable me, therefore, to relax the various restrictions in respect of appeal tribunals—in particular, the two-year qualifying period—earlier than I might otherwise be able to do.
I know that many industries and firms, especially in the public sector, already include provisions regarding dismissal in their voluntary procedure agreements. It may be that these procedures will need some measure of alteration and improvement to bring them up to the standard to qualify for exemption, but I very much hope that the parties concerned in such


procedures will seriously consider taking those steps.
I also hope that where hitherto there have been no voluntary procedure agreements relating to dismissal serious consideration will be given to introducing them, and that this introduction of statutory procedures will be an incentive to the formation of new and better voluntary ones rather than a hindrance. That is my belief, and it was also the belief of the Donovan Commission.

4.30 p.m.

Mr. Eric S. Heffer: We give the Amendment a limited welcome. We find that it is extremely reasonable in that, to quote Lord Jellicoe,
'"It is our feeling that Clause 29(1) might therefore permit the exemption of a management-dominated dismissal procedure, in the kind of situation where an employer was joined in an application by his house union, possibly to the exclusion of a recognised trade union. This is not the Government's intention and we are concerned that the provision may not in these circumstances provide adequate safeguards for employees."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, House of Lords, 13th May, 1971; Vol. 318, c. 1511.]
We are glad that it is not the Government's intention to allow a situation where a house union could have an arrangement with an employer and the bona fide trade union was excluded. We are very pleased that to that extent the Government have listened to the Opposition. But it is a limited concession, because in this Clause and Clause 30, dealing with the whole question of unfair dismissal under procedure agreements made between trade unions and employers, we are dealing with procedure agreements that have been approved by the Industrial Court, and unfortunately the House has not had an opportunity to discuss the rôle of the Court in relation to this type of agreement. Our view is that it should not be involved.
It would be wrong if procedure agreements between a firm and a company union meant that a worker who was dismissed under such agreements and was aggrieved felt that he was not being involved in proper representation because he was a member of a bona fide trade union. We are glad that that possibility has been recognised by the Government and eliminated.
Whilst we support the Amendment, we want to make it absolutely clear that we are not entirely satisfied, because it involves the Industrial Court, which we should like not to be involved in any way. The voluntary system, which the right hon. Gentleman says he is so much in favour of, should be extended and developed, but without the involvement of the Industrial Court.
As I have said, we shall not oppose the Amendment, and we feel that the Government might have listened on other occasions to the Opposition as much as they have on this.

Question put and agreed to.

Lords Amendment: No. 54, in page 22, line 27, leave out "appropriate cases" and insert
cases where (by reason of an equality of votes or for any other reason) a decision cannot otherwise be reached".

The Solicitor-General: I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.
This is a small Amendment which the Government were pleased to accept when it was suggested by Lord Brown in another place to clarify the effect of subsection (2)(d), which enables exemption from the statutory procedure to be accorded when the Industrial Court is satisfied about the existence of an alternative agreement. As drafted, it suggested that to secure exemption under the procedure it was essential for independent arbitration or adjudication to exist at the end of the road. As my right hon. Friend has just said, everyone wishes to encourage voluntary settlements for the disposal of particular disputes, and no one wishes to discourage, where the parties think it appropriate, provision for independent arbitration or adjudication. But there was no desire in this context to make provision for arbitration or adjudication an obligatory and inescapable aspect of any procedure which was to secure exemption under these provisions.

The Amendment replaces the reference to
appropriate cases
with a phrase which makes it plain that arbitration or adjudication should


only be necessary for a procedure to qualify for exemption in
cases where (by reason of an equality of votes or for any other reason) a decision cannot otherwise be reached.

In other words, where the procedure does not have built-in a machinery for resolving a conflict about whether the dismissal was fair or unfair, in those cases only some machinery for arbitration or adjudication is still believed to be necessary, but we do not wish it to stand in the way of the approval of exempt agreements. On the contrary, we want as wide a range of possibilities for exempting agreements under these provisions as possible.

Mr. Heffer: We shall not oppose this somewhat complicated Amendment. Lord Brown admitted that it was complicated when he moved it, and when I read the OFFICIAL REPORT of the debate it struck me that it became more complicated. The idea of hurdles being put in the way of workers using the appeals mechanism seemed to me to make matters unduly complicated, and I am not entirely happy that the Amendment should have been accepted. It was accepted with alacrity by the Government in the other place, with no argument about it. We feel that it does not make any serious inroad on the rights of workers. It makes things slightly more difficult, but we have no basic argument against it, and are therefore prepared to accept it.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 30

REVOCATION OF EXCLUSION UNDER S.29

Lords Amendment: No. 55, in page 23, line 18, after "effect" insert:
and shall have an extended time for presenting a complaint under Part VI of this Act in respect of a dismissal where the effective date of termination falls within that period".

The Solicitor-General: I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.

Mr. Deputy Speaker (Sir Robert Grant-Ferris): It will be for the convenience of the House if we also discuss Lords Amendments No. 56, in page 23,

line 28, leave out from beginning to "shall" in line 31 and insert:
a complaint to which those provisions apply".

No. 322, in Schedule 6, page 154, line 7, leave out from "Act" to second "the".

No. 323, in Schedule 6, page 154, line 10, leave out "with the effective date of termination" and insert:

"(a) in the case of a complaint relating to dismissal, with the effective date of termination, or
(b) in any other case, with the date of the action specified in the complaint (or, if that action occurred on two or more dates, the latest of those dates) ".

No. 324, in Schedule 6, page 154, line 11, leave out from "termination" to end of line 12 and insert:
unless the tribunal is satisfied that in the circumstances it was not practicable for the complaint to be presented before the end of that period.
(2) Any provision made by regulations in pursuance of the preceding sub-paragraph shall have effect subject to any order of the Industrial Court under section 30 of this Act.

No. 325, in Schedule 6, page 154, line 12, at end insert:
. In relation to proceedings on complaints under section 103 of this Act, the regulations shall include provision precluding an industrial tribunal from entertaining such a complaint unless it is presented before the end of the period of four weeks beginning with whichever is the latest of the following dates, that is to say—

(a) the date of the action specified in the complaint (or, if that action occurred on two or more dates, the latest of those dates);
(b) the earliest date on which that action came to the knowledge of the complainant;
(c) where the complaint relates to a matter in respect of which an application has been made under section 79 of this Act, the date on which the registrar gave notice of his conclusions on investigating that matter or gave notice that he had determined not to proceed with the application."

The Solicitor-General: Amendment No. 55 is designed, again in the context of exempting certain cases from the statutory procedure because a voluntary procedure is in existence, to take account of the relevant substantive changes to be made by Amendments 322–325 in Schedule 6. The Amendments are designed to alter, in a direction which I think is favoured in the House and by others, the circumstances in which an employee may proceed out of time, after his time for application has expired, to an industrial tribunal. I will explain in a moment the substantive provisions.

Lords Amendments 55 and 56 are designed to alter Clause 30 so as to ensure that on revocation of an exemption order an employee is not barred from access to the kind of remedies on the same kind of terms he would have had if there had been no exempted agreement.

The substantive Lords Amendments No. 322 onwards are to Schedule 6. The first, No. 322, takes account of the fact that it is now possible for an employee or worker to complain under Clause 102 not only of unfair dismissal but of other unfair action.

Lords Amendment 323 does the same thing by making it plain that the date from which the time begins to run against him is either the date of dismissal, in a dismissal case, or the date of the act of which he complains.

The substantive point is contained in Lords Amendment No. 324. As originally drawn, it was possible for the tribunal to extend his period for applying for relief to the tribunal "for special reasons". In this context, as hon. Members suggested, that simple provision "for special reasons" was not sufficiently precise, and so the concept of power to extend the time "for special reasons" is now being replaced by the power to extend the time where the tribunal
is satisfied that in the circumstances it was not practicable for the complaint to be presented before the end of that period".

The tribunal has to look at the practicability and, if reasons are shown why the employee or worker concerned could not have got to the tribunal any quicker than he did, power is given to extend the time in those circumstances. Lords Amendment 324 also requires the court, in discharging or ending the exemption agreement, to give the worker the same kind of opportunity of going to the industrial tribunal, and that is the substantive effect of Lords Amendments Nos. 55 and 56.

Lords Amendment No. 325 deals with a similar point. As the Bill now stands the employee or worker will have the right to present a complaint not only under Clause 102 but also under Clause 103 in respect of different kinds of action taken against him, and in that context as well the tribunal will have the same power as to the period in which he should have presented his complaint.

I hope the House will follow the object of the exercise. It is in substance to remove the concept of "special reasons" from any application under Clauses 102 and 103 to the industrial tribunal and allows an extension of time where the worker could not get to the tribunal any sooner than he did. On that basis I commend these Lords Amendments.

4.45 p.m.

Mr. Heffer: The hon. and learned Gentleman quite rightly concentrated on Lords Amendments 322 to 325 which are really the Amendments of substance. He quite rightly said that the "special reasons" are being removed. Nevertheless, we are not happy because we find that despite the fact that a certain amount has been done to meet our objections this does not meet the serious objection which this side of the House has about the period of four weeks. We regard that as a matter of principle.
We believe that it should not merely be left to the tribunal to decide whether there are special reasons. We believe that the time for a worker to bring forward a complaint about unfair dismissal should be much longer than four weeks. There are all sorts of reasons why this should be so. The worker could find himself dismissed unfairly, or he may believe, and rightly, that he was dismissed unfairly, but is not able to ascertain the truth of the situation within the period of four weeks. That may require him or his trade union or his friends to dig around, as it were, to get the actual proof, and although he may know the situation, he may require a longer period of time to establish the facts. If there is a period of only four weeks, and if the tribunal has discretion, it may not be prepared to grant the application for the matter to come before the tribunal.
We contrast this provision of four weeks with what happens in relation to unfair industrial practices. Until an Amendment was moved in another place the time was almost unlimited in which an employer could go to the court and say that an unfair industrial practice had taken place. In another place an Amendment was moved by the Government, and accepted, that there should be a limitation of at least six months. That was pressed upon the Government by the Opposition.


It is fair to contrast that situation, in which for up to six months the employer can say that in his opinion an unfair industrial practice has taken place and that he wishes to bring it before the court, with this situation where the worker who has been dismissed and feels he has been unfairly dismissed has to bring that before the tribunal in four weeks. We regard that as inequitable.

The Solicitor-General: Will the hon. Member acknowledge this fact, that the rather more complex provisions of Clause 34 of the last Government's Bill provided for a claim to be brought within 15 days, and that it was because we regarded that as insufficient in this kind of case that we extended the period to four weeks and improved the provisions in this Bill?

Mr. Heffer: I do not care what was in that other Bill. I want to make that absolutely clear I also want to make it quite clear that if that 15 days suggestion had come before the House I would have moved an Amendment to exclude it and to have a longer time provided. We are now discussing what has been brought forward to the House by the right hon. Gentleman and this Government, and it is time that the Government stopped hiding behind certain provisions which were in a Bill which was brought forward by my right hon. Friend but which was never discussed by this House. The Government really ought not to continue to do that, but should deal with what is in this Bill and the points we are raising about it, and we are saying that if it is right for an employer to have up to six months—it was an unlimited period until an Amendment was brought forward in another place—in which to go before the court and apply on the ground of an unfair industrial practice, then the time in which a worker who feels he has been unfairly dismissed should be allowed to present his case should be extended from four weeks to a much longer period.
On that argument we are not prepared to accept this Lords Amendment and we shall certainly be voting against it.

Mr. Stanley Orme: My hon. Friend the Member for Liverpool, Walton (Mr. Heffer) is right about this issue. The whole paraphernalia of appeals against unfair dismissal is nega-

tive unless there is a right of reinstatement. We believe that allowing pieces of eight to be paid for getting rid of a worker—and it is sometimes worth up to £4,000 to an employer to see the back of a worker—is no solution to industrial problems.
It is interesting that the period has been reduced to four weeks. The Amendment moved by my noble Friend in another place assisted the Government and made another loophole for the man to jump through. No wonder the Government accepted the Amendment with such alacrity. Speaking purely for myself, I think it is a bad Amendment, yet the Solicitor-General is trying to convince the House how fair he is being to the trade union movement, and how nice it will be for a man who thinks he has been unfairly dismissed to go to a tribunal which can award damages.
I have never known a worker to be dismissed for trade union activities. Dismissals take place for bad time-keeping, failure to do the job properly, for redundancy reasons, and the gentle methods of the Solicitor-General in putting over these proposals should be exposed for what they are.
This series of Amendments will not assist the trade union movement. The exercise is valueless unless there is a right of reinstatement. Unfair dismissal is most difficult to prove, and that is why workers take industrial action over it and why employers resist industrial action. Apart from wages and conditions it is the thing the workers fight for most when employers sometimes try to get rid of dissident workers. I do not think it possible for a court of law or an industrial tribunal to adjudicate on such matters.
Once unfair dismissals are taken out of collective bargaining and are no longer an issue betwen trade union and employer but are brought into the realms of law we go into a land of no return. The Solicitor-General has not given the trade union movement anything, and the provision for four weeks as against the six months for unfair industrial practices shows where his bias lies.

Mr. John Fraser: I am subject to correction, but I believe that the time for making a claim for redundancy payment, which is analogous to a claim unfair dismissal, is a much longer


period than four weeks. The Solicitor-General will no doubt correct me if I am wrong, but my recollection is that it is about six months. I hope that he will think seriously about this four-week period.
Any person who has dealings with industrial injury claims, damages claims, and so on, will agree that short limitation periods create gross injustice. A man often does not realise that he has been unfairly dismissed until four or five weeks afterwards. He might have been dismissed while he was on holiday. No doubt the Solicitor-General will say that that will be a special reason and it was impracticable for him to make a claim within four weeks. But there are other circumstances where a man might need to investigate. He might have been dismissed because he did not have a certain qualification. Probation officers and youth leaders have special diplomas and qualifications for their jobs, and it might sometimes take three or four months to establish whether a man had the correct qualifications. Some qualification regulation are extremely complicated and provide for exemptions, and it might, therefore, be a long time before a man could prove his case.
A man might be dismissed because of his conduct. Before putting in his claim, he might have to obtain statements from his work mates or people who might not be accessible at the time. To do all that within four weeks places a severe burden on the man, and may mean that he has to put in his claim without knowing whether or not it is justified. It is much better that a claim should be investigated before it is made, so as to save waste of time by the tribunal.
Once claims are made, attitudes tend to become frozen. This is why accident proceedings are not instituted in the High Court or the county court very often for 18 months to two years after the accident. It is realised that to negotiate is better than to go to a court or a tribunal.
It is better, especially on his Bill which has no provision for reinstatement, for a man's lawyer, trade union representative or friend to go to the employer and say, "We could make an application to the tribunal for damages for unfair dismissal, but all our chap wants is to get back into the job which he has been doing for

many years." The man may have his family established in the neighbourhood and may have bought a house near to his place of employment. The employer might reply that the man was dismissed because of his conduct. His representative might then say, "I think you are mistaken about that and, if you give me time, I can provide evidence to prove that you are mistaken." So long as a claim has not been presented to the tribunal there is a possibility of fruitful negotiation with the employer with a view to reinstatement and settling the matter amicably. Early application to the tribunal precludes this fruitful and sensible way of solving these problems.
In an earlier contribution the Solicitor-General reiterated that legal aid will not be available before the tribunal. This is crazy. If at the moment a man is dismissed unfairly because he has had only two weeks' notice when he is entitled to four weeks' notice, he has six years in which to make an application to the county court to recover damages for unfair dismissal which is a breach of his contract of employment, and he can get legal aid for that purpose. A man who has been dismissed may have no funds at his disposal, but may badly need to take legal advice and be represented in a complicated and difficult case. He is caught two ways. He is caught because he has to get his application in within four weeks, and he is caught because he cannot get legal representation.
There is an increasing reluctance for people to go to tribunals, even for redundancy payment claims, because employers are increasingly employing legal representatives and, as case law accumulates, it is becoming more difficult to establish claims. To give one example, on a claim to the industrial tribunal for redundancy payment, an employer can sometimes get away with meeting the claim by proving that there was another principal reason for the dismissal. I have known claims to be dismissed because, although there was some evidence that the man was redundant, the employer has proved some other principal reason for dismissing him.

Mr. Orme: Industrial misconduct.

Mr. Fraser: The case may not have involved industrial misconduct. Sometimes a salesman who may not have been doing well may have been got rid


of. If such a man is not legally represented it is extremely difficult to meet the points that arise. There is a reluctance to go to a tribunal if there is not legal assistance in dealing with difficult cases.
The absence of legal aid for cases before a tribunal coupled with the short limitation period work a double injustice. This contrasts unfavourably with the rights of a person to go to the Industrial Court to complain about unfair industrial conduct. I hope the Solicitor-General will think seriously about this matter and, if necessary, will introduce a manuscript Amendment to lengthen the period to six months.

5.0 p.m.

Mr. David Waddington: I listened with interest to the hon. Member for Liverpool, Walton (Mr. Heffer). I do not think I missed any part of his speech, but I did not hear him say what he thought would be a satisfactory period within which a man should have to bring a case of unfair dismissal. Perhaps he would tell the House what sort of period he had in mind.
I have some sympathy with hon. Members opposite who say that perhaps four weeks is not long enough, but on the other hand everybody would agree that one can allow too long a period because it is vitally important that all the facts should be clear in everybody's mind.
The hon. Member for Norwood (Mr. John Fraser) said that the object of the exercise was to try to get the man reinstated. If that is the aim, then one does not want to develop a situation in which lawyers are busy preparing a case in minute detail, when they should be getting on with the job as quickly as possible and presenting the case before the tribunal so that the man may be reinstated.

Mr. John Fraser: The hon. Gentleman has misunderstood me. Under the legislative provisions reinstatement cannot be altered. There is a stage, before the matter is crystallised by legal proceedings, at which it may be possible to negotiate reinstatement. That was the point I was making. I say that we should allow a period of at least four weeks to get that kind of negotiation under way. I agree that it is important to have a

rapid conclusion of the proceedings, but if reinstatement is sought it has to be negotiated.

Mr. Waddington: I take the hon. Gentleman's point, but I do not accept that once proceedings have been launched before the Industrial Tribunal all hope of negotiating reinstatement with the employer has gone. I am anxious that we should not allow a state of affairs to develop where nothing happens for a great length of time because under the rules there is no need for urgency and as a result opportunities to reinstate a man are not grasped.
I have, as I say, a certain sympathy with the hon. Gentleman's position. I would like to hear what sort of period the Opposition have in mind. One has to strike a fair balance; there must be ample time for proper advice to be taken; and finally, proceedings have to be instituted as quickly as possible so that all the facts are fresh in everybody's minds.
We know from experience that some employers are zealous in making quite sure that all opportunities to obtain evidence of an industrial injury are grasped. The National Coal Board ensures that within days of a man being injured all possible witnesses are interviewed; indeed, almost everybody concerned is interviewed by the Board. It is important that these matters should be dealt with expeditiously. I repeat that the Opposition have my sympathy on their point about legal aid. It is a pity that provision has not been made to make legal aid available in dealing with important cases.

Mr. Alex Eadie: The Solicitor-General should have another look at this proposal. I believe the legal profession in Scotland will feel some resentment at what has been done since the right hon. and learned Gentleman seems to be riding roughshod over established procedures of Scottish law.
I should like to explain what the four week provision will involve. Established procedures are laid down in the mining industry. A situation can arise in which one court can battle against another. Do we know exactly what we mean when we talk about "court"? In the mining industry there is a procedure to deal with anybody who is alleged to have committed a breach of the Coal Mines Act.


Such a man generally is dismissed straight away, if the management feel that the case warrants such a course. It is a tradition that the miners' union never contests an allegation of a serious breach of the Coal Mines Act. The offence may involve smoking underground, or a serious offence against procedure—the man may have been riding on trucks underground, which could endanger life and limb and could interfere with machinery. The trade union never attempts to interfere with that sort of case, and the man must wait until he is tried by the court.
If the man has to wait a couple of months, what is he to do in the meantime? It might be said that the man was guilty and that was why he was dismissed in the first place. But the man may not be guilty. He may come before the court and be found not guilty. If that happens and the four week period has elapsed, what will happen if the man alleges unfair dismissal?
To take a more difficult example, what will happen if the man's case is found to be not proven? This may be a matter with which the Solicitor-General is not acquainted in Scottish law. I feel that the Scottish legal professional will resent the right hon. and learned Gentleman writing into this legislation a provision which will not take account of the Scottish legal situation.
I personally have gone to the union and said, "This case was found not proven and therefore I, as the man's accredited representative, demand his reinstatement." I have to some extent been successful in getting men reinstated, but the management has often said ' We are prepared to reinstate the man, but there is some doubt about loss of earnings since the verdict was not proven rather than not guilty. "Does the Solicitor-General say that the man will be entitled to say," I am going to the Industrial Court to claim unfair dismissal and will claim compensation. Although I have my job back, I have suffered loss of earnings in the time I have been unemployed." Is the right hon. and learned Gentleman also saying that the Industrial Court will then decide on the validity of a not proven verdict? Does he intend to give guidance on that aspect of the law?
I doubt very much whether the Amendment is a starter in relation to both

English and Scottish law. I certainly believe that it would build up deep resentment in the legal profession in Scotland, irrespective of what the hon. and learned Gentleman may think. There has not been sufficient thought on this matter. The hon. and learned Gentleman must consider re-examining the proposal with a view to taking it back. I trust that we will not have to go into the Division Lobby not only in protest against the lack of time provided but in order to establish the fact that Scottish law is entitled to some consideration in legislation about industrial relations.

Mr. Edwin Wainwright: I want to say something to the Solicitor-General about his attitude to the Amendment. He mentioned that the Bill brought in by the Labour Government specified a 15-day period. He gave the impression that it was wonderful of the present Government to extend that period to one month. If the Labour Government had not brought in a Bill, or had not mentioned a 15-day period in it, I wonder what length of time the present Government would have recommended. Would it have been 30 days, or 60 days, or 90 days, or even six months?

The question of obtaining evidence is always difficult. We are not here talking about good employers on every occasion. In this context, we are talking about bad employers—on this side of the House, anyway. There are still too many bad employers in the country. As my hon. Friend the Member for Salford, West (Mr. Orme) mentioned, a bad employer will want to get rid of a man because of his trade union activities but he will choose other reasons. Other things are brought in against the employee. Provocation comes into it on many occasions when the employer wants to get rid of a man. In effect he compels the man to do something that common sense would advise him not to do. Then, when he is dismissed, he has been so unhappy in the job for a long time—when he has been fighting on behalf of his fellow workers—that he decides, "There is no future for me at this plant. I will find work elsewhere."

Then, however, the unfortunate fellow finds that he cannot get other work because he has been blacklisted. Wherever he goes, they will ask what his name is.


When he tells them, they will reply, "We are sorry. There is no work for you here." He thereupon drifts about trying to find a job. This happens on many occasions, and, of course, it is more difficult with the present rate of unemployment for a man to get a job anyway, quite apart from the reluctance of employers to take him on. He is running about for one month or two months trying to get another job but finding that he cannot get one.

Then he thinks, "I should now make application on grounds of unfair dismissal", only to be told, "Sorry, but you are out of time." There is no fairness in this limit of one month. Perhaps it is not a good analogy, but a claim for damages has a statutory period of three years. I believe that the judge says, in a claim for damages, that three years after the date of the accident is in effect a claim for damages on the first day. Three years is allowed to a man before he is barred by Statute in such cases. Here, however, a dismissed man is to be allowed only 30 days. It is my candid opinion that no consultation has taken place with the trade union movement about this period.

5.15 p.m.

I ask the Solicitor-General whether he has consulted the trade union movement on this matter. Is he satisfied that the 30 days is a fair and just period? What knowledge has he got about what is happening in industry? From where has he got his information? Has he got it from the employers on every occasion? Has he ever discussed this sort of issue with shop stewards or full-time officials of the trade union movement? Of course he has not, for otherwise, I am certain, he would not have recommended a one-month period.

This is too short a time. A man's future is at stake on many occasions. When we talk about £4,000 that can be paid instead of reinstatement, it is rather disgusting to think that one can rob a man of work in the area that he has been living in for a long time—rob him of his work because of his trade union activities, his willingness to fight on behalf of his fellow men against bad employers on many occasions—so that he has no future in the area and has to leave it.

It is not a pleasant thing to have to move from one place to another and to keep being told, when one's name is mentioned, "You are not wanted". Many of us have experienced this sort of thing.

The hon. and learned Member for Nelson and Colne (Mr. Waddington) mentioned that no time limit had been suggested by my hon. Friend the Member for Liverpool, Walton (Mr. Heifer). I will suggest a time. I suggest that it should be at least six months so that the man has plenty of time and can get the proof by questioning people and obtaining evidence. Do not let us forget that when a man goes for evidence in a plant where there is a bad employer there is a freeze, in effect, from his fellow workers because they are afraid of what will happen to them. All industry is not like work in some of the modern plants where there is a strong trade union movement and some understanding between unions and employers. Many plants have employers who are not fit to be in charge of men.

Because of all this, we must make certain that such employers cannot take advantage of any legislation. I hope, therefore, that the Government will listen to what has been said by my hon. Friends on this issue and will extend the time beyond one month to at least six months in order to enable a man to build up his case, thereby ensuring that he can be dealt with fairly and justly.

Mr. Ronald King Murray: I would like to echo the feeling of disquiet which have been expressed by my hon. Friends about the limit of four weeks on these particular complaints. It seems to me that my hon. Friend the Member for Midlothian (Mr. Eadie) has raised a substantial point which certainly has validity in regard to Scots law and may well have a validity which extends beyond that into the law of England and Wales, because it is obvious that many dismissals may well proceed upon a ground which is also a ground for a statutory prosecution in regard to some statutory provision—for example, in regard to the Factory Acts or some equivalent Act.
In such cases, it is obvious that the question whether the facts justify such a dismissal will be bound up in such a way that they cannot be separated from the facts on which a prosecution is


grounded. As far as Scotland is concerned it is the case that a summary prosecution for a statutory offence has to be completed within a period of six months. Therefore, it would follow that the period of four weeks was much too short. On any view, the period for such a complaint—and it is justifiable to ask whether there is need for a period of limitation, whether this kind of procedure demands any sort of limit at all—should be much longer than four weeks and, I should have thought, longer than six months, in order to allow the matter involved to be properly canvassed and to cover amply the procedure which may be involved in a criminal prosecution.
My hon. Friend the Member for Midlothian mentioned the Scottish verdict of "Not proven." A more sympathetic view would be to take the case of a clear acquittal when an accused is acquitted of the statutory offence which is the ground for the dismissal. It is obvious that in that case the court might say that there was no ground for the complaint and the man would be entirely vindicated. It would be extraordinary that he should be completely vindicated in a criminal court and, long before that, be found guilty in a civil court under the tribunal set-up which is given jurisdiction for this purpose in the Bill.
The argument from this side of the House is, first, that we should probe the matter strongly and ask the Government why there should be a limit and, secondly, if there is to be a limit, that it should be at least six months, as it is for complaints of unfair industrial practices in Clauses 97 and 98.
I have some sympathy for the point made by the hon. and learned Member for Nelson and Colne (Mr. Waddington) about reinstatement. It is clear that were the emphasis in this part of the Bill on reinstatement there might be an argument for speed. It might be that one could say that reinstatement is so important that one must get people moving so that the man who has been unfairly dismissed may be fully reinstated to his position in the quickest possible time.
My hon. Friend the Member for Norwood (Mr. John Fraser) dealt with that matter in his opening remarks. He pointed out that the Bill makes no provision for reinstatement. That is one of the worst features of the Bill in the view

of the Opposition. It is a serious defect. The Bill provides for re-engagement, but nowhere does it provide that a person who has been unfairly dismissed, dealt with in a scabby way, shall be reinstated. The proper way to deal with such a situation would be for the man concerned to be restored to his former position, and that would be nothing short of reinstatement.
The Bill is basically deficient in this respect and therefore we are justified in voting against these provisions in their entirety. The absence of a provision for reinstatement shows the Bill for what it is. When we look into the four weeks limitation we see what a miserable Bill it is. So far from giving a dismissed worker full reinstatement, restoration, or restitution in law, we have a shabby limitation.
I should like to raise a short technical point of some importance. The words used in Lords Amendment No. 324, allowing a tribunal to go beyond the four weeks, are:
unless the tribunal is satisfied that in the circumstances it was not practicable for the complaint to be presented before the end of that period.
I do not want to be unfair, but it seems that clearly the Amendment is better than the original provision which dealt with "reasonable cause" which is so unsatisfactory from the legal view. Criticisms made by the Opposition both here and in the other place in that regard were well justified.
What worries me is that the industrial tribunal, in construing the words "not practicable", may take a legalistic or a common sense approach. If it took a common sense approach—I hope that that is the approach which the tribunals will take in construing those words—the tribunal would not take the view that it was hidebound to some period of about four weeks. It is important to stress this point. If the words "not practicable" are to be construed in a common sense way, then, on the face of it, there is no reason for a tribunal, presented with the argument so cogently put forward by my hon. Friend the Member for Midlothian, not saying, "Obviously this is a case where it was not practicable for the complaint to be presented earlier", and to extend the period of four weeks to seven or eight months or even a year. From the common sense view, if common sense is to


rule the tribunal rather than legal interpretations, we would not have a great deal to fear, because the tribunal is composed of people who, one hopes, are not predominantly lawyers but have practical experience of industrial relations. The common sense view would take them beyond the legalistic limit of four weeks.
My fear all along has been that the National Industrial Relations Court, on the one hand, in its divisions, if there are divisions, and the industrial tribunals, on the other hand, transformed by the Bill into mini courts, will tend to be riddled with legalism. That is one reason for strongly echoing the plea of my hon. Friend the Member for Norwood that, if the tribunals are to become legalistic in their interpretation of the Bill and in their application of its provisions, the need for legal aid will be paramount. It will be essential for people to have legal aid if they are to get adequate legal advice and assistance. However, if the tribunals are to be common sense bodies, as they were before the Bill got at them, where the dominant consideration is practical knowledge of industrial relations, this fear would not be justified.
I end by making a powerful plea for the words "not practicable" to be construed in a common sense, rather than a legalistic, way. My fear is that if they are to be construed by an industrial tribunal as a mini-court in a legalistic fashion, they will take the view that
not practicable for the complaint to be presented before the end of that period
will be the kind of thing which is limited by the period of four weeks which is set in the Bill. They will probably say that "not practicable" is to be taken as something of the order of those few weeks. In other words, they will be contemplating an extension of a week or possibly two weeks, not an extension many times the limitation.
I hope that we shall hear some reassuring words from the Government on this matter, but I fear that we shall not. I believe that we shall be left in the legalistic quagmire with which the Bill has presented us throughout its passage.

5.30 p.m.

Mr. Albert Booth: It is exceedingly difficult to discuss an Amendment to part of a Bill which claims to give men protection against unfair dismissal

when we know that the whole effect of this portion of it is to take away from a number of practical trade unionists the only effective protection they have against unfair dismissal, which is the right to threaten to withdraw their labour until they have had a proper opportunity of discussing whether notice given to an active trade unionist is fair or unfair. Therefore, I propose to consider the matter against the background of what happens in practice.
If, in an engineering works, a shop steward, who normally has a good timekeeping record and is known to be a good worker, comes in late one morning and that afternoon receives notice of dismissal because he was late, no suggestion is made that he should go along to a court of law if he wants redress against his employer for unfair dismissal. His convenor goes to the manager and says, "If that chap goes outside the door in one week's time, he will not be the only one going out. All the other members of his union in this works will also go out. "The manager then calls in the trade union representative and they sit round a table and try to thrash the thing out. In other words, they will discuss whether the dismissal was unfair, with the man not outside the door, but still on his job.
If they cannot resolve the issue, the convenor will ask that the notice be withdrawn while a full-time representative of the union and a full-time representative of the employers' association are brought in to consider the matter further. A works conference will be held on the issue whether the man is to be dismissed, irrespective of any provision made for that in procedure agreements, or otherwise. At that works conference evidence will be adduced to show whether the man is being fairly or unfairly dismissed. That evidence can be adduced because the man is still at work, and other men who can testify to the way in which he did his work can be brought forward.
If the Bill is amended in the way suggested it will take away a man's right to have discussed whether his dismissal was fair or unfair while he continues at work. Whether it is the intention of the Government or not, it will introduce a presumption of guilt, because the man will be outside the door, having been dismissed by his employer on some charge or other, and he will have to prove before


the Industrial Court that he is innocent before he can return to work. That will place him at a great disadvantage.
All men who believe in justice feel that it is necessary to protect people against unfair dismissal. The trade union movement not only shares that concern, but has a special concern to protect against that form of unfairness which relates to getting rid of men who are active on behalf of their fellow workers. In other words, the trade union movement has to protect the representatives of its workpeople.
Once a work people's representative is put outside the door the organisation of his case and the means of protecting the man who is to follow him as shop steward, or work people's representative, or whatever name he is given, are undermined. His successor is at a disadvantage because the same threat hangs over him of being put outside the door and being forced to appeal through the machinery provided by the Bill.
It will be a severe handicap to anybody who is dismissed and told to go to a court if he has to operate under the proposed procedure, compared with his position under the present procedure because at the moment, whether there is provision for it in a procedure agreement or not, his case can be discussed while he is still at work.
In so far as special machinery will be required to obtain evidence, it is fair to say that that situation does not apply now. And who is to say that the employer will facilitate the obtaining of evidence about whether the man was fairly dismissed? The allegation can be extremely vague. It can be said that the man's work was unsatisfactory. But which part of his work was unsatisfactory, and in what capacity was he acting? Where was he at the time? Who says that his work was unsatisfactory? The very people who will give evidence about that at the court will be those who themselves are in danger of having the same action taken against them by the employer.
Let us imagine a shop steward being dismissed and going before an industrial court to answer the allegation of not doing a certain job properly. He will say that he wants to call the foreman to give evidence that he did do his job properly. What will happen to the fore-man

before he goes to the court? He will be called in to see the manager. Does anybody think that the manager will say to him, "I want you to make sure that justice is done on behalf of this ex-shop steward. I want you to speak highly of his work." Anybody who imagines that industry is run on such fair and just lines has not tried organising men in any shop in any engineering works.
This provision will create an unjust situation and impose unreasonable pressures upon people. Reinstatement is the only thing which can be satisfactory in terms of trade union representation. The least that the Government must concede is that there will be adequate time for the preparation of a case. In all equity that time must be comparable to the time that would be allowed to an employer to bring a case of unfair action against a trade union.

Mr. Neil McBride: If a worker complainant is denied legal aid in a case before an industrial court while the employer defendant, because of his circumstances, is able to have full and adequate legal resources, that seems to me to be a travesty of justice. If the Government say that legal aid can be granted in some cases, clearly we have the right to ask why they are refusing it in this instance. The Government must give a reason for their refusal to grant legal aid in the circumstances which I have described.
I turn now to the point made by my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Edinburgh, Leith (Mr. Ronald King Murray) about reinstatement. The Solicitor-General will remember that I raised this matter last night, but I make no apology for raising it again, as it is in order to do so. If the worker complainant wins his case, reinstatement should be full and automatic, and the onus should be on the employer to perform that operation. Such a provision should be written into the Bill.

The Solicitor-General: On a point of order, Mr. Deputy Speaker. I am prepared to discuss the comparative provisions in respect of reinstatement and what ought or ought not to be in the Bill. The hon. Member for Swansea, East (Mr. McBride) raised the question of reinstatement last night. When I attempted at the beginning of my reply to the debate


to deal with the point, and to discuss it on the merits, the right hon. Lady the Member for Blackburn (Mrs. Castle) protested that I ought not to do so. I am glad to see the hon. Member for Edinburgh, Leith (Mr. Ronald King Murray) acknowledging his recollection of that.
The hon. Gentleman has raised the matter again now. As I was prevented by the right hon. Lady's protest from replying to the matter last night, is it, or is it not in order on this Amendment to discuss the broad general question of reinstatement? I should find it difficult to see how such a proposition could be brought within the rules of order, but if you think that it is within the rules of order, and that the hon. Gentleman is entitled to go on with this point, I hope that I may be allowed to reply to it.

Mr. Deputy Speaker (Sir Robert Grant-Ferris): In the circumstances I think that it will be for the benefit of the House if the hon. Member continues with the point he is making, and the Solicitor-General has a chance to reply to it.

Mr. Heffer: On a point of order, Mr. Deputy Speaker. As I understood it, my right hon. Friend the Member for Blackburn (Mrs. Castle) was not complaining about the issue of reinstatement having been raised. She was complaining about the fact that in our previous discussions we had never been able to have a full and lengthy discussion of the whole question.

Mr. Deputy Speaker: I think that in a debate such as this, when we are operating under the guillotine procedure, a certain amount of latitude must be allowed. We are very near the conclusion of this great matter, and my view is that a certain amount of leniency from the Chair and forbearance on the part of the Government should be the order of the day.

Mr. R. Carr: On a point of order, Mr. Deputy Speaker. We willingly accept your Ruling, but I should like to make it clear—I am sure that you would not wish to be unfair to the Government benches—that it was not lack of forbearance on our part which brought the debate on this subject to an end yesterday, but that it was concluded because of an objection by the Opposition.

Mr. Deputy Speaker: I readily accept what the Minister said. I did not wish to imply that. I feel that we should be a little broad in the debate, and I am casting no aspersions whatsoever on the Government's action yesterday.

Mr. McBride: Thank you, Mr. Deputy Speaker. I am gratified to know that my observations are in order because, to a man who is dismissed, the ability to take action to prove that his was an unfair dismissal is of great value to his self-respect. It is very important to him to prove himself right in a court of law.
Coming to the reasons for dismissal, I wonder whether the Solicitor-General has ever heard of the black list referred to by my hon. Friends the Members for Salford, West (Mr. Orme) and Dearne Valley (Mr. Edwin Wainwright)? Those who come from industry are aware of such a list. It is unpublished, but it is none the less extant. Many a trade unionist has found that the ostensible reason for his dismissal is not the real one. One never hears of a trade unionist being dismissed for indulging in trade union activities. He is dismissed because he is alleged to have done some other specified thing. I believe that this period of four weeks should be increased to six months. A person wishing to enter an action should not be precluded from doing so because the specified period is four weeks.
On the matter of collecting evidence, the hon. and learned Member for Nelson and Colne (Mr. Waddington) said that some firms were very good when it came to offering facilities for the collection of evidence for and by employees. That is all to the good, but not all employers extend these facilities, Furthermore, not all workers have an adequate knowledge of the law. It therefore follows that in terms of legal aid the worker is at a disadvantage all along the line, and that he should have adequate legal representation. If that is not so. I should like to know the Government's idea of the meaning of the word "justice".
In my view there is a sense of apology on the part of the Government for the Bill that they are putting before the House—a Bill that has gone sour on public opinion and is no longer backed by it. Those who have anything to do with industry are very apprehensive that insufficient attention has been paid to the


employees' position, in terms of the rightful prosecution of his interests. That seems to have been a sin of omission on the Government's part. They have not eliminated the sense of injustice that exists as a result of their omissions from the Bill. As my hon. Friend the Member for Norwood (Mr. John Fraser) said, they could still make a manuscript Amendment to rectify the position.
If the Government consider the matter seriously they should take into account the necessity for adequate legal aid for employees in the institution of such actions. The worker-complainant is entitled to that; no more and no less. If the Government accede to my request in that respect they will have at least gone a little way towards helping the worker. He is entitled to every protection in the form of legal aid, and the logical outcome of a successful court action should be immediate and full reinstatement in the job from which he has been unfairly dismissed.

Mr. Heffer: I want to put one or two points arising from what my hon. Friends have said, and the remarks of the hon. and learned Member for Nelson and Colne (Mr. Waddington). My hon. Friend the Member for Barrow-in-Furness (Mr. Booth) raised a very important point when he drew attention to the fact that until the application of the Bill workpeople in factories will be able to defend their shop stewards and others who represent them on the basis of industrial action for unfair dismissal.
That has always been the practice. It has been understandable that such action should be taken by workers. Whenever their shop stewards or other representatives have been under threat of dismissal by their employer the workers have made it clear to the employer that they would withdraw their labour in the event of such a dismissal. Under the provisions of the Bill, however, if they withdrew their labour the workers would be carrying out an unfair industrial practice, which means that a right that they have enjoyed up to now, in terms of defending their fellow workers—their elected representatives—is being taken away from them.

The Solicitor-General: This point is so important that I must ask the hon.

Member to specify where in the Bill it is stated to be an unfair practice to call for industrial action as a means of protest against unfair dismissal or for the reinstatement of an unfairly dismissed person. Does not the hon. Member appreciate that that point was suggested to us and we have formally rejected it? Not one provision in the Bill makes it illegal to call for industrial action in support of a worker who has been unfairly dismissed.
We have made it clear that we are providing alternative arrangements. We are discussing remedies for the worker. He can go to the tribunal and challenge the justice of his dismissal, but alongside that there is the unchanged and unfettered right to take industrial action. It is wrong to suggest that that right has been eroded or minimised in any way.

5.45 p.m.

Mr. Heffer: The Solicitor-General knows that if workers taking unofficial strike action, or similar action, are going against an agreed contract they will be carrying out an unfair industrial practice, which means the removal of one of the basic rights that workers have had up to now to defend their shop stewards from being dismissed. There is no point in the Solicitor-General trying to deny that. It also puts into context the point with which I did not agree in my right hon. Friend's Bill—the point about the 15 days. There were no unfair industrial practices in that Bill.
We have a position in which the workers are not guaranteed reinstatement. I am glad that you, Mr. Deputy-Speaker, have allowed a slightly wider-ranging debate on this point. Employers are put into favourable position in respect of workers who have been unfairly dismissed. A worker is allowed legal representation, but he may not have the money to pay for it. That means that the rich will be placed in a better position. An employer can come before the tribunal with a battery of lawyers while the worker has to suffer because legal aid is not involved.
It is clear that the Bill is weighted in the interest of the employer, against the worker, despite all the great fanfares of trumpets about unfair dismissal. We cannot allow the Solicitor-General to get away with it so easily.
I was asked a fair question, namely, what did I think was a fair period of time in which a worker should be able to apply. I thought that I had made it clear in what I said, namely, that if it were recognised as fair for an employer to be able to go to the Industrial Court within a period of six months and claim that there had been unfair industrial practice it should be equally fair for a worker to go to the tribunal within a period of six months if he felt that there had been an unfair dismissal. That point has been stressed by my hon. Friend the Member for Norwood (Mr. John Fraser) and other hon. Members, who have argued that a period of six months is a reasonable one.
A little earlier the Solicitor-General made what I thought was an interesting and revealing statement in relation to the £4,000 that could be paid to a worker if he could prove that he had been unfairly dismissed. He said that that put things right, because it tipped the balance in favour of the employer whereas in the past it had been tipped in favour of the workers.

The Solicitor-General: rose—

Mr. Heffer: If the hon. learned Gentleman wishes to deny this, let him look up HANSARD tomorrow to see what he said.

The Solicitor-General: If the hon. Gentleman is suggesting that, in answering the point of the hon. and learned Member for Leicester, North-West (Mr. Greville Janner), I suggested anything of that kind, either he or I must have got it wrong. What I was saying, it is plain beyond peradventure, is that, without the unfair dismissal provisions of the Bill, an employer could dismiss anyone and, subject to damages for breach of contract, could not be brought before any tribunal or made to pay any compensation. It is true that industrial action could be taken against him.
After the Bill, he will not be able to escape without paying compensation. He will still be liable to industrial action but he will, in addition, be liable to pay a maximum of £4,000 compensation. Whereas, pre-Bill, dismissal could have been the subject of no compensation at no cost, post-Bill it will be at the cost of compensation up to £4,000. It is on that basis that I made the same point as I have

made many times before—that the scales are being tilted against the employer so as to make it more expensive for him to contemplate dismissing anyone unfairly in that situation. Surely that point is now clear beyond peradventure.

Mr. Heffer: We shall just have to look at tomorrow's HANSARD to see what the hon. and learned Gentleman said. I noted it carefully because it seemed to me to be completely in line with the basic thinking behind the Bill—that is, that the scales are being tipped in the interests of the employers and against the workers and the unions. I say in advance that, if I am wrong, I apologise to the hon. and learned Gentleman. We shall have to look at HANSARD in relation to the part that I noted down, because it seemed to me to underline the basic philosophy of this Bill.
On that basis, unless we get some pretty convincing arguments from the Minister, we shall certainly divide the House. Since we shall not get anywhere near the Amendments of consequence, Nos. 324 and 325, we shall have a token Division on this one.

The Solicitor-General: May I reply with the permission of the House. To take the hon. Member's last point first, if I mis-recollected what I was saying, I apologise, but my clear recollection is that I said what I have just explained. We can both check this, because one makes mistakes of this kind in this kind of discussion.
On the more general point, the hon. Member for Liverpool, Walton (Mr. Heffer) used characteristic phraseology in suggesting that I should stand here as though I were facing some accusational charge and that, if he had his way, the House would not let me "get away with it". I do not know what it is that I am supposed to be getting away with, but let us bring ourselves back to reality for a moment and remind ourselves what we are talking about.
We are talking about a group of Amendments designed to remove the concept of "special reasons" and to replace it with the more benevolent concept—as the hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh, Leith (Mr. Ronald King Murray) acknowledged—of entitling a person to have extended time when he could not bring a complaint to the tribunal before.


No one has been speaking against these Amendments. They have been generally acknowledged and if the debate were confined to that, the defence that I should have to put up would need to be very slender.
But beyond that, in the wider context, we are discussing provisions introducing new remedies for unfair dismissal. We are not doing anything in respect of which we have to defend ourselves. I welcome this opportunity to make it clear to the country and the workers affected that there are here new rights and remedies which, if they were to listen to what hon. Members opposite are saying about them, they might wholly fail to observe or appreciate.
I should like to deal first with the reinstatement or non-reinstatement point. I know that the hon. Member for Swansea, East (Mr. McBride) has taken a close interest in this because of his own experience and—if I may say so without doing him irreparable injury—from his own interest in the law as one of his side interests.
The comparison between the two Bills in respect of reinstatement, without going through it at enormous length, can be put as follows. Under the last Government's Bill, it was open to a tribunal to order an employer to reinstate an employee, but under that Bill, as under any system of law so far in sight, the employer could disregard such an order. The Bill went on to provide for what happened if the employer did disregard it. Under Clause 52, the employee could go back to the tribunal for a larger cash award.
In human relationships, one cannot ultimately compel someone to take someone else back into a job and the sanction against an employer at the end of the day must be a cash award. That was the provision in the last Government's Bill.

Mr. Stanley Orme: Indeed, and that was the weakness of it. It is just the same as the weakness of this Bill. If there is a feeling of injustice, there is only one remedy—that is, workers taking or threatening to take industrial action to compel the employer to take back a worker or group of workers.

The Solicitor-General: At least I am now clear that we have disposed of that argument. The hon. Member said that that was the weakness of the last Government's Bill and it is just the same as this Bill. That is my point. At the end of the day, an order for reinstatement or a recommendation for re-engagement can be disregarded by an employer and a cash award is all that this machinery can provide.

Mr. Harold Walker: The hon. and learned Gentleman will understand that I have some personal feeling in this, since my name was on that Bill. He is saying that, in this respect, this Bill is no different from the previous Government's proposals. But the important difference is, that, unlike the present Bill, the former Bill did, as he said, provide for the tribunal to make an order compelling the employer to reinstate. If he had defied it, he would have suffered a financial penalty. There was a financial sanction. This is the normal sanction in law for any infringement of that law. There is not that sanction within the present Bill——

The Solicitor-General: There is.

Mr. Walker: Then I am waiting for him to tell me under what provision the employer suffers a heavier penalty for refusing to comply with any requirement to reinstate.

The Solicitor-General: Under Clause 111(4). When an industrial tribunal has made a recommendation for re-engagement and it is not complied with, the tribunal may increase the cash award against the employer concerned. If anyone believes that an order for reinstatement, enforceable by a higher cash award if disregarded, is different in any respect from a recommendation for re-engage-men enforceable by a higher cash award if disregarded, I can only say that there is no difference in substance at all. The hon. Member for Salford, West (Mr. Orme) is right on this point. He says that it is just the same——

Mr. Rose: Will the hon. and learned Gentleman give way?

The Solicitor-General: I am surrounded by a cloud of talent.

Mr. Rose: Modestly, I accept the compliment. Is it not right that the difference is that in this case it is permissive, in that the wording is "may",


whereas what we want is wording which will enforce a cash penalty when an employer fails to reinstate? There is a serious difference between the two.

6.0 p.m.

The Solicitor-General: I do not want to conduct a detailed analysis of these proceedings, but I am prepared, if necessary, to meet that point.
The recommendation in the Labour Government's Bill for an increase in the cash award was still not mandatory. A scale was provided and reference could be made to it. The position, in practical terms, is exactly the same, as the hon. Member for Salford, West pointed out.
Hon. Gentlemen opposite will have noticed in this Bill the specific reference to the question of reinstatement. One of the express functions conferred on conciliation officers, for which provision is here made, is directly to try to promote the re-engagement of an employee who has been subject to unfair dismissal——

Mr. Harold Walker: I apologise to the hon. and learned Gentleman for the number of interruptions he is having to suffer. Does he recognise that there is a gulf between, on the one hand, the reinstatement provisions which appeared in the Labour Bill, and for which we are asking, and "re-engagement", which is the term he is using in this connection? "Re-engagement" means a new job. "Reinstatement" means going back to one's original job and continuing with it as if there had been no interruption. There is a great difference between the two.

The Solicitor-General: I wondered when someone would get round to that. Again, the order for reinstatement provided for in Clause 38 of the Labour Bill allowed, in the alternative, for the reinstatement order to be made in a different position—[Interruption.]—and the order for re-engagement under this Bill requires the tribunal to determine——

Mr. Walker: rose—

The Solicitor-General: The hon. Gentleman must contain himself and allow me to finish a sentence or two.
If one has a provision which entitles the tribunal to order reinstatement, either in the original job or in such other job as seems reasonable, then it is re-engagement by any other name——

Several Hon. Members: rose—

The Solicitor-General: I hope that hon. Gentlemen opposite will allow me to make this point.

Mr. Walker: rose—

The Solicitor-General: I appreciate the hon. Gentleman's courtesy in wishing to interrupt me as little as possible, but I trust that he will listen for a moment to what I am saying.
The order for re-engagement under this Measure, on such terms as the tribunal considers reasonable, includes the concept of reinstatement—[HON. MEMBERS: "No".]—so we are arguing about a non-point. The tribunal would in each case have to consider what sort of remedy it should secure, at best supported by a cash sanction in the event of default by the employer.
You have been tolerant, Mr. Speaker, in allowing us to go this far in discussing a point which, by no stretch of the imagination, arises directly on this Amendment. Without discourtesy to the hon. Member for Doncaster (Mr. Harold Walker) and a number of hon. Gentlemen opposite who I know are particularly interested in this issue, I move on to the other topic we have been discussing.
The hon. and learned Member for Leith was supported by the hon. Member for Salford, West in saying that these provisions were complex, and we were told that the Scottish translation of "complex" was "legalistic quagmire". It is worth bearing in mind that these provisions dealing with unfair dismissal are contained in 11 Clauses in this Bill compared with 24 Clauses in the Labour Measure, with the same structure of remedies, simply because we wish to reduce the complexity of the legalism implicit in the former presentation. One of the first things I said when I saw the precedents laid out in the earlier Measure was, "Gracious me. Need we have 24 Clauses to deal with this? Can we achieve a reduction?"
There is a curious division on this issue among hon. Gentlemen opposite.


The hon. Member for Salford, West and the hon. Member for Barrow-in-Furness (Mr. Booth) tend to reject the value of any pattern of tribunals or courts for determining the fairness or unfairness of a man's dismissal and believe that the only sort of sanction to which the worker should have resort is industrial action. I think I see the hon. Member for Sal-ford, West nodding his head in assent.

Mr. Orme: No, though I am prepared to acknowledge that this is central to my argument. I do not say that it should be ruled out entirely. Perhaps there should be some sort of machinery which is independent of this Bill and of the State. In the main, however, I believe that this matter can be resolved only by trade unionism and by trade unionist support within the factory. To that extent, therefore, the hon. and learned Gentleman is correct.

The Solicitor-General: So be it, but it is an approach which the House, almost in its entirety, rejects. [Interruption.] It is an approach which was rejected by the Labour Government and which the country rejects. One despairs of reducing the causes and quantity of industrial strife which takes place, to the disadvantage of the workers and the country, if one is to reject altogether the idea of setting up alternative machinery which can solve these matters without resort to industrial action.
The hon. Member for Midlothian (Mr. Eadie) explained how difficult it was, without such a procedure, to secure a remedy for a man wrongly or unfairly dismissed. He was supported in particular by the hon. and learned Member for Leith in the circumstances of a case in which a criminal charge had been brought and in which a verdict of not proven was returned, or there was an acquittal, by a jury——

Mr. Eadie: The hon. and learned Gentleman will appreciate that as well as a jury, it might be a sheriff.

The Solicitor-General: By all means—the magistrate, sheriff, jury, tribunal, court; the criminal court. I do not wish to be drawn into an exposure of my comparative ignorance of the terms of art used north of the Border. I have great respect for the Scottish legal system and we owe many of our recent reforms

to what goes on there. I leave it there because I do not want to follow the hon. Gentleman into the heart of Midlothian on this subject.
With or without this machinery, it is difficult, as the hon. and learned Member for Leith knows from experience, to overcome this problem, and sometimes one would have to secure a situation in which one would attain reinstatement without compensation when negotiating as a trade union official. That is a possibility that the tribunal can recommend under this machinery, just as it could have done under the Labour Bill. In other words, it can do what it considers to be just to secure the redress of what was unfairly done to the worker.
In the situation postulated by the hon. and learned Member for Leith, in which the worker has been triumphantly acquitted by the sheriff or jury, the hon. Member for Midlothian would no doubt seek to negotiate reinstatement with full back pay. Equally, the tribunal would no doubt seek to do it; and under this Measure, as under the Labour Bill, it is free to do so.

The question is whether the power to extend the time within which a complaint may be brought would be sufficient, and the hon. and learned Member for Leith was right to raise this point. The wording relating to the power of the tribunal to extend the period for a complaint to be presented will be sufficient to deal with this.

It may be—I would have thought that this would happen—that the dismissed worker would give notice to his employer saying "I am up before the sheriff court, but I am not guilty. If you have sacked me on the strength of that, I have been unfairly dismissed", and his claim would be left in abeyance, no doubt until the criminal proceedings had been brought to an end. That is the way we would want it to work and how it should work.

I return to the remarks of the hon. Member for Barrow-in-Furness, in which there were three fundamental misconceptions. The Bill does nothing to prevent or restrain industrial action from being taken in support of a claim for the reinstatement of a dismissed worker, or by way of protest against his dismissal.

There is nothing to erode the right which the hon. Member for Salford, West regards as at the heart of trade unionism,


save in a respect to which the hon. Member for Walton referred. He said that it would not be open to workers to promote unofficial strike action by way of protest against an unfair dismissal if, by so doing, they were breaking a no-strike clause in an enforceable agreement.

The hon. Gentleman went on to describe the right to take strike action in those circumstances as one of the basic rights of trade unionism. It is a sad, tragic and unnecessary picture. If a trade union has entered into an enforceable collective agreement providing for a proper grievance procedure in respect of a fair or unfair dismissal, which is no doubt what it would do, or if the State has provided this alternative machinery so that a worker who is being as he thinks unfairly dismissed can go to the tribunal and seek redress, it can no longer be claimed as a basic right of trade unionism to call unofficial strike action whether or not there is an agreement in existence to restrain it. To that extent certainly civilisation is intended to prevail, but not to the extent of destroying or removing anything resembling a basic right of trade unionism.

Mr. Orme: May I enter a caveat here in regard to the industrial action? The Solicitor-General spoke as if we were welcoming it as the most marvellous thing. He must realise that workers will take action to defend someone who they think has been unfairly dismissed only if they see just cause for doing so. If a worker is properly dismissed, or if he does not think that he has been unfairly dismissed, the matter falls at that point. It is in the minority of cases in which workers feel that it is an anti-trade union activity or where a worker has been victimised for his industrial activity that workers take action. At that point there is no other way of redressing that grievance

The Solicitor-General: The hon. Gentleman speaks sincerely about this. I acknowledge the significance of what he says. I appreciate that the most perfect system in the world, whether in terms of industrial relations or in any other sector, will never produce total justice in every case and will not satisfy every observer, particularly interested

observers, that total justice has been arrived at.
What I am saying is that the machinery here proposed is an alternative to which the workers and their representatives can go to appeal against a dismissal and which should much more often than not, produce an answer which will satisfy them and, in that case, produce a situation which is infinitely to be preferred to the resort to industrial action. I should have thought that that at least is common ground.

Mr. Booth: The hon. and learned Gentleman's original contention went further than that he is now pressing. For a strike to take place, or even for the threat of a strike to be made which would enable discussions to take place before the man went out of the door, there would have to be a procedure agreement, enabling a strike to be called within the period of notice. In practice such procedure agreements do not exist in the vast majority of industries. Therefore, the alternative which is being offered is that of having the discussion at a court at a later date as opposed in practice, if there is strong feeling on the part of work mates, to having the discussion while the man is on the job. I contend that that is a vastly inferior alternative and not one greatly to be desired.

The Solicitor-General: Almost every word that the hon. Gentleman utters is in support of our case. He says that procedure agreements do not exist for the discussion of such matters while the people remain at work. This is one of the deficiencies which we want to remedy. This is the point my right hon. Friend referred to in saying that he wished to encourage the evolution of procedure agreements designed to do that.
The whole object of this set of provisions is not to impede negotiation on an allegation in respect of unfair dismissal. On the contrary, the requirement for notice to the employer within four weeks and concurrent notice to the conciliation officer is designed expressly to bring a conciliation officer in to get the parties talking even when there is no procedure agreement to try to promote a peaceful settlement. It does not impede negotiations.
The hon. Gentleman's third point, that the worker who has been dismissed should be presumed guilty once he has been sacked, is the precise opposite of the presumption which we laboured throughout last night and the first part of today to write into the Bill. It is now plain that the worker who has been dismissed has to be shown to have been fairly dismissed by the employer, and not the other way round.
6.15 p.m.
I do not wish to take a great deal of time in answering this, because I have already spent more than a few minutes on it. The real heart of the criticism of the Government here is that this period is too short and that it is evolved as a result of no consultation. The hon. Member for Dearne Valley (Mr. Edwin Wainwright) almost flattered me by suggesting in the tone of his argument that four weeks was a figure which was dreamed up out of the back of my head and that it was my pitiful lack of experience across the board of industry that had led to this bizarre figure being advanced.
That is absolute, if I may say so out of great respect to the hon. Gentleman, nonsense. The figure is one evolved from trying to be in line with comparable provisions in the Bill, it is longer than that contained in the last Government's Bill, and admittedly not founded on extensive consultation with the trade unions, to the regret of my right hon. Friend, as he has repeatedly said, but a perfectly reasonable period.

Mr. Edwin Wainwright: Will the hon. and learned Gentleman get it into his mind that the Bill which was brought in by my right hon. Friend the Member for Blackburn (Mrs. Castle) never faced the trade union movement in the Parliamentary Labour Party when we were in government? We should have argued as strongly against that part of that Bill as we are doing against this one, so the 15-day period would never have gone through.

The Solicitor-General: I entirely accept that. I fully see that the Bill which was introduced, I think only days before the last General Election was announced, had not been subject to the scrutiny either within or outside the Houses of Parliament. The only interesting reflection I have on that is that if even that non-

contentious Bill which was entirely acceptable to the Labour movement, as the hon. Member for Liverpool, Walton said, was likely to provoke as many Amendments of that kind on representations by the hon. Member and his hon. Friends, how many Amendments in all would that modest, non-contentious Bill have provoked; and how far is it justifiable to criticise the present Government for our willingness to respond to representations and to introduce and support Amendments as we are now doing?

Mr. Heffer: The hon. and learned Gentleman must not constantly assert that I said that the Bill was acceptable to the Labour movement, not in the context in which he is raising the question. I certainly said that the Bill was acceptable in the main to the Labour movement but that it would need to be revised and changed in the course of its progress through the House of Commons. That was the caveat I entered. The hon. and learned Gentleman must not put words into my mouth as though that Bill would have been in its entirety completely acceptable without amendment.

The Solicitor-General: It is manifest from this discussion that it would not have been entirely acceptable. The only point I am seeking to make from that is that it ill lies in the mouths of hon. Members opposite to criticise us for having introduced this Bill when even their own Bill would, as they say, have been subject to many amendments.

Mr. Harold Walker: On a point of order, Mr. Deputy Speaker. Is it in order for the hon. and learned Gentleman repeatedly to waste the time of the House by making references to a Bill which is not and which was not before the House? We are debating the Government's Bill and it is their Bill that they must be answerable for. We are not answerable for a Bill which is not under debate in the House.

Mr. Deputy Speaker (Sir Robert Grant-Ferris): With the utmost good humour, may I say that it ill-becomes Opposition Members to raise points of order of that kind when the Chair has been fairly lenient with them. We shall come to a conclusion fairly soon now on this matter and I do not think that


the hon. Gentleman should tax the Solicitor-General with being unfair.

The Solicitor-General: Simply on the question of the length of the notice, the practical point is that, if a man has been dismissed and if the intention of all sides of the House is to secure a quick remedy for that, it is obviously in everybody's interests for the claim to be got to the bargaining table as quickly as possible. The idea of discussion should be promoted as soon as may be. That is the object of this. If the House recollects, under Clause 142 it is the function of the conciliation officer so soon as the matter is reported to him to try to promote re-engagement. The sooner that is done as a matter of ordinary course the better. That is the point that was made by my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Nelson and Colne (Mr. Waddington). He said that it was important to get the parties together quickly. The hon. Member for Midlothian said that they had to get together as quickly as possible. It will be recalled that the hon. and learned Member for Rowley Regis and Tipton (Mr. Peter Archer) secured the introduction into Clause I of the words "expeditious and" before the words "orderly procedures". That is why we have a short period before notice is given, but capable of being renewed, and this is the substance of these Amendments.

Mr. Ronald King Murray: The Solicitor-General mentioned Clause 1 which contains the word "re-engagement". May I take him back to what he said in answer to a previous point raised by my hon. Friend the Member for Doncaster (Mr. Harold Walker) concerning "re-engagement" in comparison with "reinstatement"? The Solicitor-General referred to Clause 111(4)(b) in that connection. If one looks at that subsection, however, one finds that it says:
if the tribunal or Court finds that the reason for which the recommendation was not complied with was that the employer in question refused or failed to make such an offer …
That must be an offer of re-engagement.
If "re-engagement" is to be taken in that context, it seems to me that the Solicitor-General's answer to my hon. Friend the Member for Doncaster will not do. There is a difference between re-

engagement and reinstatement. A re-engagement can be for a considerable time after the original job has ceased—that is, after dismissal. The difference between that and reinstatement is quite obvious. An offer of reinstatement must be an offer of restitution at that date. Re-engagement cannot be raised to that level, so far as I can see. Compensation given under Clause 111(4)(b) can never reach the level of reinstatement.

The Solicitor-General: I am slightly at a loss. A moment or two ago I was denounced by the hon. Member for Doncaster for discussing provisions in the last Government's Bill, and now the hon. Member for Edinburgh, Leith invites me to go back to it. There is a similar variable in the last Government's Bill. The amount of interim compensation which could have been awarded for that period was also in the discretion of the tribunal.
I say one thing more. Several hon. Members have discussed the availability or non-availability of legal aid in this context. The hon. Member for Norwood (Mr. John Fraser) compared the existence of remedies in respect of wrongful dismissal, which will still be available, in the situation of the worker who is dismissed in breach of contract. But the machinery that we are seeking to set up and maintain for the resolution of these unfair dismissals is deliberately designed to discourage legalisation and legalism. We do not wish to give open-ended encouragement or make provision for the introduction of lawyers into this kind of machinery.
There has been no evidence of any growing reluctance by workers to bring redundancy claims. It is for this reason that we have provided the alternative machinery of the conciliation officer, the same kind of person who intervenes in a case brought under the Race Relations Act. There is no direct legal access for the aggrieved party on these points. The worker who claims unfair dismissal has his case referred to the conciliation officer. If that does not work, he goes on to the tribunal. He may be represented by a trade union official. He can have the total resources of his union at his disposal. That will be one of the powerful arguments in favour of union membership rather than any semidetached relationship.
In this kind of way the balance of the remedies which we have discussed at great length is, I suggest, entirely right. Certainly the Amendments that we are discussing have not been put up as candidates for dismissal by anyone on the other side of the House. They may not think the Amendments go as far as they

would like, but no argument has been advanced as to why the House should reject them.

Question put, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment:

The House divided: Ayes 274, Noes 231.

Division No. 455.]
AYES
[6.25 p.m.


Adley, Robert
Elliott, R. W. (N'c'tle-upon-Tyne, N.)
Kilfedder, James


Alison, Michael (Barkston Ash)
Emery, Peter
King, Evelyn (Dorset, S.)


Allason, Jame (Hemel Hempstead)
Eyre, Reginald
King, Tom (Bridgwater)


Amery, Rt. Hn. Julian
Farr, John
Kinsey, J. R.


Archer, Jeffrey (Louth)
Fell, Anthony
Kirk, Peter


Astor, John
Fenner, Mrs. Peggy
Kitson, Timothy


Atkins, Humphrey
Fidler, Michael
Knox, David


Awdry, Daniel
Finsberg, Geoffrey (Hampstead)
Lambton, Antony


Baker, Kenneth (St. Marylebone)
Fisher, Nigel (Surbiton)
Lane, David


Baker, W. H. K. (Banff)
Fookes, Miss Janet
Langford-Holt, Sir John


Balniel, Lord
Fortescue, Tim
Legge-Bourke, Sir Harry


Barber, Rt. Hn. Anthony
Foster, Sir John
Le Marchant, Spencer


Batsford, Brian
Fowler, Norman
Lewis, Kenneth (Rutland)


Beamish, Col. Sir Tufton
Fox, Marcus
Lloyd, Ian (P'tsm'th, Langstone)


Bennett, Sir Frederic (Torquay)
Fraser, Rt. Hn. Hugh (St'fford & Stone)
Longden, Gilbert


Benyon, W.
Fry, Peter
Loveridge, John


Berry, Hn. Anthony
Galbraith, Hn. T. G.
Luce, R. N.


Biffen, John
Gardner, Edward
McAdden, Sir Stephen


Biggs-Davison, John
Gibson-Watt, David
MacArthur, Ian


Blaker, Peter
Gilmour, Ian (Norfolk, C.)
McCrindle, R. A.


Boardman, Tom (Leicester, S.W.)
Gilmour, Sir John (Fife, E.)
McLaren, Martin


Body, Richard
Glyn, Dr. Alan
Maclean, Sir Fitzroy


Boscawen, Robert
Godber, Rt. Hn. J. B.
McMaster, Stanley


Bossom, Sir Clive
Goodhart, Philip
Macmillan, Maurice (Farnham)


Bowden, Andrew
Goodhew, Victor
McNair-Wilson, Michael


Boyd-Carpenter, Rt. Hn. John
Gorst, John
McNair-Wilson, Patrick (NewForest)


Braine, Bernard
Gower, Raymond
Maddan, Martin


Bray, Ronald
Grant, Anthony (Harrow, C.)
Madel, David


Brewis, John
Gray, Hamish
Maginnis, John E.


Brinton, Sir Tatton
Green, Alan
Marten, Neil


Brocklebank-Fowler, Christopher
Grieve, Percy
Mather, Carol


Brown, Sir Edward (Bath)
Grimond, Rt. Hn. J.
Maude, Angus


Bruce-Gardyne, J.
Grylls, Michael
Mawby, Ray


Bryan, Paul
Gummer, Selwyn
Maxwell-Hyslop, R. J.


Buchanan-Smith, Alick (Angus, N & M)
Gurden, Harold
Meyer, Sir Anthony


Buck, Antony
Hall, Miss Joan (Keighley)
Mills, Peter (Torrington)


Bullus, Sir Eric
Hall, John (Wycombe)
Mitchell, Lt.-Col. C. (Aberdeenshire, W)


Burden, F. A.
Hall-Davis, A. G. F.
Mitchell, David (Basingstoke)


Butler, Adam (Bosworth)
Hamilton, Michael (Salisbury)
Moate, Roger


Carlisle, Mark
Hannam, John (Exeter)
Molyneaux, James


Carr, Rt. Hn. Robert
Harrison, Col. Sir Harwood (Eye)
Money, Ernie


Channon, Paul
Haselhurst, Alan
Monks, Mrs. Connie


Chapman, Sydney
Havers, Michael
Monro, Hector


Chichester-Clark, R.
Hawkins, Paul
Montgomery, Fergus


Churchill, W. S.
Hayhoe, Barney
More, Jasper


Clark, William (Surrey, E.)
Hicks, Robert
Morgan-Giles, Rear-Adm.


Clarke, Kenneth (Rushcliffe)
Higgins, Terence L.
Morrison, Charles (Devizes)


Cockeram, Eric
Hiley, Joseph
Mudd, David


Cooke, Robert
Hill, John E. B. (Norfolk, S.)
Murton, Oscar


Coombs, Derek
Hill, James (Southampton, Test)
Neave, Airey


Corfield, Rt. Hn. Frederick
Holt, Miss Mary
Noble, Rt. Hn. Michael


Cormack, Patrick
Hooson, Emlyn
Normanton, Tom


Costain, A. P.
Hordern, Peter
Nott, John


Critchley, Julian
Hornby, Richard
Onslow, Cranley


Crouch, David
Hornsby-Smith, Rt. Hn. Dame Patricia
Oppenheim, Mrs. Sally


Curran, Charles
Howe, Hn. Sir Geoffrey (Reigate)
Orr, Capt. L. P. S.


d'Avigdor-Goldsmid, Sir Henry
Howell, David (Guildford)
Osborn, John


d'Avigdor-Goldsmid, Maj.-Gen. James
Howell, Ralph (Norfolk, N.)
Owen, Idris (Stockport, N.)


Dean, Paul
Hunt, John
Page, Graham (Crosby)


Deedes, Rt. Hn. W. F.
Hutchison, Michael Clark
Page, John (Harrow, W.)


Dixon, Piers
Iremonger, T. L.
Parkinson, Cecil (Enfield, W.)


Dodds-Parker, Douglas
James, David
Peel, John


Drayson, G. B.
Jessel, Toby
Percival, Ian


du Cann, Rt. Hn. Edward
Johnson Smith, G. (E. Grinstead)
Pink, R. Bonner


Dykes, Hugh
Jopling, Michael
Pounder, Rafton


Eden, Sir John
Kaberry, Sir Donald
Powell, Rt. Hn. J. Enoch


Edwards, Nicholas (Pembroke)
Kellett-Bowman, Mrs. Elaine
Proudfoot, Wilfred


Elliot, Capt. Walter (Carshalton)
Kershaw, Anthony
Pym, Rt. Hn. Francis




Quennell, Miss J. M.
Soref, Harold
Vaughan, Dr. Gerard


Raison, Timothy
Spence, John
Vickers, Dame Joan


Rawlinson, Rt. Hn. Sir Peter
Sproat, Iain
Waddington, David


Redmond, Robert
Stanbrook, Ivor
Walder, David (Clitheroe)


Reed, Laurance (Bolton, E.)
Stewart-Smith, D. G. (Belper)
Walker, Rt. Hn. Peter (Worcester)


Rees-Davies, W. R.
Stodart, Anthony (Edinburgh, W.)
Walker-Smith, Rt. Hn. Sir Derek


Renton, Rt. Hn. Sir David
Stoddart-Scott, Col. Sir M.
Walters, Dennis


Rhys Williams, Sir Brandon
Stokes, John
Ward, Dame Irene


Ridley, Hn. Nicholas
Stuttaford, Dr. Tom
Weatherill, Bernard

Ridsdale, Julian
Sutcliffe, John
Wells, John (Maidstone)


Roberts, Wyn (Conway)
Taylor, Sir Charles (Eastbourne)
White, Roger (Gravesend)


Rodgers, Sir John (Sevenoaks)
Taylor, Edward M. (G'gow, Cathcart)
Whitelaw, Rt. Hn. William


Rossi, Hugh (Hornsey)
Taylor, Frank (Moss Side)
Wiggin, Jerry


Rost, Peter
Tebbit, Norman
Wilkinson, John


Russell, Sir Ronald
Temple, John M.
Wolrige-Gordon, Patrick


St. John-Stevas, Norman
Thatcher, Rt. Hn. Mrs. Margaret
Wood, Rt. Hn. Richard


Scott, Nicholas
Thomas, John Stradling (Monmouth)
Woodhouse, Hn. Christopher


Scott-Hopkins, James
Thomas, Rt. Hn. Peter (Hendon, S.)
Woodnutt, Mark


Sharples, Richard
Thorpe, Rt. Hn. Jeremy
Worsley, Marcus


Shaw, Michael (Sc'b'gh & Whitby)
Tilney, John
Wylie, Rt. Hn. N. R.


Shelton, William (Clapham)
Trafford, Dr. Anthony



Simeons, Charles
Trew, Peter
TELLERS FOR THE AYES:


Sinclair, Sir George
Tugendhat, Christopher
Mr. Keith Speed and


Skeet, T. H. H.
Turton, Rt. Hn. Sir Robin
Mr. Walter Clegg.


Smith, Dudley (W'wick & L'mington)
Van Straubezee, W. R.





NOES


Albu, Austen
Duffy, A. E. P.
Jones, Barry (Flint, E.)


Allaun, Frank (Salford, E.)
Eadie, Alex
Jones, Dan (Burnley)


Allen, Scholefield
Edelman, Maurice
Jones, Rt. Hn. Sir Elwyn (W.Ham, S.)


Archer, Peter (Rowley Regis)
Edwards, Robert (Bilston)
Jones, Gwynoro (Carmarthen)


Ashley, Jack
Edwards, William (Merioneth)
Jones, T. Alec (Rhondda, W.)


Ashton, Joe
Ellis, Tom
Kaufman, Gerald


Atkinson, Norman
English, Michael
Kelly, Richard


Bagier, Gordon A. T.
Evans, Fred
Kerr, Russell


Barnett, Guy (Greenwich)
Faulds, Andrew
Kinnock, Neil


Barnett, Joel
Fernyhough, Rt. Hn. E.
Lambie, David


Beaney, Alan
Fisher, Mrs. Doris (B'ham, Ladywood)
Latham, Arthur


Benn, Rt. Hn. Anthony Wedgwood
Fitch, Alan (Wigan)
Lawson, George


Bennett, James (Glasgow, Bridgeton)
Fletcher, Ted (Darlington)
Leadbitter, Ted


Bidwell, Sydney
Foley, Maurice
Lee, Rt. Hn. Frederick


Bishop, E. S.
Foot, Michael
Leonard, Dick


Blenkinsop, Arthur
Ford, Ben
Lever, Rt. Hn. Harold


Boardman, H. (Leigh)
Forrester, John
Lewis, Arthur (W. Ham, N.)


Booth, Albert
Fraser, John (Norwood)
Lewis, Ron (Carlisle)


Bottomley, Rt. Hn. Arthur
Freeson, Reginald
Lipton, Marcus


Boyden, James (Bishop Auckland)
Galpern, Sir Myer
Loughlin, Charles


Bradley, Tom
Garrett, W. E.
Lyon, Alexander W. (York)


Brown, Hugh D. (G'gow, Provan)
Gilbert, Dr. John
Lyons, Edward (Bradford, E.)


Brown, Ronald (Shoreditch & F'bury)
Ginsburg, David
Mabon, Dr. J. Dickson


Buchan, Norman
Golding, John
McBride, Neil


Buchanan, Richard (G'gow, Sp'burn)
Gordon Walker, Rt. Hn. P. C.
McCartney, Hugh


Butler, Mrs. Joyce (Wood Green)
Gourlay, Harry
McGuire, Michael



Grant, George (Morpeth)
Mackenzie, Gregor


Callaghan, Rt. Hn. James
Grant, John D. (Islington, E.)
Mackie, John


Cant, R. B.
Griffiths, Eddie (Brightside)
Maclennan, Robert


Carmichael, Neil
Hamilton, James (Bothwell)
McMillan, Tom (Glasgow, C.)


Carter-Jones, Lewis (Eccles)
Hamilton, William (Fife, W.)
McNamara, J. Kevin


Castle, Rt. Hn. Barbara
Hamling, William
Mallalieu, J. P. W. (Huddersfield, E.)


Clark, David (Colne Valley)
Hannan, William (G'gow, Maryhill)
Marks, Kenneth


Cocks, Michael (Bristol, S.)
Hardy, Peter
Marquand, David


Coleman, Donald
Harrison, Walter (Wakefield)
Marsden, F.


Conlan, Bernard
Hart, Rt. Hn. Judith
Marshall, Dr. Edmund


Corbet, Mrs. Freda
Hattersley, Roy
Mason, Rt. Hn. Roy


Cox, Thomas (Wandsworth, C.)
Healey, Rt. Hn. Denis
Meacher, Michael


Crawshaw, Richard
Heffer, Eric S.
Mellish, Rt. Hn. Robert


Cunningham, G. (Islington, S.W.)
Horam, John
Mendelson, John


Dalyell, Tam
Houghton, Rt. Hn. Douglas
Millan, Bruce


Darling, Rt. Hn. George
Howell, Denis (Small Heath)
Miller, Dr. M. S.


Davidson, Arthur
Huckfield, Leslie
Milne, Edward (Blyth)


Davies, G. Elfed (Rhondda, E.)
Hughes, Mark (Durham)
Mitchell, R. C. (S'hampton, Itchen)


Davies, Ifor (Gower)
Hughes, Robert (Aberdeen, N.)
Molloy, William


Davies, S. O. (Merthyr Tydvil)
Hughes, Roy (Newport)
Morris, Alfred (Wythenshawe)


Davis, Clinton (Hackney, C.)
Hunter, Adam
Morris, Charles R. (Openshaw)


Davis, Terry (Bromsgrove)
Irvine, Rt. Hn. Sir Arthur (Edge Hill)
Morris, Rt. Hn. John (Aberavon)


de Freitas, Rt. Hn. Sir Geoffrey
Janner, Greville
Moyle, Roland


Delargy, H. J.
Jay, Rt. Hn. Douglas
Mulley, Rt. Hn. Frederick


Dell, Rt. Hn. Edmund
Jeger, Mrs. Lena (H'b'n & St. P'Cras, S.)
Murray, Ronald King


Dempsey, James
Jenkins, Hugh (Putney)
Ogden, Eric


Doig, Peter
Jenkins, Rt. Hn. Roy (Stechford)
O'Halloran, Michael


Douglas, Dick (Stirlingshire, E.)
John, Brynmor
O'Malley, Brian


Douglas-Mann, Bruce
Johnson, Carol (Lewisham, S.)
Oram, Bert


Driberg, Tom
Johnson, Walter (Derby, S.)
Orme, Stanley







Oswald, Thomas
Roper, JohnTinn, James


Owen, Dr. David (Plymouth, Sutton)
Rose, Paul B.
Tomney, Frank


Paget, R. T.
Sandelson, Neville
Torney, Tom


Palmer, Arthur
Sheldon, Robert (Ashton-under-Lyne)
Urwin, T. W.


Pannell, Rt. Hn. Charles
Shore, Rt. Hn. Peter (Stepney)
Varley, Eric G.


Parker, John (Dagenham)
Short, Mrs. Renée (W'hampton, N.E.)
Wainwright, Edwin


Parry, Robert (Liverpool, Exchange)
Silkin, Hn. S. C. (Dulwich)
Walker, Harold (Doncaster)


Peart, Rt. Hn. Fred
Silverman, Julius
Wallace, George


Pendry, Tom
Skinner, Dennis
Watkins, David


Pentland, Norman
Small, William
Weitzman, David


Perry, Ernest G.
Smith, John (Lanarkshire, N.)
Wells, William (Walsall, N.)


Prentice, Rt. Hn. Reg.
Spearing, Nigel
Whitehead, Phillip


Prescott, John
Spriggs, Leslie
Willey, Rt. Hn. Frederick


Price, J. T. (Westhoughton)
Stallard, A. W.
Williams, Alan (Swansea, W.)


Probert, Arthur
Stoddart, David (Swindon)
Williams, Mrs. Shirley (Hitchin)


Reed, D. (Sedgefield)
Storehouse, Rt. Hn. John
Wilson, Alexander (Hamilton)


Rees, Merlyn (Leeds, S.)
Strang, Gavin
Wilson, William (Coventry, S.)


Rhodes, Geoffrey
Summerskill, Hn. Dr. Shirley
Woof, Robert


Richard, Ivor
Taverne, Dick



Roberts, Albert (Normanton)
Thomas, Rt. Hn. George (Cardiff.W.)
TELLERS FOR THE NOES:


Roberts, Rt. Hn. Goronwy (Caernarvon)
Thomas, Jeffrey (Abertillery)
Mr. Joseph Harper and


Robertson, John (Paisley)
Thomson, Rt. Hn. G. (Dundee, E.)
Mr. Ernest Armstrong.


Rodgers, William (Stockton-on-Tees)

Subsequent Lords Amendments agreed to.

Clause 31

PRESSURE ON EMPLOYER TO INFRINGE RIGHTS OF WORKERS

Lords Amendment:
No. 61, in page 24, line 26, at end insert—
() knowingly to induce an employer to comply with a provision declared to be
void

by an order of the Industrial Court under section 6(1B) of this Act, or".

Motion made, and Question put, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said
Amendment—[Mr. Dudley Smith]:—

The House divided: Ayes 268, Noes 228.

Division No. 456.]
AYES
[6.37 p.m.


Adley, Robert
Chapman, Sydney
Gardner, Edward


Alison, Michael (Barkston Ash)
Chichester-Clark, R.
Gibson-Watt, David


Allason, James (Hemel Hempstead)
Churchill, W. S.
Gilmour, Ian (Norfolk, C.)


Amery, Rt. Hn. Julian
Clark, William (Surrey, E.)
Gilmour, Sir John (Fife, E.)


Archer, Jeffrey (Louth)
Clarke, Kenneth (Rushcliffe)
Glyn, Dr. Alan


Astor, John
Clegg, Walter
Goodhart, Philip


Atkins, Humphrey
Cockeram, Eric
Goodhew, Victor


Awdry, Daniel
Cooke, Robert
Gorst, John


Baker, Kenneth (St. Marylebone)
Coombs, Derek
Gower, Raymond


Baker, W. H. K. (Banff)
Corfield, Rt. Hn. Frederick
Grant, Anthony (Harrow, C.)


Balniel, Lord
Cormack, Patrick
Gray, Hamish


Barber, Rt. Hn. Anthony
Critchley, Julian
Green, Alan


Batsford, Brian
Crouch, David
Grieve, Percy


Bell, Ronald
Curran, Charles
Grimond, Rt. Hn. J.


Bennett, Sir Frederic (Torquay)
d'Avigdor-Goldsmid, Sir Henry
Grylls, Michael


Benyon, W.
d'Avigdor-Goldsmid, Maj.-Gen. James
Gummer, Selwyn


Berry, Hn. Anthony
Dean, Paul
Gurden, Harold


Biffen, John
Deedes, Rt. Hn. W. F.
Hall, Miss Joan (Keighley)


Biggs-Davison, John
Dixon, Piers
Hall, John (Wycombe)


Blaker, Peter
Dodds-Parker, Douglas
Hall-Davis, A. G. F.


Boardman, Tom (Leicester, S.W.)
Drayson, G. B.
Hamilton, Michael (Salisbury)


Body, Richard
du Cann, Rt. Hn. Edward
Hannam, John (Exeter)


Boscawen, Robert
Dykes, Hugh
Harrison, Col. Sir Harwood (Eye)


Bossom, Sir Clive
Eden, Sir John
Haselhurst, Alan


Bowden, Andrew
Edwards, Nicholas (Pembroke)
Havers, Michael


Boyd-Carpenter, Rt. Hn. John
Elliot, Capt. Walter (Carshalton)
Hawkins, Paul


Braine, Bernard
Elliott, R. W. (N'c'tle-upon-Tyne, N.)
Hayhoe, Barney


Bray, Ronald
Emery, Peter
Hicks, Robert


Brewis, John
Eyre, Reginald
Higgins, Terence L.


Brinton, Sir Tatton
Farr, John
Hiley, Joseph


Brocklebank-Fowler, Christopher
Fell, Anthony
Hill, John E. B. (Norfolk, S.)


Brown, Sir Edward (Bath)
Fenner, Mrs. Peggy
Hill, James (Southampton, Test)


Bruce-Gardyne, J.
Fidler, Michael
Holt, Miss Mary


Bryan, Paul
Finsberg, Geoffrey (Hampstead)
Hooson, Emlyn


Buchanan-Smith, Alick (Angus, N & M)
Fookes, Miss Janet
Hordern, Peter


Buck, Antony
Fortescue, Tim
Hornby, Richard


Bullus, Sir Eric
Foster, Sir John
Homsby-Smith, Rt. Hn. Dame Patricia


Burden, F. A.
Fowler, Norman
Howe, Hn. Sir Geoffrey (Reigate)


Butler, Adam (Bosworth)
Fox, Marcus
Howell, David (Guildford)


Carlisle, Mark
Fraser, Rt. Hn. Hugh (St'fford & Stone)
Howell, Ralph (Norfolk, N.)


Carr, Rt. Hn. Robert
Fry, Peter
Hunt, John


Channon, Paul
Galbraith, Hn. T. G.
Hutchison, Michael Clark




Iremonger, T. L.
Monro, Hector
Sinclair, Sir George


James, David
Montgomery, Fergus
Skeet, T. H. H.


Jessel, Toby
More, Jasper
Smith, Dudley (W'wick & L'mington)


Johnson Smith, G. (E. Grinstead)
Morgan-Giles, Rear-Adm.
Soref, Harold


Jopling, Michael
Morrison, Charles (Devizes)
Spence, John


Kaberry, Sir Donald
Mudd, David
Sproat, Iain


Kellett-Bowman, Mrs. Elaine
Murton, Oscar
Stanbrook, Ivor


Kershaw, Anthony
Neave, Airey
Stewart-Smith, Geoffrey (Belper)


Kilfedder, James
Noble, Rt. Hn. Michael
Stodart, Anthony (Edinburgh, W.)


King, Evelyn (Dorset, S.)
Normanton, Tom
Stoddart-Scott, Col. Sir M.


King, Tom (Bridgwater)
Nott, John
Stokes, John


Kinsey, J. R.
Onslow, Cranley
Stuttaford, Dr. Tom


Kirk, Peter
Oppenheim, Mrs. Sally
Sutcliffe, John


Kitson, Timothy
Orr, Capt. L. P. S.
Taylor, Edward M. (G'gow, Cathcart)


Knox, David
Osborn, John
Taylor, Frank (Moss Side)


Lambton, Antony
Owen, Idris (Stockport, N.)
Tebbit, Norman


Lane, David
Page, Graham (Crosby)
Temple, John M.


Langford-Holt, Sir John
Page, John (Harrow, W.)
Thatcher, Rt. Hn. Mrs. Margaret


LeggeBourke, Sir Harry
Parkinson, Cecil (Enfield, W.)
Thomas, John Stradling (Monmouth)


Le Marchant, Spencer
Peel, John
Thomas, Rt. Hn. Peter (Hendon, S.)


Lewis, Kenneth (Rutland)
Percival, Ian
Tilney, John


Lloyd, Ian (P'tsm'th, Langstone)
Pink R. Bonner
Trafford, Dr. Anthony


Longden, Gilbert
Pounder, Rafton
Trew, Peter


Loveridge, John
Powell, Rt. Hn. J. Enoch
Tugendhat, Christopher




Turton, Rt. Hn. Sir Robin


Luce, R. N.
Proudfoot, Wilfred
van Straubenzee, W. R.


McAdden, Sir Stephen
Pym, Rt. Hn. Francis
Vaughan, Dr. Gerard


MacArthur, Ian
Quennell, Miss J. M.
Vickers, Dame Joan


McCrindle, R, A.
Raison, Timothy
Waddington, David


Maclean, Sir Fitzroy
Rawlinson, Rt. Hn. Sir Peter
Walder, David (Clitheroe)


McMaster, Stanley
Redmond, Robert
Walker, Rt. Hn. Peter (Worcester)


Macmillan, Maurice (Farnham)
Reed, Laurance (Bolton, E.)
Walter-Smith, Rt. Hn. Sir Derek


McNair-Wilon, Michael
Rees-Davies, W. R.
Walters, Dennis


McNair-Wilson, Patrick (NewForest)
Renton, Rt. Hn. Sir David
Ward, Dame Irene


Maddan, Martin
Rhys Williams, Sir Brandon
Wells, John (Maidstone)


Madel, David
Ridley, Hn. Nicholas
White, Roger (Gravesend)


Maginnis, John E.
Ridsdale, Julian
Whitelaw, Rt. Hn. William


Marten, Neil
Roberts, Wyn (Conway)
Wiggin, Jerry


Mather, Carol
Rodgers, Sir John (Sevenoaks)
Wilkinson, John


Maude, Angus
Rossi, Hugh (Hornsey)
Wolrige-Gordon, Patrick


Mawby, Ray
Rost, Peter
Wood, Rt. Hn. Richard


Maxwell-Hyslop, R. J.
Russell, Sir Ronald
Woodhouse, Hn. Christopher


Meyer, Sir Anthony
St. John-Stevas, Norman
Woodnutt, Mark


Mills, Peter (Torrington)
Scott, Nicholas
Worsley, Marcus


Mitchell, Lt. -Col. C. (Aberdeenshire, W)
Scott-Hopkins, James
Wylie, Rt. Hn. N. R.


Mitchell, David (Basingstoke)
Sharples, Richard



Moate, Roger
Shaw, Michael (Sc'b'gh & Whitby)
TELLERS FOR THE AYES:


Molyneaux, James
Shelton, William (Clapham)
Mr. Bernard Weatherill and


Money, Ernie
Simeons, Charles
Mr. Keith Speed.


Monks, Mrs. Connie






NOES


Albu, Austen
Castle, Rt. Hn. Barbara
English, Michael


Allaun, Frank (Salford, E.)
Clark, David (Colne Valley)
Evans, Fred


Allen, Scholefield
Cocks, Michael (Bristol, S.)
Faulds, Andrew


Archer, Peter (Rowley Regis)
Coleman, Donald
Fernyhough, Rt. Hn. E.


Ashley, Jack
Conlan, Bernard
Fisher, Mrs. Doris (B'ham, Ladywood)


Ashton, Joe
Corbet, Mrs. Freda
Fitch, Alan (Wigan)


Atkinson, Norman
Cox, Thomas (Wandsworth, C.)
Fletcher, Ted (Darlington)


Bagier, Gordon A. T.
Crawshaw, Richard
Foley, Maurice


Barnett, Guy (Greenwich)
Cunningham, G. (Islington, S.W.)
Foot, Michael


Barnett, Joel
Dalyell, Tam
Ford, Ben


Beaney, Alan
Darling, Rt. Hn. George
Forrester, John


Benn, Rt. Hn. Anthony Wedgwood
Davidson, Arthur
Fraser, John (Norwood)


Bennett, James (Glasgow, Bridgeton)
Davies, G. Elfed (Rhondda, E.)
Freeson, Reginald


Bidwell, Sydney
Davies, Ifor (Gower)
Galpern, Sir Myer


Bishop, E. S.
Davies, S. O. (Merthyr Tydvil)
Garrett, W. E.


Blenkinsop, Arthur
Davis, Clinton (Hackney, C.)
Gilbert, Dr. John


Boardman, H. (Leigh)
Davis, Terry (Bromsgrove)
Ginsburg, David


Booth, Albert
de Freitas, Rt. Hn. Sir Geoffrey
Golding, John


Bottomley, Rt. Hn. Arthur
Delargy, H. J.
Gordon Walker, Rt. Hn. P. C.


Boyden, James (Bishop Auckland)
Dell, Rt. Hn. Edmund
Gourlay, Harry


Bradley, Tom
Dempsey, James
Grant, George (Morpeth)


Brown, Hugh D. (G'gow, Provan)
Doig, Peter
Grant, John D. (Islington, E.)


Brown, Ronald (Shoreditch & F'bury)Douglas, Dick (Stirlingshire,
E.)
Griffiths, Eddie (Brightside)


Buchan, Norman
Douglas-Mann, Bruce
Hamilton, James (Bothwell)


Buchanan, Richard (G'gow, Sp'burn)
Driberg, Tom
Hamilton, William (Fife, W.)


Butler, Mrs. Joyce (Wood Green)
Duffy, A. E. P.
Hamling, William


Callaghan, Rt. Hn. James
Eadie, Alex
Hannan, William (G'gow, Maryhill)


Campbell, I. (Dunbartonshire, W.)
Edelman, Maurice
Hardy, Peter


Cant, R. B.
Edwards, Robert (Bilston)
Harrison, Walter (Wakefield)


Carmichael, Neil
Edwards, William (Merioneth)
Hart, Rt. Hn. Judith


Carter-Jones, Lewis (Eccles)
Ellis, Tom
Hattersley, Roy







Healey, Rt. Hn, Denis
McMillan, Tom (Glasgow, C.)
Roberts, Albert (Normanton)


Heffer, Eric S.
McNamara, J. Kevin
Roberts, Rt. Hn. Goronwy (Caernarvon)


Horam, John
Mallalieu, J. P. W. (Huddersfield, E.)
Robertson, John (Paisley)


Houghton, Rt. Hn. Douglas
Marks, Kenneth
Rodgers, William (Stockton-on-Tees)


Howell, Denis (Small Heath)
Marquand, David
Roper, John


Huckfield, Leslie
Marsden, F.
Rose, Paul B.


Hughes, Mark (Durham)
Marshall, Dr. Edmund
Sandelson, Neville


Hughes, Robert (Aberdeen, N.)
Mason, Rt. Hn. Roy
Sheldon, Robert (Ashton-under-Lyne)


Hughes, Roy (Newport)
Mellish, Rt. Hn. Robert
Shore, Rt. Hn. Peter (Stepney)


Irvine, Rt. Hn. Sir Arthur (Edge Hill)
Mendelson, John
Short, Mrs. Renée (W'hampton, N.E.)


Janner, Greville
Millan, Bruce
Silkin, Hn. S. C. (Dulwich)


Jeger, Mrs. Lena (H'b'n & St. P'cras, S.)
Miller, Dr. M. S.
Silverman, Julius


Jenkins, Hugh (Putney)
Milne, Edward (Blyth)
Skinner, Dennis


Jenkins, Rt. Hn. Roy (Stechford)
Mitchell, R. C. (S'hampton, Itchen)
Small, William


John, Brynmor
Molloy, William
Smith, John (Lanarkshire, N.)


Johnson, Carol (Lewisham, S.)
Morgan, Elystan (Cardiganshire)
Spearing, Nigel


Johnson, Walter (Derby, S.)
Morris, Alfred (Wythenshawe)
Spriggs, Leslie


Jones, Barry (Flint, E.)
Morris, Charles R. (Openshaw)
Stallard, A. W.


Jones, Dan (Burnley)
Morris, Rt. Hn. John (Aberavon)
Stoddart, David (Swindon)


Jones, Rt. Hn. Sir Elwyn (W.Ham, S.)
Moyle, Roland
Stonehouse, Rt. Hn. John


Jones, Gwynoro (Carmarthen)
Mulley, Rt. Hn. Frederick
Strang, Gavin


Jones, T. Alec (Rhondda, W.)
Murray, Ronald King
Taverne, Dick


Kaufman, Gerald
Ogden, Eric
Thomas, Rt. Hn. George (Cardiff, W.)


Kelley, Richard
O'Halloran, Michael
Thomas, Jeffrey (Abertillery)


Kerr, Russell
O'Malley, Brian
Thomson, Rt. Hn. G. (Dundee, E.)


Kinnock, Neil
Oram, Bert
Tinn, James


Lambie, David
Orme, Stanley
Tomney, Frank


Latham, Arthur
Oswald, Thomas
Torney, Tom


Lawson, George
Owen, Dr. David (Plymouth, Sutton)
Urwin, T. W.


Leadbitter, Ted
Paget, R. T.
Varley, Eric G.


Lee, Rt. Hn. Frederick
Palmer, Arthur
Wainwright, Edwin


Leonard, Dick
Pannell, Rt. Hn. Charles
Walker, Harold (Doncaster)


Lever, Rt. Hn. Harold
Parker, John (Dagenham)
Wallace, George




Watkins, David


Lewis, Arthur (W. Ham, N.)
Parry, Robert (Liverpool, Exchange)
Weitzman, David


Lewis, Ron (Carlisle)
Peart, Rt. Hn. Fred
Wells, William (Walsall, N.)


Lipton, Marcus
Pendry, Tom
Whitehead, Phillip


Loughlin, Charles
Pentland, Norman
Wiley, Rt. Hn. Frederick


Lyon, Alexander W. (York)
Perry, Ernest G.
Williams, Alan (Swansea, W.)


Lyons, Edward (Bradford, E.)
Prentice, Rt. Hn. Reg.
Williams, Mrs. Shirley (Hitchin)


Mabon, Dr. J. Dickson
Prescott, John
Wilson, Alexander (Hamilton)


McBride, Neil
Price, J. T, (Westhoughton)
Wilson, William (Coventry, S.)


McCartney, Hugh
Probert, Arthur
Woof, Robert


McGuire, Michael
Reed, D. (Sedgefield)



Mackenzie, Gregor
Rees, Merlyn (Leeds, S.)
TELLERS FOR THE NOES:


Mackie, John
Rhodes, Geoffrey
Mr. Joseph Harper and


Maclennan, Robert
Richard, Ivor
Mr. Ernest Armstrong.

Subsequent Lords Amendments agreed to.

Clause 32

PRESUMPTIONS RELATING TO COLLECTIVE AGREEMENTS

Lords Amendment: No. 63, in page 25, line 19, leave out subsections (3) and (4).

The Solicitor-General: I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.

Mr. Deputy Speaker (Miss Harvie Anderson): I think that it would be for the convenience of the House to take Lords Amendments No. 63 to 66 inclusive, together with No. 132, 182, 241, 267, 268, 269, 271 and 277.

Mrs. Castle: I think that there may be a slight misunderstanding, Mr. Deputy Speaker, I thought that the Government's grouping was No. 63 plus 66. You said, "No. 63 to 66", and we would not wish that.

The Solicitor-General: Perhaps I might be allowed to say what I think is the convenient grouping, which is as follows: No. 63, No. 66, in Clause 34, page 27, line 10, leave out subsection (3).

No. 181, in Clause 92, page 70, line 40, leave out from "agreement" to "but" in line 42.

No. 182, in page 71, line 4, leave out from "agreement" to end of line 6.

No. 241, in Clause 143, page 105, line 10, leave out from "agreement" to "excluding" in line 12.

No. 267, after Clause 157, in page 114, line 42, at end insert new Clause L.

No. 268, in Clause 158, page 115, leave out lines 13 and 14.

No. 269, in page 115, line 19, leave out "this section" and insert
section (Meaning of "collective agreement" and "procedure agreement") of this Act".

No. 275, in page 116, line 28, leave out "this section" and insert
section (Meaning of "collective agreement" and "procedure agreement") of this Act".
and No. 277, in page 117, leave out lines 27 to 44. If the House is agreeable, that is the set of Amendments which I propose to discuss.

Mr. Deputy Speaker: I think it would be for the convenience of the House to take that sequence of Amendments.

The Solicitor-General: The Amendments are grouped because they deal with the same subject. Basically they arise from the point made in Committee in this House that having the definition of a collective agreement in Clause 32 was misleading or confusing, and that it should be located in a different part of the Bill with the other general definition provisions. The opportunity has been taken to draw together a number of other definition provisions in one convenient place, substantially in new Clause L, which is the subject of Lords Amendment No. 267.

Lords Amendment No. 63 removes from Clause 32 subsections (3) and (4), which define a collective agreement and a party. Lords Amendment No. 66 removes subsection (3) of Clause 34, which says that a collective agreement for definition purposes includes an agreement rendered enforceable as a result of an order made under Clause 39. Lords Amendments Nos. 181 and 182 remove from Clause 92 similar references to a collective agreement made enforceable as a result of an order under Clause 39, Lords Amendment No. 241 does the same in Clause 143.

Lords Amendment No. 267 is the substantive new Clause which draws together all these provisions in one convenient place. I will return to it shortly.

Lords Amendment No. 268 removes the reference to a definition of a collective agreement from Clause 158, because it will now be separately set out in new Clause L. Lords Amendments Nos. 269 and 275 make further consequential changes to the definition Clause, and Lords Amendment No. 277 removes from Clause 158 the definition of a procedure agreement, which also goes into the new Clause L.

Therefore, in substance we are discussing Amendment 267, new Clause L, where there now appear the provisions which take the place of the various provisions I have identified as being within the other Amendments in the group. I hope that that explanation of what is happening will be helpful to the House so that we know exactly what we are talking about.

Subsection (1) of new Clause L—Lords Amendment No. 267—relocates the definition of a collective agreement from its earlier position in Clause 32(3). It is placed near to the main definition Clause—Clause 158—so that any misunderstanding about its general application or its intention in the context of the whole Bill is removed. It is no longer stitched alongside Clause 32(1) and (2).

The new Clause also includes a definition of a procedure agreement, which was previously in the main definition Clause. One of the reasons for separating this definition of a collective agreement from Clause 32 is to remove any room for misunderstanding about the proposition that Clause 32, which is the Clause containing the presumption of legal enforceability, unless that is disclaimed by the parties, applies only to a written agreement entered into after the commencement of the Act. The effect of Clause 32—the presumption—is plainly operative only in relation to a written agreement entered into after the commencement of the Act. My hon. Friend the Member for Rutland and Stamford (Mr. Kenneth Lewis) was another of those who suggested that having the two definitions together led to confusion. This is the main object of the exercise.

I shall now explain a little more fully what each subsection of new Clause L contains. Subsection (1) repeats the definition of "collective agreement". It is done in such a way as to extend the definition of people who may be parties to it to include employers' associations as well as simply employers and also to include a mixture of employers and employers' associations. There is no great substance in that except that it is more convenient. Subsection (1)(b) defines the nature of a collective agreement. The kind of thing that it has to deal with is the same as what was formerly Clause 32(3)(b).

Subsection (2) of the new Clause clarifies a possible doubt——

Mr. Orme: I am sorry to interrupt the hon. and learned Gentleman. Can he tell the House whether the definition "one or more employers" in subsection (1)(a) is the result of representations from the Engineering Employers' Federation?

The Solicitor-General: I would not like, although not because of any evasiveness, to give an affirmative answer to that. I cannot recollect any such representation. It is, I think, prompted more by general convenience that a collective agreement can come into existence as the result of agreements between groups of employers and groups of unions or an employers' federation and a group of unions or, sometimes, an employers' federation and separate employers working alongside it. This is merely to make it plain for definition purposes that any such coming together of people gives rise to a collective agreement. I emphasise, however, that such a coming together resulting in a collective agreement does not itself give rise to any presumption of legal enforceability. It is only in the context of Clause 32—a written agreement entered into after the commencement of the Act—that that presumption arises.
Subsection (2) of new Clause L makes it plain that a decision of a joint body to which Clause 33 applies—we will be discussing that on a subsequent Amendment—is to be regarded, provided that it is made in writing and in the manner there set out, as a collective agreement, which might not have been clear on the previous formulation.
Subsection (3) replaces the old Clause 34(3) to make it plain throughout the Bill that the phrase "collective agreement" also includes an agreement rendered enforceable by a Clause 39 order. That enables one to simplify the repetition of a reference to that in Clauses 92 and 143.
Subsection (4) makes clear who are the parties to a collective agreement when the collective agreement is made by representative organisations. This was a point on which the hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh, Leith (Mr. Ronald King Murray) made observations during the Committee stage of the Bill, when he suggested that the previous formulation said that the parties should

include certain people. The new formulation is designed with that point amongst other points in mind.
Subsection (5) repeats with only one small change the definition of "procedure agreement" previously contained in Clause 158. The small change, which I should mention in case it has escaped attention, is that paragraphs (e) and (f) separate a procedure agreement relating to dismissal from a procedure agreement relating to matters of discipline other than dismissal. The point is that some agreements relate only to dismissals and others relate to matters of discipline apart from dismissal. Each of those would normally be regarded as a procedure agreement, and they should not be joined under one heading as they were under the previous formulation.
As a result of all these restructurings of the Bill—as I say, they are drawn together in one place—the essential provisions remain in line with the points of view expressed during the debates in this House, and certainly they have been drawn in line with those points of view. However, the presumption of legal enforceability established by Clause 32 applies only to collective agreements in writing entered into after the commencement of the Act.
The implication of a best endeavours obligation relating to Clause 34(2) again applies only to a collective agreement made after the commencement of the Act. There are similar provisions in Clause 33, which we shall discuss on the next Amendment, which make it plain that the presumption there applies only to a decision given after the commencement of the Act and when it has been recorded in writing.

Mr. Harold Walker: The Solicitor-General will, I think, agree that this may be an appropriate point for me to raise with him the question, which I have raised both in Committee and on Report and about which he was good enough to write to me, of the effect of the repeal of the 1871 Act on agreements entered into before the Bill becomes law and which may, in consequence be exposed to action in the courts.
The hon. and learned Gentleman said in his letter to me that it was not the


Government's intention that any agreement which was not already directly enforceable should become directly enforceable merely as a consequence of repeal of the 1871 Act. I can find nothing in the Bill, however, that would translate that position into law. Can the Solicitor-General tell me of anything in the Bill that could reassure my anxieties on this point?

7.0 p.m.

The Solicitor-General: I am grateful to the hon. Member for raising that point now because it certainly arises here. I know his anxiety about it. We have exchanged correspondence about it. The relevant Amendment is Amendment No. 197 and the point is this. Both sides of the House were concerned that the status of an agreement which was not directly enforceable because of the provisions of the 1871 Act before the coming into operation of the Bill should not be altered by the repeal of Section 4 of the 1871 Act and in particular that remedies beyond those available under the 1871 Act should not be available under this Bill. The 1871 Act—I have not the text of it in front of me—basically provided that such an agreement should not be directly enforceable. We are concerned not to change that.

By Amendment No. 197 to Clause 101 we are making it plain that if proceedings are brought about such a collective agreement under Clause 97 then the only remedy which would be available in respect of it would be a declaration of rights. That is the same position as would have existed in relation to such an agreement had Section 4 of the 1871 Act not been repealed. I know the hon. Member has been concerned about this and we are grateful to him for having reminded us of it. I hope the House will feel that that discharges the agreement we made in respect of that.

I do not think I should say more than that at this stage about what these Lords Amendments are about, but I commend them to the House as a simplification and clarification of the substance of the previous provisions.

Mr. Rose: This group of Lords Amendments revolves around the central new Clause L to come after Clause 157. The hon. and learned Gentleman referred

to this as a restructuring. It is a restructuring, but I see no improvement save for the fact that a number of strands have been brought together. It seems to me a curious commentary on the original drafting of the Bill that these pieces have had to be collected not in Committee or on Report in this House, when we might have expected this to have happened, but the guillotine was in operation, but in another place where there was no Guillotine. That illustrates the point which we on this side of the House have made of the necessity for full debate on these matters of importance.
We now have a new and extensive and, indeed, comprehensive definition of collective agreement, although I remember at an earlier stage expressing the view very forcefully that basically a collective agreement is a changing and continuing relationship entirely ill-suited to precise legal interpretation and enforceability. Even in the United States the arbitrator rather than the judge is the important third-party decision maker under collective bargaining agreements.
There is also here a distinction drawn between the procedure agreement and the collective agreement and it becomes necessary in our law now because of the importation into the law of the fictitious procedure agreement. It would not be necessary if we did not have imposed on us the concept of the fictitious procedure agreement.
I think the hon. and learned Gentleman would acknowledge that if ever there were an area which is delicate and where the law is ill-suited to enter it is this field of procedure agreements as such; and legal enforceability in regard to procedure agreements is perhaps the most difficult of all, let alone enforceability where there has been no agreement, where "agreement" is forced upon an unwilling party. It is because of this that I strongly resent the inclusion once again in subsection (3) of the new Clause of the reference to the collective agreement, taking Clause 39 of the Bill which deals with fictitious procedure agreements.
I should like to go back for a moment to subsection (2) of the new Clause because the Solicitor-General referred to joint bodies. There is here a problem which I know is exercising the minds of


many trade unionists. The problem was raised with me at a trade union conference which I addressed very recently. It is the problem of the minute book recording the negotiations between the two sides in an industry where agreement is recorded in writing in the minute book but neither side has appended a signature to a contract, neither side has concluded a bargain in the sense of signing, sealing and delivering any document, but the proceedings are recorded in writing. Because they are recorded in writing in the minute book it would seem that under Clause 32 they are enforceable, although there is no signature to them. I know that this is a problem which has been raised on a number of occasions, not in this House but at trade union conferences.

Mr. Kenneth Lewis: Somebody, clearly, has to sign the records, the minutes, and these minutes are accepted because of signature?

Mr. Rose: The minutes are accepted as a true and proper account of what occurred; they are not necessarily accepted as a legally binding agreement. In other words, if the hon. Member entered into an agreement with me to vacate a seat for a by-election, he would have to sign. This is very different.

Mr. Orme: My hon. Friend has probably been informed on this matter, but what happens on many occasions in industry is that at a meeting between management and workers somebody takes a record of the meeting and certain decisions are arrived at and then at a later date, because the management have the facilities, those minutes are circulated by the management to the trade unions, in addition to the employer keeping a copy. They are not asked for a signature. Unless any serious objection is taken the minutes are taken as a form of agreement, but if they were to have legal backing the trade unions would have to approach the matter from an entirely different point of view. That is the important issue.

Mr. Rose: Indeed, my hon. Friend is absolutely right. I advised, and certain legal friends of mine have advised, a conference of A.S.T.M.S., my own union, that on every occasion it would be necessary to enter a caveat immediately in

writing that these minutes would not be enforceable. That would be a procedure on the taking down of the minutes.
I want to get back to the point of the procedure agreement for a moment. There is an artificial distinction between the substantive side and the procedure side. One could be a quid pro quo for the other. One could be part of an agreement. For example, for certain improvements in wages and conditions—additional holidays, for instance—a union might agree to certain procedures. There seems to me that there could be a highly artificial distinction in many cases—not in all—in trying to disentangle the procedure from the substantive side, as this new Clause seeks to do by this definition of the procedure side of an agreement.
In part, as the hon. and learned Gentleman said, the new Clause only reproduces an assortment of subsections sprinkled through the Bill, and in that sense one might welcome it as a tidying up operation. Indeed, it is the only sense in which I would welcome it. As Lord Drumalbyn admitted in another place—and I take his word for it—the words "collective agreement" appear 25 times in the Bill. I would add, 25 times too often.
Lord Drumalbyn said:
… the definition is so central to the whole purpose of the Bill."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, House of Lords, 10th June, 1971; Vol 320, c. 448.]
In other words, according to the noble Lord, the central purpose of the Bill is to stand Donovan on its head.
We debated in full in Committee the question of the enforceability of collective agreements, and pointed out some of the dangers. We pointed out the problem, not necessarily of the minute book of the type I referred to earlier, but the ordinary minute book which could render an agreement into writing. We referred to the lack of a requirement for a proper form of agreement. All one needs is something in writing, and there is no form laid down in the Clause. There may well come about a great deal of litigation in the courts, although I believe every trade union in the land will now be telling its members that the first item in any set of negotiations will be over a


proviso to prevent legal enforceability, because this amendment must be looked at in the light of Clause 32.
In particular I am concerned—and this concern was expressed in another place—about the words "or arrangement" in line 3 of new Clause L. Does this mean that an arrangement becomes a legally binding agreement where it is part of an understanding which is ancillary to a written agreement that is made enforceable by Clause 32? If it does—and this is the danger—it means that pre-existing arrangements that were not intended to be legally enforceable could become so by reason of a subsequent agreement in writing which makes on specific reference to the custom but may lead to an implication—and the court may draw this inference—that that pre-existing custom is part of the collective agreement.
It is bad enough to import legal enforceability into the complex and shifting pattern within a modern and constantly changing relationship in industry when these customs are set down in writing, but to enforce customs which are not tangible and not susceptible to precise description would only add confusion and ill feeling. I hope that the learned Solicitor-General will apply his mind to that point.
There is a new form of wording to which the hon. and learned Gentleman made no reference, and that is
(in whatever way and in whatever form)
This differs from the original Bill. That again may well be interpreted by the courts to allow for enforceability other than the enforceability intended by the Clause; in other words, it is intended only to cover agreements rendered in writing after the coming into force of the Bill.
First, we must deal with arrangements separately and, secondly, we must deal with
(in whatever way and in whatever form)
in such a manner as to show that anything that is not actually set down in writing by the parties and signed by them cannot form part of an agreement. It is interesting to note, looking at the Clause, that agreements of organisations of workers come within the definition. We have double standards here. Where the Government want to get the organisations of workers by their lapels and force them

into a collective agreement, they hold them close, but when the Government want to tear off the workers' protective clothing they do so at their whim. The unregistered trade unions, under the Bill, seem to have become the new whipping boy for the Government, who are the real culprits for the industrial decline and stagnation we have seen recently at Rolls-Royce and U.C.S.
How will the courts enforce a decision against a loose conglomeration of people who form an organisation of workers who are not within the definition of a trade union because they are not registered? The Government are likely to be laying up a great store of trouble for themselves by dealing with organisations of workers in that way.
7.15 p.m.
Much of the difficulty here could be cleared up merely by defining the form in which any collective agreement must be made to render it enforceable. There is no difficulty about doing that. There seems to be an intention in the Clause to bring surreptitiously within the ambit of enforceability as much as possible. As a result of the Clause we now have a six-fold system of arrangements. We have, first, arrangements not in writing and not enforceable; secondly, agreements not in writing and not enforceable; thirdly, agreements in writing and expressly stated not to be enforceable; fourthly, agreements in writing presumed to be enforceable; fifthly, agreements in writing stated to be enforceable; sixthly, arrangements not in writing but linked to either my fourth or fifth point and therefore possibly enforceable, and that is the difficult one.
That illustrates the tangle we are getting into, and the complexity will keep our minutes secretaries busy looking over their shoulders and reading their minutes into the late hours to make sure they have not fallen into the Solicitor-General's trap by getting themselves involved in an enforceable collective agreement.
I return to the underlying theme on this side of the House by quoting what Professor Wellington said in his evidence to Donovan:
A collective agreement is one episode in a continuing joint history of a firm and a union. It is a temporary calm in a restless, shifting relationship. Accordingly, an attempt to compel the employer or the union during contract time peacefully to yield on a deeply felt issue, particularly if it believes it never


consented to yield, often will not resolve that issue.
This links up with what my hon. Friend said in the last debate when he recognised the essential vagueness so important to collective agreements which encompass numerous unforeseen circumstances and unforeseeable events because industry is constantly changing. No amount of complex definition such as the Solicitor-General has introduced in the Amendment will help him in the context of our national traditions and our history of free collective bargaining. All the evidence is, as was clear from Donovan, that a judge's training and a lawyer's training—and I include the hon. and learned Gentleman and myself in this—are likely to make us reject some of what should be closely considered when we deal with collective agreements, because in many respects the person involved in industry is better qualified to understand these matters. Compromise, and not judicial rulings that have to be finite, definite and on one side, is the essence of free collective bargaining. Surely this is where the hon. and learned Gentleman goes wrong.
To obtain satisfactory enforceable agreements of the type covered in this definition would mean great changes in industry, and Donovan understood this. The Solicitor-General has dismissed all that Donovan had to say. He has put the cart before the horse, because Donovan recommended the consideration of enforceability only after the reform of collective bargaining. All the documents that were drawn up by the previous Government, whatever criticism the hon. and learned Gentleman may level at them, straightforwardly opposed legal enforceability.
There is the added fact that the Solicitor-General knows only too well that today, with wage drift and plant bargaining, the substantive agreement represents often nothing more than the minimum which the worker expects in that industry. Therefore, it is the procedure agreement that will be the subject of litigation, and it is the procedure agreement that gives the employer the opportunity to take action. There will be very few actions on substance by employees in that climate of collective bargaining, even if they have been unwise enough to enter a collective agreement that is enforceable. But define the

agreement as he may, legal enforceability, as Roy Lewis pointed out in an excellent article in the British Journal of Industrial Relations, will be unlikely to deter unofficial or unconstitutional strikes.
The Solicitor-General is misleading himself, the House and the public if he thinks this Clause will cut down the number of strikes. These problems
require the exercise of discretion and judgment based on practical experience, rather than the exclusive application of strict legal principles".
Those words are taken from a document which the hon. and learned Gentleman well knows—"Fair Deal at Work". I fear that in introducing this new Clause and the consequential Amendment the Solicitor-General has failed to show that discretion and judgment. All he has displayed is the fact that, despite the long passage of this Bill through this House and through another place, the Government's judgment and discretion are just as lacking as they ever were.

Mr. Ronald King Murray: I wish to echo two themes which were mentioned by my hon. Friend the Member for Manchester, Blackley (Mr. Rose) in discussing this group of Amendments. The first concerns the meaning of "collective agreement". Various subsections which reappear in this arrangement of provisions have been re-engaged rather than reinstated, and I believe the results are not satisfactory. They have been moved round and although some improvement has been made—I do not want to be under-generous—there are two quite serious flaws which remain.
This matter is connected with the point made by my hon. Friend about collective agreements. On the face of it many of the difficulties with this definition Clause are connected with the fact that the distinction between a registered trade union and an organisation of workers is drawn when it suits the Government to the disadvantage of organisations of workers; and, again when it suits the Government, it is drawn to the advantage of the employers. The result is that organisations of workers, who remain outlaws in the Bill for most purposes, are brought into the Bill for purposes of enforcement under the new Clause.
The hon. and learned Gentleman the Solicitor-General yesterday ventured to


say that the Bill followed Donovan on registration of trade unions. That is less than fair to Donovan. He will see from paragraph 792 of the Donovan Report the following statement
We think, therefore that all trade unions should as from some convenient future date receive corporate status and be registered.
The difference between that approach and the present Bill is the difference between chalk and cheese. What Donovan recommended was that trade unions for the first time should have conferred on them the full status of legal corporate bodies. They have been outlaws—pariahs—throughout industrial legislation in this country up to the present. This Bill does not propose to enfranchise them, as Donovan was proposing to do.
It is worth noting that the fundamental point in that key sentence in Donovan is the conferring of corporate status. If a new freedom and liberty is to be conferred on these bodies, it is only fair that restrictions of law should follow. The Donovan restriction was that they should be registered so that it is known where they are and so that the corporate status can be given full effect.
In this context registration is a different thing from registration under the Bill. Registration under the Bill is a special privilege conferred on trade unions which are prepared to eat humble pie and accept what is offered to them in the Bill.
What worries me is that collective agreements still stand as something to be enforced against organisations of workers, although organisations of workers are not to get the corresponding franchise which registered trade unions will obtain under the Bill.
I foresee that great trouble will arise from these provisions. It is questionable whether this Bill—this monstrous jumbo, indeed jumble, of a Bill—can ever be made to work. The more we discuss it the more questionable it becomes. I believe the provisions in the new Clause will become matters for heated controversy and much difficulty will be experienced in interpretation of a collective agreement.
I should like to take another point on the new Clause. One sees in subsection (1)(a) of new Clause L a slight change from the original form of the provisions.

The original form in Clause 32(3) started by saying:
In this Act ' collective agreement ' means any agreement or arrangement (whether written or oral) …
and then the provision proceeds to define the characteristics to be given. However, in paragraph (a) of the new Clause there is the following definition of a collective agreement:
an agreement or arrangement made (in whatever and in whatever form) …".
That is fantastic wording when one thinks of the physical reality to which it is supposed to apply.
The House will recall that there was some criticism on both sides of the House when we originally discussed Clause 32, but there is a vagueness in the wording of the new Clause which is even more open to objection. The words:
an agreement or arrangement made (in whatever way and in whatever form) …".
must be applied to the realities of shop floor experience. It is as plain as a pikestaff that often in the heat of a workshop a nod may be as good as a wink. A controversy exists, there is a great deal of discussion, and the people concerned get to the end of words and find they are getting nowhere. And then suddenly they agree on something that works. How on earth is one to prove such an agreement? Where does one start? Where is one to get the consensus which exists at the moment of crisis in the workshop? How is one to reproduce that afterwards when the heat has passed? The Clause is less workable than was the original provision. It seems to me clear that in this provision the contact between law and industrial reality is lacking.
My hon. Friend the Member for Blackley stressed the fact that it is a mockery to talk about a procedure agreement when by the provisions of Clause 39 a procedure can be imposed against the will of those concerned. Surely the Government should have taken the opportunity to rectify that situation by deleting the word "agreement" altogether. An imposed procedure is a totally different thing from a procedure agreement. I am sure that industry would regard them quite differently. A procedure agreement is obviously a much more desirable entity. There has been a consensus, which is understandable, and both sides of industry should be held to


it. In addition to the fact that there has been some kind of agreement, there is a moral sanction. But the moral sanction is often more powerful in the industrial sphere. Why get rid of that by reducing them both to the same level and by saying that a procedure agreement is to be regarded as the same kind of thing as an imposed procedure? Plainly, that is not true. What the Government are doing in putting them on the same level is levelling down on the worst possible consensus. They will find that they have poisoned the sort of atmosphere in which a procedure agreement might have a chance of viability today.
For this reason, amongst others, this new Clause is a lost opportunity. The Government have had the opportunity of rectifying a great many evils and—I do not want to be ungenerous—they have rectified some defects, but they have lost the opportunity to transform this part of the Bill and recognise the true realities of the industrial workshop instead of stressing the legality.

7.30 p.m.

Mr. Roland Moyle: When I intervened in a debate last week, I drew attention to the fact that the Amendment we were then discussing was a more complex portion of the Bill than it had been when it left this House. I can make the same point exactly on this Amendment. The hon. and learned Gentleman said that subsection (1) of new Clause L was a retransposition of the original definition which had gone to the House of Lords, but he used a euphemism and said that the definition had been extended. Indeed, that is so. Another word he might have used was that the definition of the parties to a collective agreement had been rendered more complicated than when the provision left us. Now it has come back to us, we find that there are new types of people who can be parties to a collective agreement; there are new definitions of them.
It is not a great increase in complexity, but once again the Government, faced with the problem of applying the instrument of law to what one might term either rich or appalling complexities in our industrial life—depending on one's point of view at a particular time—have solved it by extending the complexity of

the definitions which they have worked into the Bill. This has happened over and over again throughout the Bill. As a problem has been met, instead of trying to solve it by process of simplification, it has been solved on the basis of increasing complexity and has rendered the Bill less and less useful to industrial personnel on both sides who will have to try and apply it in practice.
An altercation took place between my hon. Friend the Member for Manchester, Blackley (Mr. Rose) and my hon. Friend the Member for Salford, West (Mr. Orme) about the question of the legal enforceability of minutes. This is a practical point. As someone who has been involved in this process, a practical question occurred to me. Supposing the parties to a collective agreement had had sufficient forethought to exclude their minutes from legal enforceability, as I think they would inevitably wish to do, for some reason peculiar to their trade or industry, but wanted to have the agreement itself enforced. It is well known that, if one has a dispute about the actual content of the agreement, perhaps it will not go as far as the industrial tribunal but the parties to the agreement around the table may wish to settle the dispute, and one of the documents they may take in evidence, in order to try to clear up what the collective agreement might mean, is the minutes of the joint negotiating body which had reached the agreement. Supposing there is a reference in the enforceable agreement to the non-legally enforceable minutes, for example, as a source by which obscurities in the legally enforceable agreement might be cleared up. Does that render the minutes legally enforceable—a situation which the parties to the joint negotiations deliberately wished to avoid?
I am trying to look at this new Clause as someone trying to apply it. So far I have two strong objections to it—on the grounds that it is totally obscure and that it is an opaque document when it comes to helping people like myself in doing their job in industry. The matter can be taken further. Having referred to subsection (1) of new Clause L, one turns to subsection (5). First of all, there is an attempt to define there what a procedure agreement may mean from the point of view of legal enforceability. Here


it becomes particularly difficult and complicated because, to start with, the subsection refers to
… machinery for consultation with regard to … settlement by negotiation …
This is indeed a very obscure phrase.
As I have always understood it, in industrial relations consultation means a situation where the management may invite the trade union into the room, listen to what it has to say, and then the decision in that process still rests with the management. I may be wrong on this, but I have been unable to find a definition of the term "consultation" in the Bill. On the other hand, settlement by negotiation is a totally different process. The union and the management meet. They argue and the decision which emerges, if a decision does emerge—and it does most of the time—is a joint decision, and both sides are responsible for applying it. Given that, what I would like to know is how one can have machinery for consultation with regard to settlement by negotiation.
It seems to me that these two technical phrases—at least they have a technical meaning to people who try to apply industrial relations matters in practice—only confuse the issue in the absence of some authoritative definition as to what the Bill will actually mean. This point, I suppose, I could have picked up when the Bill was in this House previously. In fact, the more one reads the Bill the more complex seem to be the issues raised, and one is forever coming across new aspects which were not recognised earlier. From that point of view, therefore, I feel that no apology is needed.
The next point arising from subsection (5) is that whereas it attempts to define what a procedure agreement may mean, and whereas Clause 142 does give the Minister power to appoint conciliation officers, there is no reference in subsection (5) to the settlement of terms and conditions of employment by a process of conciliation. I wonder whether the Government intentionally mean to exclude the settlement of terms and conditions of service reached by a process of conciliation from the Bill, or whether this is an oversight on their part.
I recall one negotiating body to which I was attached. It was the normal pro-

cedure for an officer of the Department to be present at every joint negotiating meeting. I take it that his main purpose was, if difficulties did arise, to refer the matter back to the Department. I have no doubt that, if a dispute had arisen where he felt he had the resources to conciliate and reach a settlement at the negotiating table by a process of conciliation, he would have done so. Supposing this sort of situation arose, would the right hon. Gentleman then assume that, because the agreement had been reached by a process of conciliation and not by a settlement by negotiation or arbitration, it was automatically excluded from the procedure agreement which it is the attempt of this part of the Bill to define? As I have pointed out, the Bill is not defining what a procedure agreement is but is throwing up an even greater number of questions as to what a procedure agreement is.
There is an addition here. Subsection (5)(d) of new Clause L says that
facilities for officials of trade unions or other organisations of workers
are indeed matters for a procedure agreement. I take it that any agreement between the employers and the trade unions to have a member of the right hon. Gentleman's Department present, although it might tend to be a crucial factor in any settlement which might be reached at some future stage, would not be regarded as a procedure agreement.
Another point arises on paragraph (g):
procedures relating to grievances of individual workers
I have had experience of collective agreements involving works councils, district joint industrial councils and a national joint industrial council. Under that procedure, there is the question of negotiating terms and conditions of service for the whole of the industry concerned, particularly manual workers, as they used to be called. I think that "operatives" is the usual term nowadays. In that situation there is a process by which an individual worker who has a grievance can appeal to his works council. If that does not produce satisfaction, he can appeal to the district joint industrial council. Finally, if that does not produce satisfaction, he can appeal to the national joint industrial council. I presume that that could be a procedure agreement which could be legally enforceable under subsection (5).
What can also be found in industry is a situation where small groups of workers wish to appeal against a grievance. They do not wish to renegotiate any of the national or local agreements; they wish to ensure that the national or district agreement is correctly applied to them. They appeal through the same procedure that an individual worker might use if he had an individual grievance.
Suppose it is a group grievance not of sufficient status to warrant being a national matter. Will this be a procedure agreement under subsection (5) of new Clause L? It is not clear. I assume that the Government have intentionally omitted to deal with the group procedure. If not, I hope that I have done them some service in drawing attention to the omission.
Indeed, this point particularly arose in one industry with which I was connected when an entirely new form of agreement was negotiated and was being applied. At that time it was thought that, because it was a new form of agreement and misunderstandings might arise, a special procedure should be introduced for grievance appeals by small groups of employees against the national agreement so that it might be correctly applied to them in case the personnel staff concerned were misunderstanding it and were wrongly applying that procedure to individual groups of workers.
The procedure was quite simple. It was that groups of workers were allowed to appeal directly from their works, offices or production stations, or whatever it might be, straight to the national joint industrial council. This was a specific procedure to deal with the grievances of individual groups of workers.
I cannot see how subsection (5) will define whether that is a procedure agreement or not. I assume that if the right hon. Gentleman had had notice of this kind of agreement he would have said that it should be a procedure agreement. However, I suppose that as he has not had notice of it, it is unlikely to be caught by the definition in subsection (5), and therefore there will be a loophole which I hope can be used to the advantage of trade unions and organisations representing workers. It may just compound the confusion to which this subsection is already leading.
It is interesting to see that subsection (5) of new Clause L has been deliberately drafted in considerable detail with a view to avoiding legal confusion on many of these matters. However, I believe that anybody attempting to administer the provisions in the subsection in the circumstances of British industry, by virtue of the complexity with which it has been drafted, will be led ever deeper into the mire until the point where few trade unionists or personnel managers will be confident that they can apply it to industrial relations in their own industries.
I should like answers to the many questions which I have asked. I hope that the right hon. Gentleman has those answers.

7.45 p.m.

Mr. Sydney Bidwell: In an earlier debate the Solicitor-General treated up to an intellectual exercise showing how trade unions and workpeople can be given exact equations at law. It was as if he were standing or leaning two playing cards against each other and suggesting that they could ever have equal weight. It is precisely that thinking which leads us into a situation where we now discuss the burden of enforceable contract law applying to collective agreements.
My hon. Friend the Member for Manchester, Blackley (Mr. Rose) put his finger on the crucial spot of industrial relations in this matter when he more or less pointed out that, under the concept of collective agreements between work people and trade unions and employers, the thing is in constant motion. The only constant factor in such a relationship is that of change. That is a matter which the law cannot possibly embrace, because the law is not a constant factor of change.
I cannot help feeling, Mr. Speaker, that the proceedings of this House are made workable, possible and practicable, not as a result of the rulebook, but largely as a result of convention, of continuous trial and error and, of course, of the skill and experience of yourself in our proceedings.
So it is with the realities of industrial relations. That is why we on this side of the House, with our experience and background in industry, whether in a particular trade union or over the whole of the trade union front, or whether, as in my


case, in trade union education work for many years before coming here, having listened to workers' explanations at summer school and within the whole complex of the trade union educational system, have had borne in upon us the tremendous variety of relationships which exist between workpeople and employers in the great complexity of British industry.
When we look at this attempt to draw together the concept of enforceable contract in new Clause L, I cannot help thinking that the reason that we have a relatively co-operative situation—not by any means a perfect situation—within our industry and economy is that at least we have not got the strike records and the turmoil which many other countries have. We have too many strikes in the sense that we do not want them. We want justice to be achieved without resorting to strikes. The co-operation which exists in industry results from the workers having a feeling of freedom within the existing system. If at the beginning, we had applied the concept of contract law to agreements, and had allowed it to have its run and then, over the years, progressed from it, that would have been all right, but instead of that we are walking backwards to Christmas.
Very often when an agreement is made between trade unions and employers there is provision for a certain amount of freedom of action by both sides. On many occasions trade union representatives come to an agreement with employers and then find that in practice the agreement is unacceptable to the workers on whose behalf it has been made. The trade union negotiators have misread the situation but, because of the terms of the agreement, it is possible to countermand what has been agreed with the employers. If a contract is enforceable at law, trade union representatives will have to be doubly cautious. They may even not come to any agreement at all. That is what the Solicitor-General, with his excess of legality is missing, and he will find that if he tries to enforce this provision he will come unstuck.
It is all a question of flexibility. I remember my experience as a railway worker. I was a departmental committee worker, a local shop steward. I was a shunter, doing a dirty and dangerous job.

At our meetings we always spoke about the spirit of an agreement. One cannot refer to the spirit of an agreement when there is enforceability at law. What matters is not the words on the lines of an agreement, but what is between the lines.
We are not proposing that a trade union representative has to hold a ballot among his fellow workers before accepting any and every part of an agreement. That would be totally unworkable, but one wonders whether a trade union representative will ever come to a decision in the future, bearing in mind this threat of enforceability at law. He has not been brought up in that tradition, and that factor should weigh heavily with the Solicitor-General when he considers these matters.
Time and again the Solicitor-General has referred to the Donovan Commission which laboured for so long with so much expertise and in the end gave us a brilliant presentation of the views at which its experts had arrived. In the trade union movement we had our different opinions about the extent to which we should permit the incursion of the State into trade union matters. We saw that when my right hon. Friend presented her Bill to deal with industrial relations. There was a discussion about how much of the Donovan Commission's Report would apply in the event of a Labour Government continuing in office. One thing that is certain is that we should never have ended up with the concept of enforceable contracts.

Mr. Orme: The legal analysis of my hon. Friend the Member for Manchester, Blackley (Mr. Rose), reinforced by my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Edinburgh, Leith (Mr. Ronald King Murray), is an indication of the pitfalls that await us if we make collective agreements legally enforceable.
I want to consider the problem from a practical point of view. In the engineering industry, when a national agreement is arrived at between the Confederation of Shipbuilding and Engineering Unions and the Engineering Employers Federation it is drawn up with a great deal of precision. It is probably one of the most precise agreements in the trade union world.
The agreement having been drawn up, the two sides meet to define the notes


for guidance. It must be remembered that an engineering agreement affects about 3¼ million workers. These notes for guidance are often of pamphlet size. They are circulated to all Engineering Employers Federation establishments and to the trade unions concerned. The trade unions then send copies of those notes to shop stewards throughout the engineering industry, and they become the bible for the current agreements.
The agreement may last for three years, and the notes may deal with overtime, piece-work earnings, hours of work, holidays and so on, but by the very nature of things they are somewhat imprecise. Everyone knows that it is not possible to draw up even legal agreements with absolute precision. We all know of agreements being interpreted differently by different courts. A judge in one court puts a certain interpretation on a document. A judge in a higher court may take a different view. Although judges are authorities on the law, all too often differences of opinion and emphasis arise between them.
When a trade union agreement is circulated to industry as a whole, one finds a different emphasis being put on different aspects of the agreement, depending on the area in which it is being considered. This is because of the historical background of the industry in an area. Because a certain skill predominates in, say, the Manchester area, the agreement is interpreted slightly differently there from the way in which it is interpreted in the Midlands, in London or in Nottingham.
Because there are differences of opinion on the notes for guidance, negotiations take place between district committees and local employers' associations, and between shop stewards and employers at a plant or factory. This is the very meat of industrial relations and the day-to-day work of collective bargaining. Because an agreement has been arrived at nationally, it does not mean that every employer and employee will interpret it in the same way locally.
8.0 p.m.
I have taken part in negotiations about agreements. I have experienced disputes arising about agreements. They go from the factory to the local level, and then through a tortuous procedure to a conference under the York Agreement provi-

sions, and possibly even there no agreement is possible. The matter is then referred back to the district or plant for some form of settlement. That does not happen because the people say, obdurately, "We are not going to have an agreement". It does not mean that either the employer or the union is saying that there is not going to be an agreement; it is simply a case of there being a different form of approach and a different analysis.
That is a part of industrial relations and collective bargaining, and the human relations to which the Solicitor-General referred earlier. All that I say is that on top of the complicated procedure of the national agreement—and at the moment I am not talking about anything else—we are imposing all the business of legal enforceability, and making these agreements subject to the law, as if there is not enough trouble in collective bargaining and industrial relations at the moment!

Mr. Kenneth Lewis: The Bill does not alter that position one iota, since if an agreement is made it is either accepted as legally enforceable or, if it is written in that it is not legally enforceable, it is not. In any event, the interpretation of any agreement is a matter for management and unions, at national or local level, to decide whether, in a given situation, a certain interpretation is acceptable. If it is acceptable to both unions and employers, whether at national or local level, a request is made to the workpeople on the shop floor that they should accept it. If they accept it, that is fine; if they go on strike, it is an unofficial strike.

Mr. Orme: The hon. Member has missed the point. All right—unions can agree not to make agreements legally enforceable. But let us not have any illusions about this matter; the intention of the Bill is to bring into operation legally enforceable agreements, and the employers will bring pressure to bear upon the unions to accept such agreements. At the end of the day, in certain circumstances an agreement can be made legally enforceable unless the unions and employers specifically agree that it should not.
Pressure will be imposed upon industrial relations. I was showing how the procedure operates in the engineering


industry at the moment, and what problems will arise if agreements become legally enforceable. I was asking how on earth we would overcome all the negotiating difficulties and similar problems that would arise.
In suggesting this procedure the Government fail to understand the realities of industrial life, and of negotiations and collective bargaining. Their whole effort is to switch power from the workers and trade unions to the employers. All this carefully prepared legal paraphernalia has one purpose—to restrict the activities and power of the trade unions.
I now turn to the question of what happens locally in industry. I want to refer to the strange wording already mentioned by my hon. Friend in subsection (1)(a), which provides that
an agreement or arrangement made (in whatever way and in whatever form)
may be the basis of a legally enforceable agreement. The day-to-day working of industry is not like the working of the House of Commons in its committees—including the rarefied air of Standing Committees—backed by all the civil servants and Clerks of the House, with the careful drawing up of Amendments and agreements. Even in the most advanced sections of industry, life at factory level is much more "hit-and-miss" than that.
I have worked in factories which have been 100 per cent. organised, where the management was anxious to obtain agreements with the workers and where, when agreements were arrived at, workers and management had respect for each other. The agreement was written out on a piece of paper, and there was no looking over one's shoulders to see whether it was legally correct, or whether some lawyer in the future would contest this phrase or that word. The two sides reached an agreement and got on with its implementation.
What some people fail to understand is that in industry agreements take months or even years to achieve. Over a long period a shop steward may have wished to reach some form of agreement with the management which will radically change the working operations in his factory. It may change the whole piecework system, or the method of computing wages. The tremendous number of problems that arise involve months

of long and arduous negotiations between management and trade unions, and when the two sides finally arrive at an agreement which they can set down in one or two clear, precise clauses, they do it and then get on with the implementation of the agreement. If there is a breakdown, or the management feel that the workers have gone back on the agreement, or the workers feel that the management have gone back on it, there may be a row, and then a clearing of the air. A few straight words may be spoken. But in a properly regulated industry the difficulty resolves itself and everybody gets on with the job.
I have worked in factories in which the workers are told, "This is the agreement; it is an established fact." The works manager, or the managing director, or the shop steward in the factory may not have been a party to the agreement; it may not even be written down. It has become custom and practice. In many of these custom-and-practice agreements employers and unions stick rigidly to the rules and honour the terms. They are oral agreements, arrived at
in whatever way and in whatever form
They work by trial and error—by a building up of confidence in the factory or in the industry. Such agreements have worked for a long period.

This Clause and all that is appended to it will bring into industry a fear that agreements of the kind to which I have referred can no longer be made. A rigidity will be introduced. The Secretary of State has had some experience in industry. I do not believe that he has ever operated a legally enforceable agreement; neither have I. I have tried to indicate what this provision will mean. It is being held as a sword over the heads of the negotiators. It brings into play a weapon that is alien to industrial relations.

That is the crux of the matter. The Opposition are opposed to the Clause. We feel that the Government are introducing something that will be very difficult to implement—something that will be an irritant at best, and a much more serious deterrent to industrial relations at worst. On that basis we believe that the Amendment should be rejected

Mr. Buchan: We have been listening to a great deal of trade union experience,


but the Government must recognise that the best of management are saying exactly the same. One of the tragedies is the lost opportunity. Enough has been said before, during and since Donovan, in this House and in another place, to make the Government think again. This is one of the five major provisions that they should have removed entirely from the Bill. It can do nothing but exacerbate relationships in industry, and this is particularly serious at a time when this Government may be moving us into a great deal of difficulties in industry.
We could have a difficult year ahead of us if the economic policy is continued as it is, and on top of that they try to write this kind of agreement into existing industrial relationships. Much has been said about constant factors in industrial relations. One of my hon. Friends said that the constant factor was change. But the really constant factor is the relationship itself. One cannot govern this kind of relationship by a set of written, legally binding rules.
All that agreements between the two sides of industry can achieve is set out the kind of ground work to which management and workers adhere. Often, they too have to ignore the background work, because they know that it is sensible, that this is the relationship—but what on earth happens when it is bound to a legal agreement?
There are one or two disturbing and sinister aspects apart from this terrible lost opportunity. I should have thought that the Secretary of State, with his background, would know why this should not have been done. What does the phrase "however expressed" in Clause 32(1)(b) mean? It requires that the exclusion must be in writing, as the agreement must be collectively enforceable. But the Amendment brings in the phrase "agreement or arrangement ", made in whatever way and in whatever form.
What on earth does that mean? What is an "arrangement"? In what way is this different from "however expressed", when it relates to a written exclusion clause? What is the difference? Is it something written? Is it custom and habit? How, for example, would existing custom be altered if it must be legally enforceable? When does this become included in it?
We cannot proceed with the Amendment until we see this new concept. In the whole period of the Bill, every time I come into the Chamber, I find that a new concept has emerged as we proceed to Mark III, Mark IV or Mark V of the Bill. This is becoming a frightening piece of legislation.
What are the implications of dealing in future with legally enforceable agreements? One of the problems with this, as with all written agreements relating to relationships in industry, is that we cannot envisage all circumstances. Very often, what is left out of an agreement has an equal effect in a factory to what is included. People know what is meant and when it comes to the crunch they can discuss it. They cannot discuss it if it has been spelled out in legally enforceable form—or if it has not been so spelled out. The situation creates its own problems.
In modern factories, as the Minister should know, circumstances can change so that the meaning of the original agreement alters, so that it no longer means what it was originally thought to mean. An example is the situation which the Government face in Upper Clyde Shipbuilders. Can one really have envisaged an agreement in which the management would say, "We must write in an exclusion clause saying that it will not apply if you choose to have a work-in"? But this has happened. A new dimension has been given to our industrial relations and not one Member of the Government had envisaged this situation when this clause was drawn up.
What will be the situation if this becomes legally enforceable and 7,000 workers say, "We want to work; give us work."? Will the Government say, "You have a legally enforceable agreement and you forgot to include a Clause saying that this would not apply to a work-in. You will now feel the majesty of the law."? What will the reaction be, not only among workers but among the Government's own supporters on Clydeside?
So they are exacerbating this situation on top of the problem that their economic policy is forcing upon the country. They are doing it in such a way that the law can provide no solution. What will


happen, as has been predicted often enough, is that, to a great extent, every written agreement will include an exclusion clause. But if that is so, this kind of legislation should not be imposed.
The real difficulty will occur in small groups and small factories, when everybody knows that the management does not really mean it and so they do not take the necessary care—then suddenly the crunch comes and it begins to matter.
The Government are embarking on a dangerous course. Despite all the self-praise that the Solicitor-General gave, saying that they had now cleared up the former mess of the Bill—what an admission of bad drafting this is, by the way—by bringing it together, they have shown how impossible and dangerous the whole thing is.
We must know what is meant by an "arrangement". Does it mean custom or the nod and the wink? How are we to know if an agreement as nebulous as this has been made, let alone define the way in which it has been made? We may not even know that it has been made at all.
I hope that the Government will think again and withdraw this concept. It would at least give a little comfort in a disturbed and troubled industrial world.

Mr. John Fraser: My hon. Friend the Member for Renfrew, West (Mr. Buchan) spoke of nebulous agreements. I can think of a contract that is made without any written or word of mouth agreement. Somebody gets on a bus, does not say anything to the conductor, who gives the passenger a ticket without saying a word. A contract has been made, neither in writing nor by word of mouth. That contract is legally enforceable between the passenger and bus company. Other arrangements of that nature can be entered into.
If a trade union negotiates an agreement on behalf of a number of employees to the effect that they will not come out on strike or will work a certain amount of overtime in return for three weeks' holiday and certain incremental payments, when the workers accept the extra holiday and do the overtime they are, in effect, amending their contracts of employment.
Although not a word in writing has passed between the employer and employees, a collective arrangement has been entered into by the trade union. That arrangement has, as a result, been incorporated into their individual contracts of employment. In other words, an arrangement which need not be in writing or be made by word of mouth can become a legally enforceable contract.
This was accepted by Donovan when it was pointed out that all sorts of collective agreements could be incorporated into individual contracts of employment. There has, therefore, always been legal enforceability as between employer and worker. Indeed, in most cases of unofficial strikes the employer could sue the individual workers for breach of contract. That is not normally done because he would be suing only when the strike is over, and his action would exacerbate a situation which has probably been solved by a return to work.
The Government thought how they could overcome this problem. By making the leadership of workers subject to an action for damages in cases where a collective agreement is broken, they have missed an opportunity and in this connection my hon. Friends have two main arguments against this set of proposals. The first is that if an agreement is made legally enforceable—for example, by saying that the terms will be enforceable unless there is a disclaimer clause, that the proceedings of a voluntary body are presumed to be legally enforceable, or if an agreement is imposed by the court when no collective agreement has been arrived at—one is attempting to impose on organisations of workers a legal liability.
This is a lost opportunity because, in practice, few employers will choose to sue trade unions. The Government have been challenged on this in the past and have been unable to provide one instance where a bad industrial relations situation—a strike or go-slow—would have been averted as the result of the existence of a legally enforceable contract with the trade unions.
This is, therefore, a lost opportunity in the sense that while we are against legal enforceability, because it will not work, we are deeply concerned to improve industrial relations. This is not a private fight between the benches in this House.


We want to reduce the number of strikes and industrial disputes.
Why have the Government flown in the fact of all the recommendations of, for example, Donovan? Having gone thoroughly into the proposition that legally enforceable agreements would reduce the number of disputes, Donovan came to the conclusion in every case that that would not be so.
The second missed opportunity results from the fact that once one begins to attach legal enforceability to agreements, people will be more shy to enter into them. This is rather like a client being told by his lawyer about the possibility of buying a business, "For heaven's sake don't sign anything". Ordinary working people are afraid of the law. They do not like to get involved with legal commitments because they have found from experience that the processes of the law and litigation often involve one individual facing a powerful and large body.
In many cases tenants do not enforce their rights under the housing legislation because they are afraid of a confrontation between the individual and a large organisation. They know that legal proceedings are a gamble. Indeed, they can be more of a gamble than going to a casino in Monte Carlo. A man with a small wage and limited savings does not want to get involved in the courts because the course of legal proceedings appears to be capricious. At the end of the day he may lose a case that he expected to win, with the loss of his personal wealth. That is why people do not want to enter into legal obligations.
There are, of course, circumstances when recourse to the law is sensible. A man will obviously wish to sue for damages for an industrial injury. He will not ask his colleagues in a factory to come out on strike to get him compensation. He uses the processes of the law because he can usually get legal aid and because he knows from experience that the arrangements are satisfactory.
In this instance the Government are not saying, "We want the legal enforceability of remedies between one worker and his employer" but "We want to place a legal liability on the representatives of that and other employees". It is rather like a lawyer making an agreement on behalf of a client and being told

that he will be personally responsible if the client does not observe it.
This Measure says that if the client, the worker and member of a trade union, does not obey an agreement negotiated on his behalf, then his representatives, the trade union, will be liable for damages. Indeed, it goes further and says that people who purport to encourage a breach of an agreement negotiated on their behalf can be made liable for damages.
This all adds up to the fact that people will cry off making better procedure and working agreements, the very things that Donovan said were at the centre of any solution to the problem of bad industrial relations. Nobody produced credible evidence before Donovan—no such evidence was produced up to the time when we left office—to show that legal enforceability would improve industrial relations.
As this long debate draws to an end, I plead with the Government to give an example, if they cannot give evidence, of how legal enforceability will improve industrial relations and lead to more and better procedure and collective agreements being entered into. If they cannot, as I am convinced that they cannot, these proposals will be shown to be the pursuing of an idealogy which was conceived before the Donovan Commission was set up, an ideology which remained unaltered by the conclusions of the Donovan Commission and of most responsible commentators on industrial relations, and an ideology which will harm and not benefit industrial relations.

8.30 p.m.

Mrs. Castle: I have immense sympathy with my hon. Friend the Member for Renfrew, West (Mr. Buchan), who said that whenever he entered the Chamber in the course of the many weeks of debate we have had on the Bill he found that some new elaborate form of redrafting was under consideration.
I felt on listening to the Solicitor-General a sense of despairing sadness spreading through the Chamber as we face the fact that in these very complicated Amendments we are dealing with three of the Bill's major Clauses—we are dealing with the presumption of legal enforceability, we are dealing with the incredible Clause 33, and we are dealing with the iniquitous Clause 39 under


which the Government take power to impose an agreement where none exists. These Clauses are at the heart of the industrial relations argument and the industrial relations battle.
This is an absolute complex of Amendments. Perhaps I am more stupid than other hon. Members—that is perfectly possible and I am prepared to accept it—but I had to sit for an hour in intense concentration following just the meaning of this group of Amendments in drafting terms. They change literally nothing. The Government have not heeded one argument advanced in this House, in another place, or outside Parliament, about their policy. They have gone to enormous trouble to regroup, redraft and rejig, to give us exactly the same result at the end of the day and to leave everybody who is trying to understand the Bill and the many people who will have to work by the Bill in future years literally more confused than ever.
The Solicitor-General is like a sort of favoured son of the Government who has been given his head on his pet theme and in his pet sphere. He sits there with his enormous and staggering ingenuity. We are all dazzled by the forensic brilliance with which he goes on drafting and redrafting, grouping and regrouping, to his own personal satisfaction but to the increasing mystification and despair of everyone else.
It is a tragic commentary on the Government's whole approach that they should have handed over this admittedly serious problem of industrial relations to the Society of Conservative Lawyers to have a field day of the kind we have been having here again today.
This group of Amendments does nothing to meet the objections which have been poured out against the Government's policy and which have been reiterated by my hon. Friends so tellingly today. It does not do anything to alter the provisions of Clause 32, which seek to presume legal enforceability where none was intended to exist by some of the parties. It does nothing to alter Clause 39. It does nothing to alter Clause 33.
I turn to one of the policy implications of what we have been discussing but which nobody has touched on today. I speak as a layman lost in a lawyer's

world—the unreal world in which we have been debating this subject for all these weary weeks and months. I am lost in that world, but I cannot afford to be lost in it, just as no shop steward can afford to be lost in it and no trade union official can afford to be lost in it. I want to try to follow the Solicitor-General through one part of this legal labyrinth.
I want to look at the effect of the Amendments on Clause 143, to which Lords Amendment No. 241 applies. This Clause is part of the Government's argument in what they are doing about the right to strike. This is crucial to the whole theme of trade union rights. If trade unionists are to be put under the threat of legal penalties, they will have to understand those rights. Clause 143 appears on the surface to be a charter of the right to strike. It says that where a worker strikes after having given due notice, he shall not be held to be in breach of his contract of employment. This all fits in with the image of reasonableness which the Government have tried to present to the country. They say, "We are only getting at the wildcats." I have heard the Secretary of State saying so effectively and plausibly on television and on radio—" Nobody need fear anything unless he is a wildcat." That is a nice emotive expression.

Clause 143 says that where a man takes part in a strike after due notice, he is not to be held to be breaking his contract of employment. If I understand subsection (2)(d) of that Clause, nobody who calls him out on strike can be committing an unfair industrial practice. It says:
shall not be regarded as a breach of his contract of employment for the purposes of … (d) section 92 of this Act.

Section 92 relates to the unfair industrial practice of inducing people to break their contracts of employment.

We now know that it is not as simple as that. It never was as simple as that in Clause 143 in its old form. Subsection (3) says that none of these immunities shall apply in certain circumstances—and this has not been altered by the Amendment; it has, in fact, been elaborated in new Clause L.

Subsection (3), as amended by new Clause L, says that even if a worker does give notice before striking, he will be


breaking his contract of employment if there is in his contract of employment any term, implied or incorporated, which excludes his right to strike. I should have thought that was a lawyer's diet for a month in itself. A man will be breaking his contract of employment if there is in his contract of employment any implied term arising from any of the following—first, a collective agreement which, as we see from new Clause L(5), includes a procedure agreement.

New Clause L defines a collective agreement for us at great length, and it includes a procedure agreement. Secondly, a man will be breaking his contract of employment if there is a decision of any joint body of any kind under Clause 33, or if there is an imposed procedure agreement under Clause 39. So the man's right to strike with impunity provided that he gives due notice, is now eroded if it can be held that there is an implied term in his contract of employment arising either from an imposed procedure agreement or from any negotiated procedure agreement or from any decision of a joint body under Clause 33.

Their Lordships were considerably exercised about this when they discussed it in another place. The noble Lord, Lord Diamond, put this question to the Government, having heard that explanation by the Government spokesman of what this complex of Amendments meant. He said:
What the noble Lord is saying is what I feared was the effect of this subsection; namely, that an 'agreement' (in inverted commas)—meaning an arrangement imposed upon you—can include (I shall be delighted if the noble Lord will tell me I am wrong) a provision, under which a no-strike clause is involved, as a result of which it is a breach of that contract to strike, What I am concerned with is getting a clear statement from the Government of the limitations on the freedom to strike.

That was the question asked in another place, and we must ask it here at this stage. Lord Diamond was saying that if under Clause 39, a procedure agreement is imposed which contains a no-strike clause, the right to strike under due notice can be taken away by imposition from above; and the same is true equally if there is any kind of no-strike clause negotiated in any sort of collective agreement.

The noble Lord, Lord Windlesham, had a rather vague shot at answering that, and then the Lord Chancellor decided

that he had not got it right because he then intervened with legal explanations even more involved than those which we hear from the Solicitor-General. It is not surprising, therefore, that the subject still remains obscure. Answering Lord Diamond, the Lord Chancellor said:
I am not sure this is quite right. Perhaps I am talking out of turn, but I think the difficulty lies in the difference between the two phrases ' collective agreement ' and ' procedure agreement '.

When my noble Friend Lord Diamond pointed out that a collective agreement may include a procedure agreement—under new Clause L it expressly includes a procedure agreement—the Lord Chancellor blundered on, adding more and more confusion. "Oh, no", he said, "there is a difference; and my understanding is that a collective agreement is related to terms of employment and a procedure agreement is not". This difference, therefore, he said, was crucial to the definition of the right to strike, but he went on, with unaccustomed humility, to add:
Having said that, I would rather look at it again in order that I may be able to retract if I am wrong".

He kept returning to the point: the collective agreement can be of two kinds; it can either relate to terms and conditions of employment or it can be a procedure agreement, and he went on to say about a procedure agreement,
that, in the nature of things, is not something which is imported into the individual contract of employment, because the individual workman does not necessarily work on those terms ".—[OFFICIAL REPORT,House of Lords, 9th June, 1971; Vol. 320, c. 350–6.]

But is that not exactly what is being imported into the contract of employment by this Amendment? Is it not being expressly done by the Amendment, and is that not exactly what new Clause L is all about, that is to say, that the right to strike, if notice be given, shall not apply where a strike is contrary to any term of the worker's contract of employment implied by a collective agreement—which new Clause L now makes clear can include a procedure agreement? What is more, new Clause L, in subsection (3), expressly provides that a collective agreement may include a procedure agreement imposed under Clause 39.

So the distinction which the Lord Chancellor drew was false. In practice, as everyone knows, it is impossible to draw a strict line between the terms and


conditions of employment and the procedure for negotiating them. If a man has a no-strike clause imposed on him in a procedure agreement, the effect is to reduce his bargaining power. That is the intention in doing it. So the distinction was always false from the start. But the Lord Chancellor went further. He misrepresented new Clause L. So he was wrong, on my reading of it, when he said that a procedure agreement could not affect a worker's rights under Clause 143. He said, again somewhat tentatively, "I am not always sure that I am right, but I believe myself to be right." I ask the Solicitor-General to tell us when he replies, because the Lord Chancellor explicitly silenced doubts on the issue in another place by promising to reconsider. Who was right in the reading of the Clause and the effect of the Amendments? Was Lord Diamond right when he said that an agreement to be imposed can include a no-strike clause, as a result of which it would be a breach of contract to strike? Of was the Lord Chancellor right when he said, "Oh, no. It is only a collective agreement that we are concerned with here, and a collective agreement is different from a procedure agreement"? The House is entitled to clarity on this point at least.

8.45 p.m.

I do not think that the Secretary of State is really a party to most of the Bill, for the simple reason that, like us, he could not possibly understand it sufficiently to do so. I think that he appreciates the paramount importance of psychology in industrial relations. I want to leave with him this thought about the provisions of Clause 39, which we are reaffirming in the Amendments. We are limiting the workers' freedom to strike by imposing on them a legally enforceable agreement to which they never agreed. What kind of example do the Government think they are giving in doing that? I entirely agree with the wise words of my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Edinburgh, Leigh (Mr. Ronald King Murray) on this point. If the Government can, through the law of the land, say that "agreement" shall mean what they say it means, what can they expect the ordinary worker on the shopfloor to define it as meaning? Have not the workers the right to say, "No. 'Agreement' shall mean what we say it means"?

If the Government say, "You will not get away with that, because we are in power, and we shall enforce an agreement through our power", the workers will retaliate by saying that the only answer is the use of power. So we have got away from negotiation, away from conciliation, away from agreement, into industrial war. The right hon. Gentleman knows that the Bill feeds the very opposite psychology to that at which we should be aiming.

Perhaps the Solicitor-General can tell me which of the two sides in another place was right.

The Solicitor-General: With the leave of the House, I should like to reply.
I am tempted, rather sadly, to ask which of the two personae in which, within the space of two years, the right hon. Lady the Member for Blackburn (Mrs. Castle) has appeared before the House is to be regarded as the persona she wishes to go down in history as representing her contribution to this very important subject. To hear her closing her speech suggesting that to admit the concept of law into this subject, to admit the idea of prescribing or varying procedure agreements——

Mrs. Castle: That was never in my proposals.

The Solicitor-General: —was to be regarded as wholly unacceptable, to hear her putting it in such a regrettably provocative style and tone of voice, must be sad for those who remember the attempts she was making two years ago to solve the very problems with which we are dealing. It is unconvincing, to say the least, to hear her denouncing this kind of provision, when she proposed to take powers for the imposition of cooling-off periods, and the imposition on individual workpeople of an obligation to return to work when some situations arose. I know—I do not want to reopen the whole debate—that there are variations—[Interruption.] If the right hon. Lady will contain herself and allow me to answer the last point and then go on to the other one, I will do so but I must finish disposing of this point.
Of course variations in method are adopted to solve these problems, but the most unimpressive variation is the translation of the right hon. Lady from someone who was at one time responsibly putting forward proposals related to these


problems into the tone on which she has just closed her speech to the House. I say that it is a sad translation honestly and meaningfully. It will be a difficult task for history to decide with which character the right hon. Lady is to be credited in the years ahead.
As regards Clause 143(3) of the Bill, the right hon. Lady has used an Amendment which is designed to translate from one part of the Bill to new Clause L exactly the same reference to Clause 39. The right hon. Lady asked to what extent Clause 143(3) makes any variation in the apparent intention of Clause 143(2). The effect of subsection (3) is to say that where the terms of a collective agreement are implied or incorporated in a contract of employment, in the same kind of way as they are now implied or incorporated in the overwhelming majority of contracts of employment, by reference to the surrounding circumstances, the terms of that collective agreement have effect in that contract of employment.
If the collective agreement prescribes a different period of notice by having a "notice of strike action" clause, say, on 14 days' notice rather than on seven days' notice, that different period of notice operates to vary or replace the due notice which would otherwise arise from the contract of employment. That is what would happen today.
If a collective agreement provided for no notice of strike action, but that notice to terminate a contract of employment should not be less than six weeks' notice, the worker in his own contract of employment would be bound by such a clause from the collective agreement if it was implied into the contract of employment.

Mrs. Castle: This would, therefore, be true where an imposed procedural agreement contained a no-strike clause. Therefore, Lord Diamond was right and the Lord Chancellor was wrong.

The Solicitor-General: I am coming to the point.
If a collective agreement includes a provision which varies by extending or, perhaps, diminishing—it would probably be by extending—the length of notice which has to be given to terminate a contract of employment, if it is incorporated into the original contract, that takes effect; and it follows from the reference to Clause 39 in the Clause as drafted

and from the replacement, that the incorporation of a no-strike clause, including a minimum notice period in a procedural agreement made enforceable under Clause 39, that it would have the same effect. There is nothing particularly sinister in saying that the length of notice which has to be given under an individual contract of employment is that which is incorporated into it by reference to the governing conditions in the place of work where the worker is employed.

Mrs. Castle: There was a long debate on this in another place. The Lord Chancellor, the highest legal luminary in the land, replied to Lord Diamond's analysis of the position—which is exactly what the Solicitor-General has confirmed was right—by saying that he was not sure that it was right and then said, "I do not understand it. I will go away and look at it. If I am sure that it is right, I will come back and rectify the position." The Lord Chancellor obviously thought that for an imposed procedure agreement to have the effect which the Solicitor-General now reveals was rather shocking. Therefore, he denied it was Government policy. Can we have that corrected?

The Solicitor-General: I think the right hon. Lady is reading too much into this. Obviously, since the reference to this, I have not restudied what my noble and learned Friend said about it, but the effect of the provision is as I have explained. The provision in Clause 143 is there to prevent the judgment of the case of Morgan v. Fry from being overturned to the disadvantage of the worker. Notice which the worker has to give to terminate his employment is notice either as contained in his contract of employment or by reference to the collective agreement, if the provisions of that collective agreement have been incorporated in the contract of employment. That is the answer to the right hon. Lady's question.
Apart from that, however, the greater part of this debate has been concentrated on the reconsideration of the central idea of enforceability of collective agreements. The hon. Member for Manchester, Blackley (Mr. Rose) quoted Professor Harry Wellington and his evidence to the Donovan Commission, and the right hon. Lady asked for evidence which would justify disregarding Professor Wellington's view, and the hon. Member for Liverpool,


Walton (Mr. Heffer) also wanted justification for disregarding Professor Wellington's view on balance against the enforceability of collective agreements.
The evidence which justifies that is evidence of almost the whole of industrial experience outside this country, even the evidence of the country from which Professor Wellington was coming, and the evidence is supported by the example given by the hon. Member for Norwood (Mr. John Fraser), which, given in a different context, was saying that in every walk of life we expect as a matter of course that legally enforceable agreements are the relationships which we have when dealing with one another. He made reference to the existence of industrial injury legislation, of rent tribunal legislation. He certainly did not go on to argue that we should disregard or abandon those provisions—it would be an absolutely nonsensical proposition—or that in those areas where we have effective law giving rise to remedies we should discard them.
All we are saying is that in this field it is important to introduce the idea of people being bound by agreements which they make, unless they expressly decide to the contrary. The argument has been advanced that this is out of line with the Donovan approach and that we ought more constructively to take the opposite view. I want to make this point about that. Rather significantly, the hon. Member for Blackley, defending the present non-enforceable contract, said it was important to have regard to the essential vagueness of the relationships which prevail in industrial relations, and that was illustrated by the example given by the hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh, Leith (Mr. Ronald King Murray) with his reference to a nod and a wink.
This is the point. Donovan said in paragraph 502:
We are not in principle opposed to the use of legal sanctions for the enforcement of agreed procedure.
Donovan went on to say that he would not recommend the use of legal sanctions till those procedures had been improved. That second part is important, because Donovan was saying, as far as quality of agreements is concerned—this is paragraph 503—that

wherever possible, collective agreements should be written and precise … procedure agreements should be comprehensive in scope and should provide for rapid and equitable settlement of disputes.
Specifically—and this is why I take up the essential vagueness referred to by the hon. Member for Blackley—the Donovan Commission made its summary judgment in paragraph 504 in this way:
Those resorting to unconstitutional action should not be threatened with any disadvantages imposed by law until new procedures have been put into operation, procedures which are clear where the present procedures are vague, comprehensive where the present procedures are fragmentary, speedy where the present procedures are protracted, and effective where the present procedures are fruitless.
All experience in other fields and in other countries suggests that until people approaching the collective bargaining table start from the premise that they are intending to arrive at a legally enforceable bargain, they are unlikely to set about the task effectively, negotiating procedures which are clear where the present procedures are vague, and so on, and that is the emphasis of our approach.
Once people appreciate that this is what they are after, once they acknowledge the overwhelming force of the Donovan diagnosis that our troubles spring from vague, imprecise, indecisive, slow procedures, they will appreciate what the Government are saying, that it is a good thing for people to approach the business of looking at their collective agreements on the basis that they mean what they say.

9.0 p.m.

Mr. McBride: The hon. and learned Gentleman quoted Donovan as being in favour in principle, but he did not say that Donovan was in favour in fact. Is there not a difference in law between principle and fact and should not the hon. and learned Gentleman's definitive preference have been given the other way?

The Solicitor-General: This is not so much a legal argument as a more practical matter of judgment. It is a question of carts and horses. We make it perfectly plain that it is only collective agreements in writing arrived at after the commencement of the Act to which the presumption of enforceability is to be attached if the parties do not dissent from that. Upon the footing that no presumption is attaching to anything save that which is hammered out hereafter,


people are more likely to come to bargains which are plain, precise and expeditious, rather than the opposite.

Mr. Bidwell: rose—

The Solicitor-General: I do not want to give way any further at this point. I will now follow up what the hon. and learned Member for Leith said about registration and non-registration, because we have already canvassed that territory many times. When he makes the point that an unregistered organisation can be under liability on a collective agreement, I reply, "Yes, certainly, but only when the agreement is written, when it has not secured an exclusion of enforceability and when the agreement is reached after the commencement of the Act." There can be no question there, or anywhere else, of a trap situation.
The hon. Member for Renfrew, West (Mr. Buchan) raised a point which was touched on by the hon. Members for Blackley and Salford, West (Mr. Orme) about the meaning of the phrase:
(in whatever way and in whatever form)
introduced instead of "whether orally or in writing". It is important to see the two settings in which this can arise. Sometimes the court and those operating the Bill will be concerned with such things as the reporting of a procedure agreement. In that sense it is often important to know about arrangements or agreements that are founded upon custom and practice. When one is concerned with making an agreement enforceable, then—again going back to Clause 32—enforceability cannot be attached to custom and practice in that sense, but only to something which is reduced to writing after the commencement of the Act either under Clause 32 (1)(a) or Clause 33.
I think it was the hon. Member for Lewisham, North (Mr. Moyle) who asked how far minutes about a non-enforceable agreement could be relied upon to construct an enforceable written agreement thereafter That is related to the same kind of point: how far will custom and practice be capable of importation into a subsequent written agreement? The answer is that the minutes would not in the ordinary way be admissible. If they are non-enforceable minutes, they are part of the negotiations between the parties—

just as correspondence between people is not admissible to construe what they finally put into a written agreement. They would become admissible only if incorporated by express reference in the written agreement when made. They would not become admissible by presumption but only if they had been brought into it in that way.

Mr. Heffer: What is the situation when minutes of a joint committee are circulated because they contain decisions of that committee? Would not such a document be presumed to be legally binding, unless there is a disclaimer?

The Solicitor-General: That was not the point put by the hon. Member for Lewisham, North. If a minute recording a decision of that joint body is unaccompanied by a statement saying that it is not to be legally binding, then it is presumed to be legally binding—the hon. Member for Walton is right. But the hon. Member for Lewisham, North asked whether a minute recording a decision and having attached to it a statement "This is not intended to give rise to a legal obligation" could be incorporated in some subsequent, legally-binding document. The answer is that it cannot and would not be unless expressly incorporated. If a decision were reached which was not intended to be legally binding—say a decision which regulates the variation of shifts or the manning on a job—but if at a later stage the parties got to the point of drawing up a legally binding agreement and said, "The arrangements informally arrived at in minute 123 six months ago shall hereafter be incorporated in the collective agreement ", then it would be brought in. It would not otherwise be brought in as a matter of implication.
I was going to deal with the point raised by the hon. Member for Lewisham, North, who referred to the definition of procedure agreements. I was simply going to say that when he pointed out that in new Clause L subsection (5)(a) included machinery
for consultation with regard to, or for the settlement by negotiation or arbitration of, terms and conditions of employment
that is only setting out alternatives. It refers to machinery for consultation with regard to terms and conditions of employment, or machinery for the settlement by negotiation or arbitration of terms


and conditions of employment. So that machinery by either party could give rise to a procedure agreement. It does not involve machinery for consultation with regard to settlement. They are two separate concepts.
I refrain at this comparatively tranquil stage of the debate from making any comparison on the source of that definition with the previous Government's Bill. I imagine that if I were to speak from now until midnight tomorrow on this provision, I should not persuade hon. Members opposite to accept our approach to this question of enforceability.

Mr. Moyle: Could the hon. and learned Gentleman say whether subsection (5)(a) refers to settlement of disputes by conciliation?

The Solicitor-General: I do not think it does, not expressly; but that does not relate to the conciliation arrangements set out under the Act, because those exist anyway. This is merely a definition of those matters which would be

regarded as a procedure agreement which is in line, apart from the variations I have mentioned, with that adopted by the previous Government's Bill.

I was drawing to a close and saying that these provisions, as the right hon. Lady said, are not significantly different from those originally debated by the House. They are an important part of the Bill.

It is a little hard for the Government to be criticised for altering the drafting in this way simply on the basis that it changes nothing when, in fact, we redrafted the definitions in this way in response to requests from both sides of this House. All we have done is to bring them together to make them plain and simple. They are an important part of the policy of the Government and on that basis I commend them to the House.

Question put, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment:—

The House divided: Ayes 270, Noes 231.

Division No. 457.]
AYES
[9.10 p.m.


Adley, Robert
Carr, Rt. Hn. Robert
Foster, Sir John


Alison, Michael (Barkston Ash)
Channon, Paul
Fowler, Norman


Allason, James (Hemel Hempstead)
Chapman, Sydney
Fraser, Rt. Hn. Hugh (St'fford & Stone)


Amery, Rt. Hn. Julian
Chichester-Clark, R.
Fry, Peter


Archer, Jeffrey (Louth)
Churchill, W. S.
Galbraith, Hn. T. G.


Astor, John
Clark, William (Surrey, E.)
Gardner, Edward


Atkins, Humphrey
Clarke, Kenneth (Rushcliffe)
Gibson-Watt, David


Awdry, Daniel
Clegg, Walter
Gilmour, Ian (Norfolk, C.)


Baker, Kenneth (St. Marylebone)
Cockeram, Eric
Gilmour, Sir John (Fife, E.)


Baker, W. H. K. (Banff)
Cooke, Robert
Glyn, Dr. Alan


Balniel, Lord
Coombs, Derek
Godber, Rt. Hn. J. B.


Barber, Rt. Hn. Anthony
Corfield, Rt. Hn. Frederick
Goodhart, Philip


Batsford, Brian
Cormack, Patrick
Gorst, John


Beamish, Col. Sir Tufton
Costain, A. P.
Gower, Raymond

Bell, Ronald
Critchley, Julian
Grant, Anthony (Harrow, C.)


Bennett, Sir Frederic (Torquay)
Crouch, David
Gray, Hamish


Benyon, W.
Curran, Charles
Green, Alan


Berry, Hn. Anthony
d'Avigdor-Goldsmid, Sir Henry
Grieve, Percy


Biffen, John
d'Avigdor-Goldsmid, Maj.-Gen. James
Grimond, Rt. Hn. J.


Biggs-Davison, John
Dean, Paul
Grylls, Michael


Blaker, Peter
Deedes, Rt. Hn. W. F.
Gummer, Selwyn


Boardman, Tom (Leicester, S.W.)
Dixon, Piers
Gurden, Harold


Body, Richard
Dodds-Parker, Douglas
Hall, Miss Joan (Keighley)


Boscawen, Robert
Douglas-Home, Rt. Hn. Sir Alec
Hall, John (Wycombe)


Bossom, Sir Clive
Drayson, G. B.
Hall-Davis, A. G. F.


Bowden, Andrew
du Cann, Rt. Hn. Edward
Hamilton, Michael (Salisbury)


Boyd-Carpenter, Rt. Hn. John
Dykes, Hugh
Hannam, John (Exeter)


Braine, Bernard
Eden, Sir John
Harrison, Col. Sir Harwood (Eye)


Bray, Ronald
Edwards, Nicholas (Pembroke)
Haselhurst, Alan


Brewis, John
Elliot, Capt. Walter (Carshalton)
Havers, Michael


Brinton, Sir Tatton
Elliott, R. W. (N'c'tle-upon-Tyne, N.)
Hawkins, Paul


Brocklebank-Fowler, Christopher
Emery, Peter
Hayhoe, Barney


Brown, Sir Edward (Bath)
Eyre, Reginald
Hicks, Robert


Bruce-Gardyne, J.
Farr, John
Higgins, Terence L.


Bryan, Paul
Fell, Anthony
Hiley, Joseph


Buchanan-Smith Alick (Angus, N & M)
Fenner, Mrs. Peggy
Hill, John E. B. (Norfolk, S.)


Buck, Antony
Fidler, Michael
Hill, James (Southampton, Test)


Bullus, Sir Eric
Finsberg, Geoffrey (Hampstead)
Holt, Miss Mary


Burden, F. A.
Fisher, Nigel (Surbiton)
Hooson, Emlyn


Butler, Adam (Bosworth)
Fookes, Miss Janet
Hordern, Peter

Carlisle, Mark
Fortescue, Tim
Hornby, Richard




Hornsby-Smith, Rt. Hn. Dame Patricia
Monks, Mrs. Connie
Smith, Dudley (W'wick & L'mington)


Howe, Hn. Sir Geoffrey (Reigate)
Monro, Hector
Soref, Harold


Howell, David (Guildford)
Montgomery, Fergus
Speed, Keith


Howell, Ralph (Norfolk, N.)
More, Jasper
Spence, John


Hunt, John
Morgan-Giles, Rear-Adm.
Sproat, Iain


Hutchison, Michael Clark
Morrison, Charles (Devizes)
Stanbrook, Ivor


Iremonger, T. L,
Mudd, David
Stewart-Smith, Geoffrey (Belper)


James, David
Murton, Oscar
Stodart, Anthony (Edinburgh, W.)


Jessel, Toby
Neave, Airey
Stoddart-Scott, Col. Sir M.


Johnson Smith, G. (E. Grinstead)
Noble, Rt. Hn. Michael
Stokes, John


Jopling Michael
Normanton, Tom
Stuttaford, Dr. Tom


Kershaw, Anthony
Nott, John
Sutcliffe, John


Kilfedder, James
Onslow, Cranley
Tapsell, Peter


King, Evelyn (Dorset, S.)
Oppenheim, Mrs. Sally
Taylor, Edward M. (G'gow, Cathcart)


King Tom (Bridgwater)
Orr, Capt. L. P. S.
Taylor, Frank (Moss Side)


Kinsey, J. R.
Osborn, John
Taylor, Robert (Croydon, N.W.)


Kirk, Peter
Owen, Idris (Stockport, N.)
Tebbit, Norman


Kitson, Timothy
Page, Graham (Crosby)
Temple, John M.


Knox, David
Parkinson, Cecil (Enfield, W.)
Thatcher, Rt. Hn. Mrs. Margaret


Lane, David
Peel, John
Thomas, John Stradling (Monmouth)


Langford-Holt, Sir John
Percival, Ian
Thomas, Rt. Hn. Peter (Henden, S.)


Legge-Bourke, Sir Harry
Pink, R. Bonner
Tilney, John


Le Marchant, Spencer
Pounder, Rafton
Trafford, Dr. Anthony


Lewis, Kenneth (Rutland)
Powell, Rt. Hn. J. Enoch
Trew, Peter


Lloyd, Ian (P'tsm'th, Langstone)
Prior, Rt. Hn. J. M. L.
Tugendhat, Christopher


Longden, Gilbert
Proudfoot, Wilfred
Turton, Rt. Hn. Sir Robin


Loveridge, John
Pym, Rt. Hn. Francis
van Straubenzee, W. R.


Luce, R. N.
Quennell, Miss J. M.
Vaughan, Dr. Gerard


McAdden, Sir Stephen
Raison, Timothy
Vickers, Dame Joan


MacArthur, Ian
Rawlinson, Rt. Hn. Sir Peter
Waddington, David


McCrindle, R. A.
Redmond, Robert
Walder, David (Clitheroe)


McLaren, Martin
Reed, Laurance (Bolton, E.)
Walker, Rt. Hn. Peter (Worcester)

Maclean, Sir Fitzroy
Rees-Daves, W. R.
Walker-Smith, Rt. Hn. Sir Derek


McMaster, Stanley
Renton, Rt. Hn. Sir David
Walters, Dennis


Macmillan, Maurice (Farnham)
Rhys Williams, Sir Brandon
Ward, Dame Irene


McNair-Wilson, Michael
Ridley, Hn. Nicholas
Weatherill, Bernard


McNair-Wilson, Patrick (New Forest)
Ridsdale, Julian
Wells, John (Maidstone)


Maddan, Martin
Roberts, Wyn (Conway)
White, Roger (Gravesend)


Maginnis, John E.
Rodgers, Sir John (Sevenoaks)
Whitelaw, Rt. Hn. William


Marten, Neil
Rost, Peter
Wiggin, Jerry


Mather, Carol
Russell, Sir Ronald
Wilkinson, John


Maude, Angus
St. John-Stevas, Norman
Wolrige-Gordon, Patrick


Mawby, Ray
Scott, Nicholas
Wood, Rt. Hn. Richard


MaxwelI-Hyslop, R. J.
Scott-Hopkins, James
Woodhouse, Hn. Christopher


Meyer, Sir Anthony
Sharples, Richard
Worsley, Marcus


Mills, Peter (Torrington)
Shaw, Michael (Sc'b'gh & Whitby)
Wylie, Rt. Hn. N. R.


Mitchell, Lt.-Col.C. (Aberdeenshire, W)
Shelton, William (Clapham)



Mitchell, David (Basingstoke)
Simeons, Charles
TELLERS FOR THE AYES:


Moate, Roger
Sinclair, Sir George



Molyneaux, James
Skeet, T. H. H.
Mr. Victor Goodhew and


Money, Ernie

Mr. Hugh Rossi.




NOES


Albu, Austen
Cant, R. B.
Duffy, A. E. P.


Allaun, Frank (Salford, E.)
Carmichael, Neil
Eadie, Alex


Allen, Scholefield
Carter-Jones, Lewis (Eccles)
Edelman, Maurice


Archer, Peter (Rowley Regis)
Castle, Rt. Hn. Barbara
Edwards, Robert (Bilston)


Armstrong, Ernest
Clark, David (Colne Valley)
Edwards, William (Merioneth)


Ashley, Jack
Cocks, Michael (Bristol, S.)
Ellis, Tom


Ashton, Joe
Coleman. Donald
English, Michael


Atkinson, Norman
Corbet, Mrs. Freda
Evans, Fred


Barnett, Guy (Greenwich)
Cox, Thomas (Wandsworth, C.)
Faulds, Andrew


Barnett, Joel
Crawshaw, Richard
Fernyhough, Rt. Hn. E.


Beaney, Alan
Cronin, John
Fisher, Mrs. Doris (B'ham, Ladywood)


Benn, Rt. Hn. Anthony Wedgwood
Crossman, Rt. Hn. Richard
Fitch, Alan (Wigan)




Fletcher, Ted (Darlington)


Bennett, James (Glasgow, Bridgeton)
Cunningham, G. (Islington, S.W.)
Foley, Maurice


Bidwell, Sydney
Dalyell, Tam
Foot, Michael


Bishop, E. S.
Darling, Rt. Hn. George
Ford, Ben


Blenkinsop, Arthur
Davidson, Arthur
Forrester, John


Boardman, H, (Leigh)
Davies, G. Elfed (Rhondda, E.)
Fraser, John (Norwood)


Booth, Albert
Davies, lfor (Gower)
Freeson, Reginald


Bottomley, Rt. Hn. Arthur
Davies, S. O. (Merthyr Tydvil)
Galpern, Sir Myer


Boyden, James (Bishop Auckland)
Davis, Clinton (Hackney, C.)
Gilbert, Dr. John


Bradley, Tom
Davis, Terry (Bromsgrove)
Ginsburg, David


Brown, Bob (N'c'tle-upon-Tyne, W.)
de Freitas, Rt. Hn. Sir Geoffrey
Gordon Walker, Rt. Hn. P. C.


Brown, Hugh D. (G'gow, Provan)
Delargy, H. J.
Gourlay, Harry


Brown, Ronald (Shoreditch & F'bury)
Dell, Rt. Hn. Edmund
Grant, George (Morpeth)


Buchan, Norman
Dempsey, James
Grant, John D. (Islington, E.)


Buchanan, Richard (G'gow, Sp'burn)
Doig, Peter
Griffiths, Eddie (Brightside)


Butler, Mrs. Joyce (Wood Green)
Douglas, Dick (Stirlingshire, E.)
Hamilton, William (Fife, W.)


Callaghan, Rt. Hn. James
Douglas-Mann, Bruce
Hamling, William


Campbell, I. (Dunbartonshire, W.)
Driberg, Tom
Hannan, William (G'gow, Maryhill)







Hardy, Peter
McGuire, Michael
Rhodes, Geoffrey


Harper, Joseph
Mackenzie, Gregor
Richard, Ivor


Harrison, Walter (Wakefield)
Mackie, John
Roberts, Albert (Normanton)


Hart, Rt. Hn. Judith
Maclennan, Robert
Roberts, Rt. Hn. Goronwy (Caernarvon)


Hattersley, Roy
McMillan, Tom (Glasgow, C.)
Robertson, John (Paisley)


Healey, Rt. Hn. Denis
McNamara, J. Kevin
Rodgers, William (Stockton-on-Tees)


Heffer, Eric S.
Mallalieu, J. P. W. (Huddersfield, E.)
Roper, John


Horam, John
Marks, Kenneth
Rose, Paul B.


Houghton, Rt. Hn. Douglas
Marquand, David
Sandelson, Neville


Howell, Denis (Small Heath)
Marsden, F.
Sheldon, Robert (Ashton-under-Lyne)


Huckfield, Leslie
Marshall, Dr. Edmund
Shore, Rt. Hn. Peter (Stepney)


Hughes, Mark (Durham)
Mason, Rt. Hn. Roy
Short, Mrs. Renée (W'hampton, N.E.)

Hughes, Robert (Aberdeen, N.)
Meacher, Michael
Silkin, Hn. S. C. (Dulwich)


Hughes, Roy (Newport)
Mellish, Rt. Hn. Robert
Silverman, Julius


Hunter, Adam
Mendelson, John
Skinner, Dennis


Irvine, Rt. Hn. Sir Arthur (Edge Hill)
Millan, Bruce
Small, William


Janner, Greville
Miller, Dr. M. S.
Smith, John (Lanarkshire, N.)


Jay, Rt. Hn. Douglas
Milne, Edward (Blyth)
Spearing, Nigel


Jeger, Mrs.Lena (H'b'n & St. P'cras, S.)
Mitchell, R. C. (S'hampton, Itchen)
Spriggs, Leslie


Jenkins, Hugh (Putney)
Molloy, William
Stallard, A. W.


Jenkins, Rt. Hn. Roy (Stechford)
Morgan, Elystan (Cardiganshire)
Stewart, Rt. Hn. Michael (Fulham)


John, Brynmor
Morris, Alfred (Wythenshawe)
Stoddart, David (Swindon)


Johnson, Carol (Lewisham, S.)
Morris, Charles R. (Openshaw)
Stonehouse, Rt. Hn. John


Johnson, James (K'ston-on-Hull, W.)
Morris, Rt. Hn. John (Aberavon)
Strang, Gavin


Johnson, Walter (Derby, S.)
Moyle, Roland
Taverne, Dick


Jones, Barry, (Flint, E.)
Mulley, Rt. Hn. Frederick
Thomas, Rt. Hn. George (Cardiff, W.)


Jones, Dan (Burnley)
Murray, Ronald King
Thomas, Jeffrey (Abertillery)


Jones, Rt. Hn. Sir Elwyn (W.Ham, S.)
Ogden, Eric
Thomson, Rt. Hn. G. (Dundee, E.)


Jones, Gwynoro (Carmarthen)
O'Halloran, Michael
Tinn, James


Jones, T. Alec (Rhondda, W.)
O'Malley, Brian
Tomney, Frank


Kaufman, Gerald
Oram, Bert
Torney, Tom


Kelley, Richard
Orme, Stanley
Tuck, Raphael


Kinnock, Neil
Oswald, Thomas
Urwin, T. W.


Lambie, David
Owen, Dr. David (Plymouth, Sutton)
Varley, Eric G.




Wainwright, Edwin


Latham, Arthur
Paget, R. T.
Walker, Harold (Doncaster)


Lawson, George
Palmer, Arthur
Wallace, George


Leadbitter, Ted
Panned, Rt. Hn. Charles
Watkins, David


Lee, Rt. Hn. Frederick
Parker, John (Dagenham)
Weitzman, David


Leonard, Dick
Parry, Robert (Liverpool, Exchange)
Wells, William (Walsall, N.)


Lever, Rt. Hn. Harold
Peart, Rt. Hn. Fred
Willey, Rt. Hn. Frederick


Lewis, Arthur (W. Ham, N.)
Pendry, Tom
Williams, Alan (Swansea, W.)


Lewis, Ron (Carlisle)
Pentland, Norman
Williams, Mrs. Shirley (Hitchin)


Lipton, Marcus
Perry, Ernest G.
Wilson, Alexander (Hamilton)


Loughlin, Charles
Prentice, Rt. Hn. Reg.
Wilson, William (Coventry, S.)


Lyon, Alexander W. (York)
Prescott, John



Lyons, Edward (Bradford, E.)
Price, J. T. (Westhoughton)
TELLERS FOR THE NOES:


Mabon, Dr. J. Dickson
Probert, Arthur
Mr. John Golding and


McBride, Neil
Reed, D. (Sedgefield)
Mr. James Hamilton


McCartney, Hugh
Rees, Merlyn (Leeds, S.)

Clause 33

PRESUMPTIONS RELATING TO PROCEEDINGS OF VOLUNTARY JOINT NEGOTIATING BODIES.

Lords Amendment: No. 64, to leave out Clause 33 and insert the following new Clause—
33.—(1) This section applies to any joint body consisting of representatives of one or more organisations of workers and of representatives either of one or more employers or of one or more organisations of employers or of a combination of one or more employers and one or more organisation of employers, with or without other persons, and established by or under a collective agreement (whether made before or after the commencement of this Act) for either or both of the following purposes, that is to say—

(a) regulating the terms and conditions of employment of workers of one or more descriptions;
(b) determining, in relation to workers of one or more descriptions, any matters for which a procedure agreement can provide.

(2) The following presumptions shall apply to any proceedings of a joint body to which this section applies, where those proceedings take place after the commencement of this Act.
(3) For the purposes of any such proceedings it shall be conclusively presumed that the parties (whether organisations of workers, employers or organisations of employers) for the time being represented on that joint body (in this section referred to as "the constituent parties ") intend to authorise it, in relation to matters falling within the scope of its functions, to make decisions having effect as legally enforceable contracts made on behalf of the constituent parties.
(4) Any decision made by any such body in any such proceedings, in relation to matters falling within the scope of its functions, if the decision—

(a) is duly recorded in writing by or on behalf of that body, and
(b) as so recorded, does not contain a provision which (however expressed) states that the decision is intended not to be legally enforceable,
shall be conclusively presumed to be intended by that body to have effect as a legally


enforceable contract made on behalf of the constituent parties.
(5) In this section "decision" includes any award or resolution, by whatever name called, and "functions", in relation to a decision of a joint body established by or under a collective agreement, means its functions under that agreement as it has effect at the time of that decision.

Mr. R. Carr: I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.

The Amendment replaces the original Clause 33. The new Clause like the one it replaces, relates to joint voluntary negotiating bodies from national level down to works or plant committee level, and it applies to the written decisions of such bodies a presumption equivalent to that applied by Clause 32—which we have just been debating—to collective agreements reached by other ways of collective bargaining.

The basic purposes of redrafting the original Clause 33 in this new form are twofold—first, to take account of criticisms which were made of the original Clause; second, to put beyond doubt that, like Clause 32, the Clause has no retrospective effect.

Subsection (1) differs from the drafting in the old Clause in specifying more comprehensively the composition of bodies to which the Clause relates. The difference is small, but it is significant, because it recognises that for some of these bodies the parties represented may include individual firms and one or more employers' organisations. The functions of these bodies are as defined in subsections (1)(a) and (b), and these are unchanged compared with equivalent subsections in the original Clause 33.

The functions, as so defined, are that these bodies are there to regulate either the terms and conditions of employment of any workers, or any matters provided in the procedure agreement, or both, and that deals with the first subsection of the new Clause.

Subsection (2) is designed to bring out more clearly that the presumptions specified in the Clause apply only to proceedings which take place after the commencement of the Bill. Some hon. Members, at least, will remember that when we had our debate on Clause 33 at an earlier stage although we made it clear that it was our intention and, indeed, it

was our belief that the original form carried no danger of retrospection, nevertheless some doubt was thrown on it, and the new Clause makes it clear beyond any doubt that it affects only proceedings which take place after the commencement of the Bill.

Subsection (3), taken with the definition of "functions" in subsection (5), is designed to remove the doubts which have been voiced about whether the conclusive presumption in the earlier version was too absolute and, more particularly—and this comes back in a second way to the point that I was making a moment ago—to make quite sure that there is no risk at all of its being interpreted by the courts as having any retrospective effect.

We do not think that there was such a risk, but to allay any uneasiness the Clause substitutes the wholy contemporaneous concept of
matters falling within the scope of its functions

in place of the earlier and less certain phrase
purposes for which it was established

We are sure that subsection (2), coupled with subsection (3), makes it absolutely certain that there can be nothing retrospective about the application of the Clause.

Subsection (4) is in substantially the same form as subsection 3 in the old Clause. It is true that the word "award" has been omitted but, as the definition subsection—subsection (5)—makes clear, a decision of the body includes "any award or resolution" where either may be the term appropriate to a particular body.

It might not be out of place for me to remind the House that by way of Lords Amendment No. 267, which was included in our previous debate, we are providing that any reference in the Bill to a collective agreement shall include a decision of a joint body to which this Clause applies.

That is the explanation of the new Clause, and the case for it. It is a clarification and a removing of doubts and fears which were there before. It is not an attempt to change the policy, any more than—as my hon. and learned Friend made clear—the previous Amendments were; our basic policy on these issues was deeply thought out and considered


before we became committed to it. It has never been our intention to change it. We are making a genuine attempt to allay those fears which, however shaky their foundations may have seemed, the Government recognise were nevertheless genuinely disturbing to ordinary people and therefore ought to be removed, even though we do not believe that they were justified in the first place.

I realise that hon. Members opposite would like us to go much further, to the point of changing our basic policy. That is something that we are not prepared to do, and this Amendment does not attempt to do so. I commend it to the House in the terms that while reaffirming our previous policy it clears up some uncertainties about it and, in the context of that policy, removes doubts and fears that previously existed.

9.30 p.m.

Mr. Heffer: In introducing the new Clause, the right hon. Gentleman has rightly pointed out that it in no way changes the Government's basic policy and that it does not attempt to do so. The Government are deeply committed to the policy that is now embodied in the Bill. The right hon. Gentleman is correct in saying that, because if we examine the new Clause against the old one we see that although there have been some drafting changes the essence is precisely the same.
One significant change has been made, to which we ought to draw the attention of the House. The old Clause contained the phrase "procedure agreement". That phrase is repeated in subsection (2) but is replaced in the new Clause by "collective agreement".
This touches on our previous debates, because it is a recognition by the Government that a collective agreement and a procedure agreement cannot be divorced. In that sense, the new Clause widens the scope of the agreements that it will cover. It was previously confined to procedure agreements and it could be argued that the substantive collective agreement would not be covered. There could have been some argument on this, but it has now been eliminated.
The right hon. Gentleman was right to point out that this covers agreements from national to works committee level. We

had some heated debates on the issue in Committee, but our arguments have not been accepted. The Government have only accepted the need to rewrite the Clause for clarification: our essential arguments were not accepted. As the right hon. Gentleman said, the principle is precisely the same.
We are as totally opposed as the right hon. Gentleman is totally committed to the legal enforcement of collective agreements and to the concept that, without disclaimers, agreements will be legally binding. This will create immense problems, despite the Secretary of State's suggestion that it will iron out problems, keep disputes to a minimum and get rid of what they term the wildcat strike.
The T.U.C. has already invited all its affiliated members not to conclude an agreement with an employer if it would be legally binding. So the first item discussed in any negotiation will inevitably be a disclaimer to ensure that the agreement is not legally enforceable; this is a point of conflict where none existed before.
In a very small minority of cases, legally enforceable agreements are in existence. These have been concluded where there has been agreement between employers and trade unionists that such agreements should exist, and that has been done without the existence of this legislation. However, the overwhelming majority of trade unions have never gone along with this concept of legally enforceable agreements, and they are not prepared to do so now. This is, therefore, a new point of conflict in industrial relations.
Consider the chaotic state of affairs that could arise. Will the minutes of a joint body containing a decision made at a meeting of that body and circulated to union members be regarded as legally enforceable—that is, unless a disclaimer is included in the minutes? The right hon. Gentleman will be aware that in industry there are at all levels any number of joint bodies such as works, welfare and safety committees. These all exist within the terms of a collective agreement. If such an agreement does not contain a disclaimer clause, will these organisations be covered by this proposal?
Lord Drumalbyn made it clear in another place that even if a disclaimer is


inserted in the original agreement at works committee level, if somebody forgets to put in a new disclaimer when new agreements are made at that level, such agreements could become legally enforceable. This is absolutely chaotic and certainly will not assist industrial relations. More points of conflict will be created.
We are totally opposed to the whole idea of legally enforceable agreements and to this proposal, which basically changes nothing. I accept that it gets rid of some of the fears which we expressed but, as the right hon. Gentleman said, it represents a basic point of fundamental difference between the two sides of the House, as it does between the trade union movement and the Government.

New Clause 33, which is Lords Amendment No. 64, refers in subsection (4) to
Any decision … as so recorded, does not contain a provision which (however expressed) states that the decision is intended not to be legally enforceable.

We discussed the expression "however expressed" earlier. This represents another possible point of conflict because of the legal argument that could ensue over the meaning of that phrase.

Subsection (5) provides that
'decision' includes any award or resolution, by whatever named called …".

There can be continual arguments about what is an award, what is a resolution, and about the type of award or resolution. Anybody who knows anything about industrial relations knows that these are points of argument in any case. When there is the possibility of an agreement's being legally enforceable, these points of conflict will exacerbate what is already a sufficiently difficult matter.

For all these reasons, we believe that the Government have not made out a case. We do not think that the Clause should be accepted. We are opposed in principle to the Clause and to the ideas expressed in it. We know that unfortunately the House will not support our view, because we do not have the majority, but we shall continue to argue against this type of legally enforceable agreement and against this presumption, because we believe that this is a very serious introduction of a point of conflict which has not existed up to now.

Mr. Bidwell: The essence of the Secretary of State's presentation of the Government's thinking in tabling a Clause of this kind has been that they are according people greater liberty and are not depriving workers of the right to leave their employers. However, the Government are attacking the right to collectivism. As soon as they step on the road of making things more difficult in that sense, they set about attacking the ordinary worker as an individual, because faced with the power and strengh of employers workpeople are forced to rely upon collectivism.
I object to the new Clause 33 because, even though it is now more clearly defined, I believe that it is more objectionably expressed. The Clause attacks the fundamental liberty of the ordinary workman, in that it attacks his right to take collective action, not merely against his employer, but against his trade union representative if necessary. What happened at Ford's not too long ago was an example of how workers will kick over the traces. At Ford's the union officials had concluded an agreement with the employers. In future, union representatives will have much less facility and freedom to make agreements.
Psychology will play a great part in it. Union representatives will not in future take the chances that they have been prepared to take hitherto. The Clause looks nice and tidy with all this wording about legal enforceability and obtaining as much as possible in writing. My experience has been in a national industry. In seeking to conclude local agreements the struggle with employers has always been to get them to commit themselves in writing. There will be a great reluctance in future on the part of workers' representatives to enter into written agreements, particularly at the level where the Government are virtually accusing union representatives of being always on the itch to call wildcat strikes or to lead their members out of the factory gate at the drop of a hat. I do not know how employers will react. It is an almost ludicrous situation when people have to keep reminding themselves to write in advance that an agreement shall not be legally enforceable, with all the consequent nonsense that that implies.
9.45 p.m.
I want to expose the whole fallacy of the Government's thinking in this matter. The Solicitor-General, who is the principal architect of the ideas in such provisions as Clause 33, is not with us at the moment. The hon. and learned Gentleman attempted to justify these Amendments—these so-called "tidying-up" Amendments—and he referred to the position in other countries. Other countries have legally enforceable laws of this kind, and the assumption is that Britain is somehow lagging behind because we do not have such legally enforceable contracts. I submit that there is no comparison. In Germany and Japan the strike record is not so great as it is in this country—I think they are the two exceptions—but in many other countries where such laws obtain, such as Australia where the conflicts are sometimes bloody and bitter, we take no lessons in relation to Clauses such as Clause 33—this applies particularly to the United States of America—because it is in those countries where the iron-bound characteristics of contract law are drawn up by a handful of people representing many workers, on the one side, and representatives of employers, on the other.
I know that the Secretary of State and the Solicitor-General have exercised a little so-called trade union compassion in their approach to this matter, but in this country that approach cannot be interposed in such a massive way. It is the maturity of our situation which makes this unworkable. The Secretary of State—not the Solicitor-General, who is a legalistic theoretician—is a man of some experience and he holds a difficult and responsible job as Minister responsible for employment. He has to get the two sides together and get the wheels of production rolling. I am not sermonising to him, but I suggest that he is nearly choking himself to death with all this rigmarole. He cannot do it in Britain. He cannot enforce provisions such as Clause 33. He can introduce changes, but I do not think he will get the fundamental changes that he wants. Only a Labour Government will do that because this situation is geared up with property relationships and the slave-master relationship which is the psychological attitude of British workers when they

face employers. The employers have always had the edge on the workers.
Many employers will have a sufficiently progressive mentality and prefer to have a co-operative work force, so they will accept a preamble to any agreement providing that it shall not be legally enforceable. They know that they will have to live with their workers. They value their skill, and they want to retain it. Other more clumsy employers will not be so co-operative and they will run into headlong collision.
For those reasons, I very much resent the Amendment, and I am sure that all my right hon. and hon. Friends will wish to divide against it.

Mr. Ted Fletcher: The new Clause 33 is virtually the same as the old one, with the exception of the dropping of retrospection, and it is just as obnoxious. It will have no great effect upon trade union negotiations, because there is an option for a union to decide that an agreement shall not be legally enforceable.
The Trades Union Congress has advised its affiliated unions not to enter into legally enforceable agreements, and it is almost certain that the unions will follow that advice, for two reasons. In the first place, they cannot see an end to the rise in the cost of living. The cost of food has gone up by 10 per cent. in the last twelve months of Tory Government, and no trade union leader knows how it will go in the next twelve months. A union official would be foolish to set his signature to an agreement which could not be revised from time to time and which would be legally enforceable for twelve months or two years without knowing what the economic situation would be towards the expiry of such an agreement. Inevitably, therefore, trade unionists will be reluctant to enter into legally enforceable agreements.
We are told that the object of the Bill is to improve relationships between work people and their employers. This Clause may well make the situation worse and make it more difficult for trade unionists to reach agreement with their employers. Let us suppose that an industrial dispute which led to a stoppage of work has reached the point of settlement and it is possible for the union and the employer


to agree upon an increase. Work is resumed. The negotiations may well be protracted because the employer will insist on the terms of the agreement being legally enforceable. The strike may have lasted several weeks, and the negotiations several days, but they may yet break down because of the employer's insistance on legal enforceability. The trade unions are for that reason, too, rightly suspicious of this Clause.
The Government have had no second thoughts. They have made no change of principle by introducing the new Clause, save on the question of retrospection. It is the same obnoxious Clause in a different guise. We shall divide against it. We disagree violently with the principle, and the Government have conceded anything in their new form of words.

Mr. David Stoddart: When I return to the power station where I used to work and talk to the chaps on the shopfloor about the Bill, one of the things I tell them about is legal enforceability. When they first heard about it, they regarded it with amusement, but afterwards they regarded it with disbelief, and then with anger. From then on, they called the Secretary of State names that I cannot repeat without using unparliamentary language. [HON. MEMBERS: "Go on."] I am being tempted, Mr. Speaker, but I do not want to risk your wrath, because I know that you would call me to order.
The people on the shop floor see exactly what legal enforceability means to them. They have been working in works committees and joint consultative bodies for a long time. Their shop stewards have been making collective agreements with the employers orally and in writing, and over a period of time there has grown up between the two sides, a mutual understanding. As a result, good industrial relations have been built up. That has happened without any legal enforceability. The people who have made the agreements know perfectly well that those on the other side can be trusted to keep their word, and that if there is a misinterpretation it will be put right comparatively easily.
If agreements, which are often on both large or small issues locally, are to be made legally enforceable, the trust which has been built up is likely to be diminished, because there is always a suspicion of employers, and it is growing at present.

Mr. R. Carr: Where both sides have developed the trust of which the hon. Gentleman is speaking, where agreements on both sides are kept, I am sure that both sides will quickly and easily agree to have a waiver clause. There is no merit in legal enforceability in itself; the merit is in making good, precise agreements and then keeping them.

Mr. Stoddart: I was coming to that. In such places the Bill is unnecessary. I am saying that the very act of putting in legal enforceability is likely to undermine the position which has been established and to create new tensions at a time when they are already being created. For example, in works committees it will not be sufficient for a waiver clause to be put at the head of each set of minutes. If my understanding is correct, it will have to be put at the end of each resolution, and it will be necessary to have a member of the committee watching to see that on each resolution someone moves that it is not legally enforceable.
Some people believe that one side of a negotiating body can insert the waiver clause. As I read the Bill, it has to be the joint body itself—in other words, a majority of both sides voting for the waiver clause. Immediately, therefore, there is conflict and an obstacle to negotiation——

It being Ten o'clock, the debate stood adjourned.

BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE

Ordered,
That at this day's Sitting Consideration of Lords Amendments to the Civil Aviation Bill may be proceeded with, though opposed, until any hour; and that the Motions relating to Petroleum (S.I., 1971, No. 1062 and 1961) may be proceeded with, though opposed, until half-past one o'clock or for one and a half hours after the first has been entered upon, whichever is the later.—[Mr. Goodhew.]

INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS BILL

Question again proposed, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.

Mr. John Page: I think that the hon. Member was casting his mind back to the Second Reading debate. The whole point is that unless there is agreement, there is no new contract. The position is not that if both sides do not agree it is legally binding. Unless both sides agree, there is not a contract in the first place.

Mr. Stoddart: I think that if the hon. Member reads it correctly, he will find that I am right and he is wrong. The Minister appears to be confirming that. Before the interruption, I was saying that this could create obstacles to agreement and harmony in industry. That is why I and my hon. Friends, most of whom have had experience in industry at shop floor level, violently oppose the Clause.
I do not know whether it is generally realised that throughout industry, as in many other walks of life, there is great difficulty in getting people to serve. I am sure that my hon. Friends will have had experience that it is not easy to get people to serve on works councils, works committees and similar bodies, which are voluntary in nature but nevertheless carry great responsibilities. The fact that the contracts are made legally enforceable will make it even more difficult to get people to serve on a voluntary basis on these important bodies in industry.
Make no mistake about it: works committees, with the participation of shop stewards at local level, are the sort of bodies that make industry tick. Without these bodies and without trust and mutual confidence, industry will collapse at local level and the difficulties for management and worker alike will be increased beyond measure.
I urge the Government, even at this late hour, to have another look at the Clause and take it out. It will do far more harm than good, it will cause a great deal of injury in industrial relationships and the worker on the shop floor simply will not have it.

Mr. McBride: This new Clause, as my hon. Friend the Member for Liverpool, Walton (Mr. Heffer) so rightly emphasised,

lays great stress on legal enforceability of contracts as between employers' representatives and trade union representatives, and this concept is not British. It is totally foreign to our way of life and our way of doing things. Large employers in Britain will not welcome this Lords Amendment because it would induce a sense of rigidity, as the Secretary of State is well aware, because he is a former industrialist and knows this to be so. The rigidity which this would introduce into British industry would be in contrast to the flexibility which now exists and joint committees, if this new Clause were carried into law, would not function so efficiently as they do now.
In my estimation this new Clause abrogates the principles of common sense. I wonder whether the right hon. Gentleman has ever thought how day-to-day bargaining between employers and shop stewards takes place. There are effected daily thousands of oral agreements. I have been a party to many of them. One comes from the shop floor and listens to hon. Members opposite arguing about industrial relations and one knows that they are not able to earn their living with their hands; the great majority of them have never done so; they have no concept of the relationships on the shop floor. It is staggering beyond belief that it should be so, but it is.

Mr. Kenneth Lewis: rose—

Mr. McBride: When I want the advice of the hon. Member for Rutland and Stamford (Mr. Kenneth Lewis) I will ask for it.

Mr. Lewis: The hon. Member can have it now. Will the hon. Member give way?

Mr. McBride: No. I would say to the hon. Member that if he were to offer advice he would devalue it at the moment of giving it.
Very often employers cannot wait, and it is only by the very nature of the flexible methods of the day-to-day consultation between shop stewards and managements in industry that industry proceeds on its way, and that will continue if this Bill is enacted, because I believe that a great many of the larger employers will simply ignore this.

Mr. R. Carr: A few moments ago the hon. Member was talking about the


making daily of oral agreements. This new Clause does not affect oral agreements at all. It is specifically limited to written agreements. It has no effect at all upon what the hon. Member is talking about.

Mr. Kenneth Lewis: May I say to my right hon. Friend that——

Hon. Members: No.

Mr. McBride: No. The presumption of some hon. Members opposite is beyond belief. I remind the hon. Member for Rutland and Stamford of a proverb which we have in this House and which has been mentioned very often, that good manners are for the Labour Party but not for the Tory Party.

Mr. Kevin McNamara: That is being proved now.

Mr. McBride: The right hon. Gentleman was talking about agreements and I draw his attention to the new Clause which says, in subsection (4), "any decision". I would presume that in law, as that is not qualified, "any decision" would be an oral or written decision and that the term "any decision" would embrace oral agreements.
Must we have a multitude of case law precedents which would shackle industry and delay work and—let us be frank about it—increase the costs of industrial products? There is the creation of the problem in industry of making the ramifications of these proposals fully known throughout the whole of industry, and I venture to suggest that there will be widespread evasion of this legal enforceability.
As I say, this is the abrogation of the principles of common sense, and the very terms of this Lords Amendment suggest the Government should have thought this out. I am bound to say that the Government have failed to do so, and that the common sense and give and take principle which is so essentially British, and which has helped industry so much, will be deliberately thrown away because of the legal rigidity of this Lords Amendment.
Subsection (4)(b) provides that unless a decision is stated not to be legally enforceable it shall be legally enforceable. Subsection (5) contains the definitions, and it affects committees at all levels and illustrates the sweeping nature of the

Clause. Every body will be involved, from the national executive council and the national joint committee in the great industries to the smallest joint committee in the smallest shop in the country. As my hon. Friend the Member for Swindon (Mr. David Stoddart) says, the difficulty of getting people to serve on these committees will be increased by the operation of the Clause. This great British tradition of people serving on joint committees because they feel that they are responsible to the community and to the industry to which they belong will be swept away.
The right hon. Gentleman is no legal theoretician, but he will have the job of explaining to industry precisely how the Clause will affect it without the benefit of his legal adviser at his side. Industry will look for his help to escape from the morass of the Bill's legal complexity, but the legal implications of the Bill are completely lost on the right hon. Gentleman.
Right hon. and hon. Gentlemen opposite thought that this would be a vote winner but, curiously enough, the man who is defeated is the Prime Minister who supposes that we shall go into the Common Market. When the British people understand fully the nature and content of the Bill they will regard it as another stage in their reckoning with the Government.

10.15 p.m.

Mr. E. Fernyhough: In introducing the new Clause the Secretary of State pretended that it was to meet the criticism made by this side of the House of the original Clause. He has changed a noun there, a verb here, and an adjective elsewhere, but the end result is precisely the same. He has made no concession to the arguments and pleas put forward in Committee. He has, therefore, wasted the lawyers' time because we are in precisely the same position after his concessions as we were before.
The Secretary of State said that we were trying to learn from the experiences of other countries. He is a pro-Common Market man, but has he learned anything about strikes from Italy, France or Belgium? One would think that the British worker was the most strike-prone worker in the world. Although we may be bottom of the league in some respects


and at the top in others, we are neither bottom nor top in respect of strikes. We come somewhere about half way up the table. In other words, there are some better and some worse but, on average, we are as good or as bad as the rest of the industrial workers in the world.
Why should the right hon. Gentleman believe that these measures will reduce industrial unrest in this country? Wherever legally enforceable agreements apply, it does not follow that this automatically brings down the number of days lost through strikes—as anybody knows who looks at the league table and takes account of those countries in which legislation on the lines of this Bill is already in existence.
When agreements are entered into in this country as between trade union officials, shop stewards and management, both sides believe that in future they will be able to interpret those agreements to their mutual satisfaction. It is just like the electorate last June who thought that the Tory Party manifesto was an agreement that, if the British people gave the Tories their support, the Tories would deliver the goods. The further we get away from 18th June the less they believe this.
We have had legislation in the past to deal with strikes and the breaking of agreements. My right hon. Friend said that the Secretary of State has become a prisoner of the legal profession. This is quite true. It may be remembered that there was a Minister of Labour during the war—a not unknown figure on these benches—who occupied the position now held by the right hon. Gentleman. That Minister of Labour decided that, because an agreement had been broken, the law should be brought in. Never was a Minister of Labour, as he was then called, more humiliated when he tried to introduce the law into this field.
The right hon. Gentleman knows—and I know the circles in which he moves, and I say this in no condemnatory manner—that none of the large employers will bother with this provision. Does anybody believe that there will be legally enforceable agreements in the I.C.I., the National Coal Board, British Railways, the gas and electricity industries and the motor car industry? Of course, there will not. The people who will be hit will be

the little people—the people who are not very strong and in relation to whom trade union leaders are not able to bring the same pressure to bear on employers. Those people probably will have to accept legally enforceable agreements.
But for the vast majority of British industry, particularly that part with which the right hon. Gentleman wants to deal—the strike-prone part—this will be completely ineffective because none of the employers in those large, basic, fundamental industries will even attempt to get the unions to sign legally enforceable agreements.

Mr. Adam Butler: Does not the right hon. Gentleman think that the American-controlled car industry at least, from my experience in America, would be prepared to push for legally enforceable agreements for a period of perhaps two or three years, as in the United States?

Mr. Fernyhough: All I know is that the vast majority of British employers would not like a strike record as bad as that of the United States. America is almost at the top of the strike league table. If American industrialists only had the size of our strike problem they would be happy, because theirs is far worse. If he believes that the introduction of American methods would be beneficial here, the hon. Gentleman should look at the number of days lost in America compared with the number lost here and he will appreciate that our people are good boys.

Mr. Harold Walker: In Committee we also had this comparison between the American motor industry and ours. I threw out a challenge to hon. Members opposite then. I asked them to compare the strike record of my workers at the Ford plant in Doncaster with any American Ford plant. I wagered that the Doncaster boys would have the better record. I am still waiting for that wager to be taken up.

Mr. Fernyhough: I am sure that my hon. Friend will wait a long time because he is on a certain winner, while those who challenge him know that they are on a certain loser. I know that it is the eleventh second of the eleventh minute of the eleventh hour, but I ask the right hon. Gentleman, who I know has a good


measure of common sense, even now to reflect upon what he is doing to future negotiations and to be big enough to do the sensible thing and withdraw this Clause entirely.

Mr. Hugh Jenkins: I make it clear that even those unions which have incorporated an element of enforceability into some parts of their own agreements are absolutely opposed to this Clause and endorse every word which has been said on the subject by my right hon. and hon. Friends. Negotiating in certain circumstances an element of enforceability of part as an agreement by agreement between the two parties is quite different from proposing to enforce by law, unless everybody opts out on specific occasions a universality of enforceability.
What the right hon. Gentleman is doing is rather ironical. He is forcing everyone to contract in automatically unless specifically they decide to contract out of enforceability. It is ironical that he should seek to impose a sort of contracting in on the entire trade union movement. Up to now what I have said is of universal application, but I am sure that my hon. Friends would be disappointed if I were not to illustrate my case from Equity, whose name I have not mentioned so far in this speech. They would like me to illustrate from the case I know best. I want to illustrate the immense variety of the trade union movement which the right hon. Gentleman always underestimates in trying to create this cage in which we are all supposed to operate.
It is the case that Equity and its members accept in certain circumstances that contracts are not only enforceable as between the union and the employers' organisation but are also individually enforceable, as indeed are all contracts between the employer and the employed. So there is an enforceability of contract between employee and employer. What is done in collective agreements is to provide circumstances in which the contract between the employer and the employee becomes non-enforceable. It is in this respect that I want the right hon. Gentleman to give me an undertaking. It is important that he should do so. Will it be possible to provide for circumstances in which the contract between the employer

and employee ceases to be enforceable? That is the position at the moment.
In the example which I have given, if any employee is not a member of the union the contract between the employer and the employee ceases to be enforceable. Equally, if the employer is not a member of an employers' association, again the contract ceases to be enforceable between the employer and the employee. This is the method by which a union shop is organised. In consequence, the moment that a person who is not a member of Equity appears on the stage the contracts of everybody cease to be enforceable. Therefore, the star can and will walk out of the show.
Is the right hon. Gentleman seeking to get the best of both worlds? Is he trying to make a universality of enforceability between trade unions and employers' associations without permitting the breaking of non-enforceability? Does the Clause, as drafted, prevent non-enforceability being written in? Can it become part of an agreement that in all circumstances all members in this area of employment shall be members of the trade union? Can it be part of the agreement that all employers in this industry shall be members of the employers' organisation? If the right hon. Gentleman can give that assurance, it will not remove the objection to the Clause as a whole, but it will certainly make it somewhat more palatable.

Mr. Kenneth Lewis: I must intervene. If I am tedious in speaking to the House at least I do not have to sit and listen to the same speeches again and again from hon. Gentlemen opposite. I get a rest by listening to my own voice.
The hon. Member for Swansea, East (Mr. McBride) indicated that we know very little about this matter. I assure him that, having listened to the debates in the last few days, if we did not know anything at the beginning, we certainly know a good deal more now. [An HON. MEMBER: "We know a good deal less."] My hon. Friend complains that we know a good deal less. We have heard many times from hon. Members opposite that the legal Members of the House and the lawyers who will be concerned will complicate matters in industrial relations. Having listened to the speeches by hon. Gentlemen opposite today, I have heard


more complications from laymen about what the lawyers are proposing than the lawyers could possibly conjure up.

New Clause 33 is extremely simple. How could it be made so complicated by hon. Gentlemen opposite I fail to understand. I am particularly pleased that my right hon. Friend took out the word "oral". We had a fierce debate on this word in Committee. Some hon. Members on this side of the House could not understand how an oral agreement could be made legally enforceable. It is interesting to note that the other place, doubtless with the guidance of my right hon. Friend and his Department, finally decided that we were correct in suggesting that this word should be removed.

10.30 p.m.

Mr. Ronald King Murray: Would the hon. Gentleman tell the House where the word "oral" appears in the original Clause?

Mr. Lewis: We discussed this earlier, and my right hon. Friend mentioned it.
Legally binding contracts are voluntary. No group of trade unions or workers need to have a legally binding contract if they do not wish it. It is

as simple as that. The complications that have been suggested by hon. Gentlemen opposite simply do not exist. There are no complications at all. There are no difficulties. If there is a legally binding contract, it has been made because it is acceptable to both sides. I have no doubt that such a contract would not be acceptable to a trade union unless it believed that it was in its interests and in the interests of its members to make the contract legally binding. If the employers were to offer a deal which the union thought it was worth accepting as legally binding, it would do so. If it did not wish the agreement to be binding, it would simply accept the present situation, make an agreement with the employers, and the courts would not come into it.
We discussed this issue in Committee, it was mentioned on Second Reading, and yet hon. Gentlemen opposite still seem to want to introduce their own complications. It is my belief that once the Bill is on the statute book, unions and employers will work this provision to their benefit in the way in which they want to work it, and not in the way in which we think they will want to work it.

Mr. Ronald King Murray: One good thing about the new Clause is that subsection (2) makes it clear that the provisions of the Clause are not intended to apply to proceedings which take place before the Bill comes into force. But for the rest the new Clause replaces the bad by the worse.
I should like to underline the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Liverpool, Walton (Mr. Heffer) about subsection (3). My hon. Friend said that whereas the original corresponding subsection was restricted to procedure agreements, there is no such restriction in the new Clause. It means that the impact of the new Clause is greatly extended. Indeed, it is extended to an extent which nobody can foresee.
The extension may be very wide, indeed, and may lead to all kinds of things being regarded as legally enforceable agreements which previously no one conceived to be in that category at all. While there was a restriction to procedure agreements one could keep one's feet pedestrianly on the ground. Now that contact with the ground has been lost nobody can predict where the Clause will lead, but it can be said with certainty that it will lead to trouble.
There is another respect in which the Clause has been revised. The right hon. Gentleman said that he took some pride in the fact that the word "functions" had replaced the words "purposes for which it "—that is the body—"was established". In some respects I accept that that is an improvement, because functions are things one can test by an examination of facts. One can see what the body does and judge from that what its functions are.
But any advantage which that appears to provide rather appears to be lost when one looks at the definition subsection, subsection (5), because there it says that functions
in relation to a decision of a joint body … means its functions under that agreement as it has effect at the time of that decision.
When we look at that it seems clear that we have to consider "functions" as they are effective at the time of the decision. In other words, a joint body of the type conceived by the Clause may be doing a great deal more than it was originally set up to do; it may operate

over a much wider sphere than the purposes for which it was originally set up. Whereas the original Clause 33 confined the ambit of this operation to the purposes for which it was established we are now dealing with functions instead of getting precision. There is a spurious precision. When we examine the realities we may find that it is doing something wider than the purposes for which it was set up. We have gone from some precision to a great extension of the ambit of the Clause.
I do not want to go into too much detail about the difficulties that we discussed with a great deal of anxiety in the earlier stages of the Bill, but hon. Members opposite will remember that the subsection corresponding to the present subsection (4) in the new Clause was the one that gave rise to enormous difficulty. It started with great difficulty, because the Solicitor-General himself assured the House that it did not mean what it apparently said, namely, that legally enforceable agreements would be spelt out of the minutes unless there was a disclaimer for each entry. It is fair to point out, however, that the Solicitor-General withdrew that interpretation at a later stage in Committee.
That subsection (4), with all its ambiguity and unfortunate consequences, remains unchanged, and the reasons canvassed previously in relation to the two points made by my hon. Friend the Member for Walton, about collective agreements, and myself, about the question of functions, are cogent reasons why the new Clause should be abandoned by the Government before it is too late.
I want to give an illustration of the extent to which the Amendment may be going when taken in conjunction with the Amendments we discussed with Amendment No. 267. My hon. Friend the Member for Renfrew, West (Mr. Buchan) posed a question that the Government Front Bench did not seek to answer. He asked what would happen after the Bill had come into force if a situation arose corresponding to the "work-in" now taking place in John Brown's yard in Upper Clyde Shipbuilders.
It seems to me that on a strict reading of the Bill, as it will stand with these two Amendments, the arrangement under


which the workers in John Brown's are at present operating in the shipyard may be a collective agreement that is enforceable under the Bill. Amendment No. 267 defines "collective agreement" as
an … arrangement made … by or on behalf of one or more organisations of workers and either one or more employers".
There is no doubt that there is an organisation of workers who are seeking to run John Brown's yard at the moment. There is an organisation—not a trade union. It may be an ad hoc organisation, but I conceive it to be covered by the new Clause.
One finds what "employer" means in Clause 158, in paragraph (a) or (b). If it is said that the definition contained in paragraph (a) does not apply, it seems obvious that the alternative definition contained in paragraph (b) applies, because it says that an employer
in any other case, means a person regarded in that person's capacity as one for whom one or more workers work or have worked or normally work or seek to work.
That definition would apply to the shop stewards' management committee in John Brown's.
One has only to postulate one further step to get the application of Amendment No. 64. The shop stewards' management committee must have minutes of its decisions. Therefore, after the Bill has come into effect, a work-in like this could be a legally enforceable collective agreement within the meaning of the Bill. That is a measure of the absurdity to which this Clause and the previous one can carry us.

Mr. James Tinn: We have heard few speeches from hon. Members opposite, and, to judge from the speech of the hon. Member for Rutland and Stamford (Mr. Kenneth Lewis), that might be because they find it astonishingly difficult to argue in favour of this Clause or the one that it will replace. The Government seem to rely on the argument that the new Clause can be disregarded by writing disclaimers into collective agreements. This is true, but what a negative argument !
The Secretary of State did argue that, even if this contracting out procedure is adopted- -as it will be on a wide scale—

it will at least add greater precision and clarity to industrial agreements. We have just had a wonderful example from my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Edinburgh, Leith (Mr. Ronald King Murray) of what legal precision and clarity can mean in this context. Negotiators, on both sides, will not have the benefit of the Government or their advisers. The people doing the day-to-day jobs in industry will have to rely on their own common sense and the increasingly expensive and growing amount of legal advice which they will come to need.
But in the end it will be disregarded. I imagine that the first management negotiator who forgot to insert a disclaimer would quickly be shown the door—because management will not like this any more than the unions will.
But we cannot be sure that the new Clause will do no harm. It may do great harm. I believe that the C.B.I. is very worried about this. It is not difficult to envisage firms coming to this country from abroad, perhaps from the United States, from a different industrial relations system where legal enforceability is taken for granted, and assuming that they can stand on their legal rights in this country too. Just as they are beginning to get their enterprises off the ground, they will run headlong into totally unnecessary clashes with the trade unions.
10.45 p.m.
It is sometimes suggested that similar provisions exist in other countries, though little has been said about foreign experience to justify legal enforceability. It is important to consider the way in which this system was introduced in other countries. Indeed, that is crucial in determining whether it is likely to succeed here.
A similar system was introduced in Germany after the war, during which the trade union movement there had been destroyed. A whole new system was being formed, and an essential feature of the process was that the system was acceptable to the unions. On the rare occasions when it has been used, such as during the strikes in the coal and steel industries a couple of years ago, the legal terms of the agreement have not been used against the unions. In other words, the German system is essentially voluntary.
These provisions in Australia date back to the last century and were adopted in an entirely different climate. At that time the small, fragmented trade unions of the Australian sub-continent were under attack, and the legal enforceability provisions have been used by them more as a defence, but that situation does not apply here.
While these provisions may not prove as damaging as their critics make out—because they will be largely ignored—I fear that they will not ease the conduct of industrial relations and that they could be potentially damaging when foreign firms are involved.

Mr. Harold Walker: I led the debate on this subject from this side of the House when we discussed the original Clause 33 in Committee. Hon. Members may recall that on that occasion my hon. Friend the Member for Swindon (Mr. David Stoddart) described the reaction of the trade unionists and shop stewards in his constituency to the proposal.
I had exactly the same reaction when I first read the Clause. My emotions were disbelief, incredulity and anger. My hon. Friends have made it clear that there is no reason now, in view of the Amendment, for us to change our attitude or emotional reaction to the original Clause. In other words, we have no reason to change our fundamental objection to these provisions.
I will not go over the ground that has been eloquently covered by my hon. Friends, except to remind the House that whereas some people might think that here is an example of the Government responding to pressure to change the Bill, in fact, as my hon. Friend the Member for Cleveland (Mr. Tinn) pointed out, the Amendment is likely to create as much difficulty for employers as for trade unions.
I have evidence to support this view. The starting point in the process is the Royal Commission's Report, made after two and a half years' consideration of the subject. This distinguished Commission, which sat for three years and which gave the question of legal enforceability the most careful scrutiny, said this in paragraph 475 of its Report, talking about the kind of unofficial strikes about which the Government are concerned:

… the root of the evil is in our present methods of collective bargaining, and it is in the absence of speedy, clear and effective disputes procedures. Until this defect is remedied, all attempts to make procedure agreements legally binding are bound to defeat themselves.
The Commission said this in paragraph 476:
Any attempt to deal with unofficial and unconstitutional strikes in isolation must be deprecated. This applies to the legal enforcement of procedure agreements as much to the proposal to eradicate these strikes….
Paragraph 506 states:
We thus reject the proposal to make collective agreements—whether substantive or procedural—enforceable at the present time. We do so, not because we think that the law could not in any circumstances assist in the reduction of the number of unofficial strikes. It cannot do so in this country today—that is the point.
These are the Commission's words:
To take steps in this direction today would be not only useless but harmful, and they would undo a great deal of the good we hope to see done through the reform of the collective bargaining system which we recommend.
My hon. Friends, whether consciously or subconsciously, have echoed that theme. What the right hon. Gentleman proposes will do irreparable damage to our system of industrial relations, because it will put shop stewards and trade unionists in a position where they will unwittingly enter into legally binding collective agreements.
The hon. Member for Rutland and Stamford (Mr. Kenneth Lewis) said that nobody needs to enter into a legally binding collective agreement if he does not want to. The proposed Clause will provide that if the disclaimer is entered into the agreement will not be legally binding. That presumes that the parties to the negotiations will have read and understood the Bill and will know what they are about.

Mr. Kenneth Lewis: Of course they will.

Mr. Walker: How many of the thousands of trade unionists and shop stewards and managers who sit round the negotiating table in industry to discuss matters of mutual concern have read any of the Statutes relating to the negotiations or affecting industrial relations? The Lord Chancellor confessed his difficulty in dealing with the complexities of the Bill. We have all acknowledged the complexities of the Bill. I wonder how shop stewards


will deal with the complexities of the Bill if indeed they ever read it at 90p a time.
We have not at any stage during our lengthy proceedings on the Bill referred to the evidence submitted to the Royal Commission by the Engineering Employers' Federation, paragraph 37 of which says this about the proposal to make collective agreements legally enforceable:
To introduce a system of general legal enforcement in the civil courts would involve making fundamental changes in our system of industrial relations without any certainty that such changes would effectively deal with the problem of strikes in breach of agreements.
Paragraph 38 states:
The reason why the Federation takes this view is that it does not consider it practicable or desirable for employers to be put in the position of having to sue their workpeople in the civil courts to secure the observance of an agreement. Many employers would be extremely reluctant to take such action.
The Confederation of British Industry raised a number of objections and said to the Royal Commission about the proposal to introduce enforceability:
We cannot assume that the contracts to be enforced would be similar to the present agreements. Trade unions might well be reluctant to accept as a legal liability certain undertakings which are now given voluntarily and honoured in the main.
They went on to say:
The British system of industrial relations is founded upon the principle that the parties at every stage accept responsibility for their actions and agreements and that resort to outside bodies is strictly limited. Legal enforcement would undermine this responsibility and lead to constant references to the Courts whenever one or other of the parties was dissatisfied.
The C.B.I. then said:
Enforceability of contracts would almost certainly be accompanied by a host of other legal provisions as in the American system. British employers would be most reluctant to envisage a system under which almost all their actions in the industrial relations field might be challenged in the Courts—or under which they themselves would regularly be the plaintiffs in suits against their employees or the trade unions with which they negotiate.
Finally they said:
The legal remedies likely to be available would not be well adapted to the industrial situation. What the employer wants is a good day's work willingly performed; this cannot be obtained by legal action. Fines might well not be paid, and action for contempt of court become necessary.
Those were the views of the Confederation of British Industry submitted

to the Royal Commission. They are powerful arguments. They are not arguments advanced by the trade unions or by hon. Members from this side of the House. They are the arguments of people with deep knowledge of industry, who can see what problems these proposals would present.

Mr. R. Carr: rose—

Mr. Walker: Will the right hon. Gentleman forgive me for not giving way? I am about to conclude. There is etched on my mind the memory of the discussions that were held at the Department of Employment and Productivity following the publication of the Royal Commission's Report when the views of the Confederation of British Industry were expressed and reinforced orally. It was pointed out by the C.B.I. that legal responsibility would be unlikely to lead to any improvement in our industrial relations system. The then Director-General of the C.B.I. is the present Secretary of State for Trade and Industry.
I recall the words which I used on the occasion of our last debate on Clause 33, in Committee, which seem as appropriate as any:
The proposal is impractical to the point of absurdity. Furthermore, it will have a harmful effect on industrial relations at shop floor level, and it is inequitable in the extreme."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 1st February, 1971; Vol. 810, c. 1358.]

Mr. R. Carr: With the leave of the House, I should like to try to deal with some of the points which have been raised. May I first deal with the closing remarks of the hon. Member for Don-caster (Mr. Harold Walker). Two things need to be said about them. First, the quotation of evidence that he read out was anticipating fines on individual workers. We are opposed to fines on individual workers just as much as anybody else. It was the hon. Gentleman's party, when they were in power, who thought of imposing fines on individual workers. We never proposed that. It is nowhere in our Bill.

Mr. Harold Walker: The right hon. Gentleman must not misrepresent me or the employers' organisations who submitted evidence. The employers were anticipating the kind of legal enforceability that the right hon. Gentleman has in mind and is proposing now, where


the agreements will be turned into contracts, for which people will be accountable in the civil courts. As to the right hon. Gentleman's reference to fines, it is a lot of nonsense, and he knows it.

11.0 p.m.

Mr. R. Carr: It is not a lot of nonsense, but I shall not embark on an argument about that. I am sure that if the hon. Member looks it up he will see that fines for workers was part of what he read out. The other and more substantial point is that he did not tell the House when that evidence was given. Does he have a date by him? It was given certainly five or six years ago, or that sort of time, and, of course, he must remember that the Donovan Report was published——

Mr. Harold Walker: It was 1968.

Mr. Carr: The Donovan Report was published in 1968 but I am fairly sure that the evidence about which he is speaking was given considerably earlier than that. As the Donovan Report was published in 1968, a good bit of it must have been written and the conclusions reached probably in the last half of 1967, and I suspect, a great deal of the evidence, including the evidence he mentioned, may well have been given even earlier than that.
The House will remember that it was the rapid and serious deterioration which took place in the number of strikes in the latter half of the 1960s which led the party opposite when in power to a complete reversal of its previous policy.

Mrs. Castle: Can the right hon. Gentleman tell the House the date on which the document of the Society of Conservative Lawyers, "A Giant's Strength", on which the proposals for the right hon. Gentleman's Bill are based, was published? Was it not 1959?

Mr. Carr: It could well have been. But that does not alter the point.

Mrs. Castle: Of course it does.

Mr. Carr: No. Many of us have been feeling for a very long time that legislation of this kind was necessary. I personally, I think, went on record around 1959 expressing the view that legislation was necessary. Some of us, we believed, were some way ahead and showed more

foresight as to what might have been necessary in this respect than others. I make no apology for that. But there are many people, including many employers and many from all parties and all walks of life, who went on maintaining the view that I once held but gave up around the end of the 1950s, that legislation would not be helpful. Many of us have changed our minds. I make no secret of the fact that I have changed my mind. I changed my mind somewhat earlier than some others changed theirs.
In this debate we have been doing what one of my hon. Friends graphically described to me in the Lobby last week, having listened to another similar debate, as "sawing sawdust". He said it seemed to him that we were, at the choice of the Opposition, sawing it up over and over again, finer and finer, and not getting on to all the new things the Opposition are always complaining there is no time to debate. This is exactly what we have had.
In the last debate, a long debate, the main object was to discuss principles of enforceable agreements. We had a substantial debate to which my hon. and learned Friend replied. Yet throughout most of this subsequent debate the main subject has been, believe it or not, the principle of legally binding agreements. We have discussed this twice this evening, in two successive debates, and goodness knows how many times in the past 400-odd hours that this Bill has been before the House.
All right; if that is what hon. Members wish to debate over and over again, they are at liberty to do so. We have arranged the procedure to give the Opposition every opportunity. [An HON. MEMBER: "We are doing our best with the right hon. Gentleman's Bill".] I am not complaining. It is hon. Members opposite who make a habit of complaining that they never have a chance to get on to the new matters which they could discuss, yet, at the same time, they go on talking about some things over and over again, sawing sawdust, as I have said.
I shall not go into detail on the general principle again. I have done that several times already, and my hon. and learned Friend the Solicitor-General did it earlier in the evening. I shall now take up some of the separate points which were raised. The hon. Member for Putney (Mr. Hugh


Jenkins) asked me a question. I am sure that he quite well knew the answer when he asked it, but I shall give it none the less. Of course, if an employer makes an agreement with a union that he will employ only union members, he will lay himself open if he discriminates against a would-be employee by refusing to take him on, because of Clause 5 of the Bill. That is absolutely clear.
The right hon. Member for Jarrow (Mr. Fernyhough), in arguing against the principle, cited the experience of one of my most illustrious predecessors, Ernest Bevin, a man who will always rank among the most illustrious Ministers at my present Department. I take it that the right hon. Gentleman was thinking of the attempt to bring action against the Kent miners during the war. But, when he stops to think about it, he must know that that was an entirely different sort of law. Ernest Bevin at that time was trying to enforce a criminal law which laid down that it was illegal to strike. That is not a law which one can enforce. Perhaps one had to have that experience to discover that it is an unenforceable law, but it was discovered, and, because it was, there is nothing approaching a similar law in our Bill. Therefore, the experience of Ernest Bevin and the Kent miners is not remotely relevant to the sort of proposals which we are discussing now. They are as different as chalk and cheese.

Mr. Fernyhough: At a time when the whole nation believed that anything which offended against what one called the war effort was unpatriotic and pro-Hitler, even in those circumstances men felt so aggrieved that, despite the whole of public opinion and the law, they took that step. What I was trying to explain to the right hon. Gentleman is that there will be occasions when, despite any legally enforceable agreement, men will be so outraged and so frustrated that they will not consider what the consequences may be; and there will be consequences—they have been spelled out—if they do it.

An Hon. Member: Like the Upper Clyde, for instance.

Mr. Carr: We have never claimed, and I have often gone to the point of underlining that we have never claimed, that this or any law can create a state of perfection. We are talking about making

things better or worse, about pressures and incentives to make things less imperfect in what, no doubt, will always be an imperfect world. We are talking about creating pressures and incentives to make things more nearly perfect, or less imperfect.
What the right hon. Gentleman says is right. He is right in our experience of contract law and the other fields in which people enter into binding agreements. Such agreements are sometimes broken. But, just because they are sometimes broken, it does not follow that they are without influence or that, if there were no binding agreements, there would not have been even more agreements broken than is the case now. The law has a general influence for the better, and people enter into agreements with more seriousness if they have the general belief that they are agreements which should not be broken and that, if they blatantly or carelessly break them, they may have to suffer some liability for the damage they cause to the other party by their action. We have discovered in every other sphere of human activity in this country, as other countries have discovered it in this sphere as well, that such liabilities on the whole leads to better, more precise agreements, which people think about more seriously before entering into them, and having entered into them they take marginally, but importantly, more care in trying to keep.
That is our claim, but we believe that it is important. It is why for many years we have been convinced that among the proposals—by no means alone, or even perhaps the most important single proposal—for the reform of industrial relations in this country, in a new legal framework, is the concept that both sides should in future come to the negotiating table with the presumption that unless they wish to say otherwise they will enter into an agreement that they will both feel bound to keep to the best of their ability. If we have that concept, of course we shall still have failures to keep agreements—employers will fail, trade union leaders will fail, shop stewards will fail. We shall go on failing, but perhaps a little less often than in recent years. If we can get even a marginal improvement, even a slide in the right direction of better agreements, better kept, it will be to the enormous


benefit of this country and the people most directly involved.
That is what we are after here. Let the House remember, however sceptical hon. Members may be of things like public opinion polls—and we can all, thank goodness, be pretty sceptical of them—we have had opinion poll after opinion poll, taken by all sorts of different people and organisations, all of which have shown that the ordinary people of this country including the ordinary rank and file trade union members and industrial workers, all approve of this proposal—[Interruption.]—I should not have said that they all approve, but over and over again a substantial majority have said that they

approve. They may say that they do not like the Bill as a whole and that they do not like the Government of which I am a member, but over and over again, when the right hon. Lady and her party were in power, and still today, the polls have shown that a substantial majority believe that, among other proposals, the making of collective agreements legally binding is sensible and something they would like to see in this country. That is what we are providing.

Question put, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment:—

The House divided: Ayes 261, Noes 226.

Division No. 458.]
AYES
[11.13 p.m


Adley, Robert
Dean, Paul
Hiley, Joseph


Alison, Michael (Barkston Ash)
Deedes, Rt. Hn. W. F.
Hill, John E. B. (Norfolk, S.)


Allason, James (Hemel Hempstead)
Dixon, Piers
Hill, James (Southampton, Test)


Amery, Rt. Hn. Julian
Dodds-Parker, Douglas
Holt, Miss Mary


Astor, John
Douglas-Home, Rt. Hn. Sir Alec
Hooson, Emlyn


Atkins, Humphrey
Drayson, G. B.
Hordern, Peter


Awdry, Daniel
du Cann, Rt. Hn. Edward
Hornby, Richard


Baker, Kenneth (St. Marylebone)
Dykes, Hugh
Hornsby-Smith, Rt. Hn. Dame Patricia


Baker, W. H. K. (Banff)
Eden, Sir John
Howe, Hn. Sir Geoffrey (Reigate)


Balniel, Lord
Edwards, Nicholas (Pembroke)
Howell, David (Guildford)


Barber, Rt. Hn. Anthony
Elliot, Capt. Walter (Carshalton)
Howell, Ralph (Norfolk, N.)


Batsford, Brian
Elliott, R.W. (N'c'tle-upon-Tyne, N.)
Hunt, John


Beamish, Col. Sir Tufton
Emery, Peter
Hutchison, Michael Clark


Bennett, Sir Frederic (Torquay)
Eyre, Reginald
James, David


Benyon, W.
Farr, John
Jessel, Toby


Berry, Hn. Anthony
Fell, Anthony
Johnson Smith, G. (E. Grinstead)


Biffen, John
Fenner, Mrs. Peggy
Jopling, Michael


Biggs-Davison, John
Fidler, Michael
Kershaw, Anthony


Blaker, Peter
Finsberg, Geoffrey (Hampstead)
Kilfedder, James


Boardman, Tom (Leicester, S.W.)
Fisher, Nigel (Surbiton)
King, Evelyn (Dorset, S.)


Body, Richard
Fookes, Miss Janet
King, Tom (Bridgwater)


Boscawen, Robert
Fortescue, Tim
Kinsey, J. R.


Bowden, Andrew
Fowler, Norman
Kirk, Peter


Boyd-Carpenter, Rt. Hn. John
Fox, Marcus
Kitson, Timothy


Braine, Bernard
Fraser, Rt. Hn. Hugh (St'fford & Stone)
Knox, David


Bray, Ronald
Fry, Peter
Lambton, Antony


Brinton, Sir Tatton
Galbraith, Hn. T. G.
Lane, David


Brocklebank-Fowler, Christopher
Gardner, Edward
Legge-Bourke, Sir Harry


Brown, Sir Edward (Bath)
Gibson-Watt, David
Le Marchant, Spencer


Bruce-Gardyne, J.
Gilmour, Ian (Norfolk, C.)
Lewis, Kenneth (Rutland)


Bryan, Paul
Gilmour, Sir John (Fife, E.)
Lloyd, Ian (P'tsm'th, Langstone)


Buchanan-Smith, Alick (Angus, N & M)
Glyn, Dr. Alan
Longden, Gilbert


Buck, Antony
Godber, Rt. Hn. J. B.
Loveridge, John


Burden, F. A.
Goodhart, Philip
Luce, R. N.


Butler, Adam (Bosworth)
Goodhew, Victor
McAdden, Sir Stephen


Carlisle, Mark
Gorst, John
MacArthur, Ian


Carr, Rt. Hn. Robert
Grant, Anthony (Harrow, C.)
McCrindle, R. A.


Channon, Paul
Gray, Hamish
McLaren, Martin


Chapman, Sydney
Green, Alan
Maclean, Sir Fitzroy


Chichester-Clark, R.
Grieve, Percy
McMaster, Stanley


Clark, William (Surrey, E.)
Griffiths, Eldon (Bury St. Edmunds)
Macmillan, Maurice (Farnham)


Clarke, Kenneth (Rushcliffe)
Grylis, Michael
McNair-Wilson, Michael


Clegg, Walter
Gummer, Selwyn
McNair-Wilson, Patrick (NewForest)


Cockeram, Eric
Gurden, Harold
Maddan, Martin


Cooke, Robert
Hall, Miss Joan (Keighley)
Maginnis, John E.


Coombs, Derek
Hall, John (Wycombe)
Marten, Neil


Corfield, Rt. Hn. Frederick
Hall-Davis, A. G. F.
Mather, Carol


Cormack, Patrick
Hamilton, Michael (Salisbury)
Maude, Angus


Costain, A. P.
Hannam, John (Exeter)
Mawby, Ray


Critchley, Julian
Harrison, Col. Sir Harwood (Eye)
Maxwell-Hyslop, R. J.


Crouch, David
Haselhurst, Alan
Meyer, Sir Anthony


Curran, Charles
Havers, Michael
Mills, Peter (Torrington)


Davies, Rt. Hn. John (Knutsford)
Hayhoe, Barney
Mitchell, Lt.-Col. C. (Aberdeenshire, W)


d'Avigdor-Goldsmid, Sir Henry
Hicks, Robert
Mitchell, David (Basingstoke)


d'Avigdor-Coldsmid, Maj.-Gen. James
Higgins, Terence L.
Moate, Roger




Molyneaux, James
Rees-Davies, W. R.
Tebbit, Norman


Money, Ernie
Renton, Rt. Hn. Sir David
Temple, John M.


Monks, Mrs. Connie
Rhys Williams, Sir Brandon
Thomas, John Stradling (Monmouth)


Monro, Hector
Ridley, Hn. Nicholas
Thomas, Rt. Hn. Peter (Hendon, S.)


Montgomery, Fergus
Ridsdale, Julian
Tilney, John


More, Jasper
Roberts, Wyn (Conway)
Trafford, Dr. Anthony


Morgan-Giles, Rear-Adm.
Rost, Peter
Trew, Peter


Morrison, Charles (Devizes)
Russell, Sir Ronald
Tugendhat, Christopher


Mudd, David
St. John-Stevas, Norman
Turton, Rt. Hn. Sir Robin


Murton, Oscar
Scott, Nicholas
van Straubenzee, W. R.


Neave, Airey
Scott-Hopkins, James
Vaughan, Dr. Gerard


Noble, Rt. Hn. Michael
Sharples, Richard
Vickers, Dame Joan


Normanton, Tom
Shaw, Michael (Sc'b'gh & Whitby)
Waddington, David


Nott, John
Shelton, William (Clapham)
Walder, David (Clitheroe)


Onslow, Cranley




Oppenheim, Mrs. Sally
Simeons, Charles
Walker, Rt. Hn. Peter (Worcester)


Orr, Capt. L. P. S.
Skeet, T. H. H.
Walker-Smith, Rt. Hn. Sir Derek


Osborn, John
Smith, Dudley (W'wick & L'mington)
Wall, Patrick


Owen, Idris (Stockport, N.)
Soref, Harold
Ward, Dame Irene


Page, Graham (Crosby)
Speed, Keith
Weatherill, Bernard


Parkinson, Cecil (Enfield, W.)
Spence, John
Wells, John (Maidstone)


Peel, John
Sproat, Iain
White, Roger (Gravesend)


Percival, Ian
Stanbrook, Ivor
Whitelaw, Rt. Hn. William


Pink, R. Bonner
Stewart-Smith, D. G. (Belper)
Wiggin, Jerry


Pounder, Rafton
Stodart, Anthony (Edinburgh, W.)
Wilkinson, John


Powell, Rt. Hn. J. Enoch
Stoddart-Scott, Col. Sir M.
Wolrige-Gordon, Patrick


Prior, Rt. Hn. J. M. L.
Stokes, John
Wood, Rt. Hn. Richard


Proudfoot, Wilfred
Stuttaford, Dr. Tom
Woodnutt, Mark


Pym, Rt. Hn Francis
Sutcliffe, John
Worsley, Marcus


Quennell, Miss J. M.
Tapsell, Peter
Wylie, Rt. Hn. N. R.


Raison, Timothy
Taylor, Sir Charles (Eastbourne)



Rawlinson, Rt. Hn. Sir Peter
Taylor, Edward M.(G'gow, Cathcart)
TELLERS FOR THE AYES:


Redmond, Robert
Taylor, Frank (Moss Side)
Mr. Paul Hawkins and


Reed, Laurance (Bolton, E.)
Taylor, Robert (Croydon, N.W.)
Mr. Hugh Rossi




NOES


Albu, Austen
Delargy, H. J.
Houghton, Rt. Hn. Douglas


Allaun, Frank (Salford, E.)
Dell, Rt. Hn. Edmund
Howell, Denis (Small Heath)


Archer, Peter (Rowley Regis)
Dempsey, James
Huckfield, Leslie


Ashton, Joe
Doig, Peter
Hughes, Mark (Durham)


Atkinson, Norman
Douglas, Dick (Stirlingshire, E.)
Hughes, Robert (Aberdeen, N.)


Bagier, Gordon A. T.
Douglas-Mann, Bruce
Hughes, Roy (Newport)


Barnett, Guy (Greenwich)
Driberg, Tom
Hunter, Adam


Barnett, Joel
Duffy, A. E. P.
Irvine, Rt. Hn. Sir Arthur (Edge Hill)


Beany, Alan
Eadie, Alex
Jay, Rt. Hn. Douglas


Benn, Rt. Hn. Anthony Wedgwood
Edelman, Maurice
Jeger, Mrs. Lena (H'b'n & St. P'cras, S.)


Bennett, James (Glasgow, Bridgeton)
Edwards, Robert (Bilston)
Jenkins, Hugh (Putney)


Bidwell, Sydney
Edwards, William (Merioneth)
Jenkins, Rt. Hn. Roy (Stechford)


Bishop, E. S.
Ellis, Tom
John, Brynmor


Blenkinsop, Arthur
English, Michael
Johnson, Carol (Lewisham, S.)


Boardman, H. (Leigh)
Evans, Fred
Johnson, James (K'ston-on-Hull, W.)


Booth, Albert
Faulds, Andrew
Johnson, Walter (Derby, S.)


Bottomley, Rt. Hn. Arthur
Fernyhough, Rt. Hn. E.
Jones, Barry (Flint, E.)


Boyden, James (Bishop Auckland)
Fisher, Mrs. Doris (B'ham, Lady wood)
Jones, Dan (Burnley)


Bradley, Tom
Fitch, Alan (Wigan)
Jones, Rt. Hn. Sir Elwyn (W.Ham, S.)


Brown, Bob (N'c'tle-upon-Tyne, W.)
Fletcher, Ted (Darlington)
Jones, Gwynoro (Carmarthen)


Brown, Hugh D. (G'gow, Provan)
Foley, Maurice
Jones, T. Alec (Rhondda, W.)


Brown, Ronald (Shoreditch & F'bury)
Foot, Michael
Kaufman, Gerald


Buchan, Norman
Ford, Ben
Kelley, Richard


Buchanan, Richard (G'gow, Sp'burn)
Forrester, John
Kerr, Russell


Butler, Mrs. Joyce (Wood Green)
Fraser, John (Norwood)
Kinnock, Neil


Callaghan, Rt. Hn. James
Freeson, Reginald
Lambie, David


Campbell, I. (Dunbartonshire, W.)
Galpern, Sir Myer
Latham, Arthur


Cant, R. B.
Garrett, W. E.
Lawson, George


Carmichael, Neil
Gilbert, Dr. John
Leadbitter, Ted


Carter-Jones, Lewis (Eccles)
Ginsburg, David
Lee, Rt. Hn. Frederick


Castle, Rt. Hn. Barbara
Golding, John
Leonard, Dick


Clark, David (Colne Valley)
Gordon Walker, Rt. Hn. P. C.
Lever, Rt. Hn. Harold


Cocks, Michael (Bristol, S)
Gourlay, Harry
Lewis, Arthur (W. Ham, N.)


Coleman, Donald
Grant, George (Morpeth)
Lewis, Ron (Carlisle)


Conlan, Bernard
Grant, John D. (Islington, E.)
Lipton, Marcus


Corbet, Mrs. Freda
Griffiths, Eddie (Brightside)
Loughlin, Charles


Cox, Thomas (Wandsworth, C.)
Hamilton, William (Fife, W.)
Lyon, Alexander W. (York)


Crawshaw, Richard
Hamling, William
Lyons, Edward (Bradford, E.)


Cronin, John
Hannan, William (G'gow, Maryhill)
Mabon, Dr. J. Dickson


Cunningham, G. (Islington, S. W.)
Hardy, Peter
McBride, Neil


Dalyell, Tam
Harper, Joseph
McCartney, Hugh


Davidson, Arthur
Harrison, Walter (Wakefield)
McGuire, Michael


Davies, G. Elfed (Rhondda, E.)
Hart, Rt. Hn. Judith
Mackenzie, Gregor


Davies, Ifor (Gower)
Hattersley, Roy
Mackie, John


Davis, Clinton (Hackney, C.)
Healey, Rt. Hn. Denis
Maclennan, Robert


Davis, Terry (Bromsgrove)
Heffer, Eric S.
McMillan, Tom (Glasgow, C.)


de Freitas, Rt. Hn. Sir Geoffrey
Horam, John
McNamara, J. Kevin







Mallalieu, J. P. W. (Huddersfield, E.)
Parry, Robert (Liverpool, Exchange)
Stewart, Rt. Hn. Michael (Fulham)


Marks, Kenneth
Peart, Rt. Hn. Fred
Stoddart, David (Swindon)


Marquand, David
Pendry, Tom
Stonehouse, Rt. Hn. John


Marsden, F.
Pentland, Norman
Strang, Gavin


Marshall, Dr. Edmund
Perry, Ernest G.
Summerskill, Hn. Dr. Shirley


Mason, Rt. Hn. Roy
Prentice, Rt. Hn. Reg.
Thomas, Rt. Hn. George (Cardiff, W.)


Meacher, Michael
Prescott, John
Thomas, Jeffrey (Abertillery)


Mellish, Rt. Hn. Robert
Price, J. T. (Westhoughton)
Thomson, Rt. Hn. G. (Dundee, E.)


Mendelson, John
Probert, Arthur
Tinn, James


Millan, Bruce
Reed, D. (Sedgefield)
Torney, Tom


Miller, Dr. M. S.
Rees, Merlyn (Leeds, S.)
Tuck, Raphael


Milne, Edward (Blyth)
Rhodes, Geoffrey
Urwin, T. W.


Mitchell, R. C. (S'hampton, Itchen)
Richard, Ivor
Varley, Eric G.


Molloy, William
Roberts, Albert (Normanton)
Wainwright, Edwin


Morgan, Elystan (Cardiganshire)
Roberts, Rt. Hn. Goronwy (Caernarvon)
Walker, Harold (Doncaster)


Morris, Alfred (Wythenshawe)
Rodgers, William (Stockton-on-Tees)
Wallace, George


Morris, Charles R. (Opsnshaw)
Roper, John
Watkins, David


Morris, Rt. Hn. John (Aberavon)
Rose, Paul B.
Weitzman, David


Moyle, Roland
Sandelson, Neville
Wells, William (Walsall, N.)


Mulley, Rt. Hn. Frederick
Sheldon, Robert (Ashton-under-Lyne)
Whitehead, Phillip


Murray, Ronald King
Shore, Rt. Hn. Peter (Stepney)
Williams, Alan (Swansea, W.)


Ogden, Eric
Short, Mrs. Renée (W'hampton, N. E.)
Williams, Mrs. Shirley (Hitchin)


O'Halloran, Michael
Silkin, Hn. S. C. (Dulwich)
Wilson, Alexander (Hamilton)


O'Malley, Brian
Silverman, Julius
Wilson, William (Coventry, S.)


Oram, Bert
Skinner, Dennis
Woof, Robert


Orme, Stanley
Small, William



Oswald, Thomas
Smith, John (Lanarkshire, N.)
TELLERS FOR THE NOES:


Owen, Dr. David (Plymouth, Sutton)
Spearing, Nigel



Paget, R. T.
Spriggs, Leslie
Mr. Ernest Armstrong and


Palmer, Arthur
Stallard, A. W.
Mr. James Hamilton.

Clause 34

BREACH OF COLLECTIVE AGREEMENT

Lords Amendment: No. 65, in page 26, line 46, leave out from "action" to "that" in line 1 on page 27 and insert:
contrary to an undertaking given by that party and contained in the collective agreement or in".

The Solicitor-General: I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.

Mr. Speaker: It will be for the convenience of the House to discuss also Lords Amendment: No. 67, in page 27, line 15, at end insert:
() For the purposes of subsection (2) of this section action taken by a person other than the party who gave the undertaking in question (in this subsection referred to as "the contracting party") shall be regarded as action taken contrary to the undertaking if either—

(a) it is action which, if taken by the contracting party, would have been a breach of the undertaking by the contracting party, or
(b) it consists in doing that which, in accordance with the undertaking, was not to be done, or in not doing that which, in accordance with the undertaking, was to be done."

The Solicitor-General: These two Amendments to Clause 34 are drafting Amendments, although plainly important ones. They do not change the purpose of Clause 34. They serve to remove doubts that have been expressed about whether the drafting fulfils the purpose.
The House will remember that this Clause applies to collective agreements, and in particular Clause 34(2) applies to enforceable agreements made after the commencement of the Act. So that it deals only with legally binding obligations consciously entered into by the parties after the Act comes into force. The obligation contained in this Clause is that the parties to such a collective agreement should use their best endeavours to uphold that agreement by preventing action inconsistent with any undertaking contained in the agreement: In other words, to prevent or bring to an end action being taken by agents or members of the party which would, if taken by the party itself, amount to a breach of the agreement. That was and is the Government's intention in this Clause.
The intention is that the parties should use their best endeavours to uphold an agreement; an aim to which all try to aspire. The effect of these Amendments is only to make more clear the Government's objective.
The important point to appreciate is that the effect of the Amendments is to impose on the party to a collective agreement the obligation to use the best endeavours to prevent any action that would be a breach of an undertaking given by the party to the agreement; to prevent anything being done—or being left undone—that is contrary to the undertaking given by the contracting party.
Some people have said it would be possible, and admissible in this context, to attach to a trade union or organisation of workers, or anybody else, an overriding responsibility from which it could not escape for the mass action of its members, whatever the terms of the contract it had entered into. That is not the intention or effect of this Clause and these Amendments.
Let me illustrate the situation that could arise. If a collective agreement entered into with the intention that it should be binding after the commencement of the Act says that the party to the agreement shall not strike or lockout before going through procedure, then with an agreement of that kind if a strike or lock-out occurs, the party should be required to use its best endeavours to prevent or bring to an end an action on the part of its members or agents—in other words, to bring to an end that strike which was taking place in breach of the current terms of the agreement to that effect.
If, on the other hand, the agreement said that the party would not call a strike or order a lock-out without the matter going through procedure, then the best endeavours obligation would be available to prevent any agent or member of the party calling a strike on behalf of its members before the agreed procedure was exhausted. But the best endeavours obligation will be limited to doing all that is reasonably practicable to prevent or bring to an end action, by or on behalf of the party, that is contrary to the undertaking given by the party set out in the agreement which was intended to be legally enforceable. It does not go beyond that.
It does not attempt to reach the solutions suggested by some people or introduce the implications that arise in some other contexts, namely, that the organisation shall be automatically responsible, whatever it does or does not do, for the mass action of its members. All it does is to write in what the Government have always made plain is their intention. An obligation should rest on the party to an enforceable collective agreement to take all steps reasonably practicable to uphold and secure the performance of the agreement or undertaking that it has entered into or given. It is on that basis I

commend these two Amendments to the House.

11.30 p.m.

Mr. John Prescott: I make it clear to begin with that it is with dislike and protest that I make these comments so briefly. Hon. Members opposite have accused us of making Second Reading speeches on this Clause, but there is here a substantial point which the House has not had the opportunity to consider adequately, and it includes issues concerning international trade unionism. Because of our desire to get on to more fundamental Amendments, I shall attempt to be brief, but I put it on record that many of us are having to curtail important points about various Clauses and Amendments.
Again the hon. and learned Gentleman has given the impression that the Government are making a concession, that they are making the provision clear or tightening it up or giving a bit more protection to trade unionism. But the Government do not truly appreciate the full consequences of the Clause as it must be interpreted in the light of the practicalities of active trade unionism both in this country and abroad.

Clause 36 places an obligation on the union which is a party to an agreement which it has been agreed shall be legally binding to attempt to see that it and its members observe it. The difficulties of the Amendments arise from the attempt to get appropriate drafting to meet a number of complex problems arising from that objective. Reading the debates in another place, one is considerably confused, particularly by the contradictory statements on the issue by the noble and learned Lord, the Lord Chancellor. If such an eminent legal authority makes mistakes of interpretation of the Clause, one hesitates oneself to attempt to interpret it.

The Clause seeks to put the responsibility on the parties to an agreement to see that it is observed. It puts the responsibility on to the union to see that it takes all reasonable steps practically possible to ensure that the agreement is observed. If it does not take all reasonable steps to do so, that will be an unfair industrial practice. What is so onerous to us is that the union is being cast in the rôle of policeman. I have served on disciplinary committees and there has


always seemed to me a conflict in such circumstances in that a democratic organisation, whose members electing its officials and pay contributions so that they can look after their interests, exercises disciplinary functions over the members. But the question of disciplinary procedures may be a controversial point for debate later.

If the Amendment is accepted, subsection 2(a) will read:
of preventing persons acting or purporting to act on behalf of that party from taking any action contrary to an undertaking given by that party and contained in the collective agreement or in that part of the agreement, as the case may be;

Clearly an attempt is being made to make it clear that whoever is party to that agreement will be responsible for the conditions laid down in it and for seeing that they are observed. That is the intention of the Amendment.

I should like to raise one point with the Solicitor-General. I make no apology for the fact that it is based on my seafaring experience. A seamen signs articles on a ship. That constitutes a contract of employment for him individually with the captain of the vessel. He will also hold a collective agreement with the company involved and he may hold a collective agreement with the industry through the Shipping Federation. A conflict may arise concerning the terms of his collective agreement and a notice of finishing in a period of three months may have to be given. The articles solely require him at his place of work to give 48 hours' notice. Which agreement will have to be applied when we talk about whether it is an unfair industrial practice to breach a collective agreement? I hope that the Solicitor-General does not say, as he said about the ballot, that we cannot continue to exempt seamen and that there are some people for whom it is difficult to compose a law.

When we started these debates I said that other enactments had exempted seamen. If that logic was correct, then the hon. and learned Gentleman should have considered it must be so in this situation. But he has chosen to make the Bill fit the circumstances of the seamen, which is totally unjustifiable.

The second Amendment raises the whole issue of international trade

unionism, which has not been discussed due to the imposition of the guillotine. Subsection (3) is concerned with making it clear that in certain circumstances actions by persons other than those who gave the undertaking—in this case, the trade union which may be party to the signing of the collective agreement—can be treated as committing an unfair industrial practice if they breach the agreement. Therefore, there is concern to give a remedy to deal with those who originally were parties to the collective agreement.

This is a substantial point. It concerns the whole rôle of international trade unionism. There are many international trade union bodies. One which will be readily known to the House is the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions which embraces metal, chemical and transport workers. It is important to understand this obligation within the concept of international trade unionism.

The International Transport Federation has been in being since 1896. I think that the hon. Member for Derbyshire, South-East (Mr. Rost) is one of the auditors of that organisation. It has over 6 million members with unions in 80 countries representing 320 organisations in aviation, rail, transport and shipping.

My section, shipping, resolved—this is important to the concept of international trade unionism—not to allow or to tolerate competition between maritime countries to be fought out on the backs of the seafarers. We sought to establish minimum standards internationally. It is important for trade unions in this sphere, because we face competition internationally. Companies can get foreign labour, which is cheaper, and that, therefore, puts us at a serious disadvantage. This applies not only to seamen, but to aviation and transport workers. However, it is more pertinent to seafarers who sail around the world. International trade unionism seeks minimum standards for all seamen. In many cases—for example, on Greek and Liberian ships—the captains pay very low wages and provide very little food. We have many examples of ships coming to this country, the crews of which have not been paid for months, have not been fed properly for a long period, and have no power to force their captains to pay their wages.

The international trade union movement attempts, in those circumstances to


use its influence and bring pressure to bear on those concerned. In the case that we are considering here, it is in Britain that this happens. If one of these vessels comes to one of our ports we, as a union, go on board to see the conditions. Sailors from Liberia and Greece can expect no help from their courts to force the company or the captain to pay their wages. To get that done we have to call on affiliated unions for help. To take this in the context of shipping, it means that we go to the dockers and say, "Will you support us? Do not service this ship. Pull off the dockers". We use that as a sanction against the owner to get him to pay the men their wages.

Clauses 91, 92 and 93 deal with extraneous parties, but, due to the guillotine procedure, we shall not be able to debate them, and I must therefore raise the issue in the context of this Amendment. If a trade union such as the International Transport Federation were to call on another union to take the kind of action to which I have referred, what would happen? Let us suppose that there is a legally binding collective agreement, and the union wants to call on the dockers to withdraw their support. It will find itself in the position of saying that this cannot be done because to do it would breach a collective agreement and would mean committinig an unfair industrial practice.

In those circumstances, because of the feeling among trade unionists, some people in the labour force will say, "This is our international trade union obligation. We intend to observe it, and we will refuse to service this ship". The union will be placed in a dilemma. It is supposed to be able to take all reasonable practicable steps to see that its members observe the collective agreement, but at the same time it will know that it is denying its obligation to the rest of the international trade union movement, which is to assist other trade unionists who find themselves in difficult circumstances.

The Clause will make it difficult, in fact almost impossible, for any help to be given to those who desperately need it. An essential principle of trade unionism is to help people who find themselves in that kind of situation, and I ask the

Solicitor-General to reply to the points that I have raised.

Mr. John Fraser: I should like to take up what the Secretary of State said with some fervour towards the end of this speech. He said that the Government might fail, but that they would fail a little less than the Opposition had failed when they were in power. I think that the right hon. Gentleman is going to fail even more, because the point that is dealt with in the Amendment was considered by Donovan, and in paragraph 1054 on page 268 the Commission came to the conclusion that
A measure which had the effect of putting on unions a legal obligation to use their best endeavours to secure the observance of procedure agreements would be more likely to lead to internal union disruption than to fewer unofficial strikes.
The likelihood is that this kind of provision will either increase the number of disputes, or decrease the number of agreements being entered into. That is what we are faced with, and the Secretary of State says that this kind of Clause has the support of working men. I have been out canvassing a great deal, and in response to inquiries on doorsteps I have not heard any working men talking about Clauses 32, 33 or 34.
The Secretary of State's allegation reminded me of the story of Serjeant Sullivan when he appeared before the Judicial Committee of the House of Lords. When asked by one of the Law Lords whether his client had ever heard of the maxim volenti non fit injuria, he replied, "In the little village in Ireland where my client comes from they talk of little else".

11.45 p.m.

Mr. Ronald King Murray: My hon. Friend is right in referring to Serjeant Sullivan, but I understand that the maxim he quoted was not the one that my hon. Friend has given us, but "Sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas" which, freely translated, is, "Mind your own business, and do not harm your neighbour". I suspect that it was the free translation which was the topic of conversation in the village referred to.

Mr. Fraser: I am grateful to my hon. Friend for that correction. It may be that in the little village of Lambeth, from which I come, they talk of nothing else but Schedule 6.

The Solicitor-General: Does the hon. Member wish to intervene?

Mr. David Mitchell: My reason for seeking to interject was the hon. Member's suggestion that the Secretary of State had no backing for his contention that binding agreements had widespread support among trade unionists. I would have thought that the fact that the Daily Mirror—hardly a Conservative newspaper—carried out the largest poll ever conducted of trade unionists and found that over 70 per cent. favoured binding agreements would have been something that he ought not to have overlooked.

Mr. Fraser: I prefer to believe the evidence of Donovan and its considered opinion on this point, which I have quoted, to the opinion given in a public opinion poll. I do not know whether the hon. Member will tell the House at some stage that if the majority of the people of this country, in a public opinion poll, are against going into the Common Market, we should not do so. Will he suggest that? Otherwise it is no good praying in aid a public opinion poll on this issue.
The Solicitor-General dealt with the kind of undertaking that might appear in an agreement—an undertaking not to strike. I believe that this provision is unfair because, first, not only does it apply to trade unions but it means that a trade union commits an unfair industrial practice if it does not prevent people from purporting to act on behalf of it in breach of an undertaking. In other words, the trade union is fixed with an obligation to take proceedings against people acting entirely outside the scope of its authority. It seems unfair, in that it provides that the union should take action against its own members, and that is likely to lead to appalling union dissensions, as Donovan said.
Let us examine the position of a trade union if it is to be faced with a possible action for damages for failing to prevent other people from breaching the agreement. It will lead to less effective and not more effective agreements. That is the point that the Government seem to have missed all the way through. Donovan points out that trade unions infrequently breach undertakings contained in

agreements, but they are often breached by other people.
The fact is that this obligation upon a trade union will diminish the chances of reaching agreement and not increase them. It is like asking the bride at a wedding, "Do you promise to love, honour and obey?" and when the bride says "Yes", the vicar says, "That means that you have to undertake to prevent your mother-in-law from interfering, as well." That is the conclusion.

Mr. Rose: I wish it were!

Mr. Fraser: The result will be to diminish the effectiveness of agreements and not to increase it. We shall not vote against this, because if we were to defeat the Amendment we would simply have something even worse. That is our dilemma, but we disagree fundamentally with this approach and with the philosophy of the Clause.

The Solicitor-General: If I may reply, with leave of the House—but not to deal with the general arguments of the hon. Member for Norwood (Mr. John Fraser), with the literate support of his hon. and learned Friend the Member for Edinburgh, Leith (Mr. Ronald King Murray). On that front, I would feel obliged to start my observations in Latin, but I do not feel up to that at this time of night.
The hon. Member for Kingston-upon-Hull, East (Mr. Prescott) asked two questions which he is entitled to have answered. The first was about the impact of this obligation where an individual seaman is bound by articles with a 48 hour notice provision, but is also employed in a situation to which a collective agreement with a long notice provision applies.
In this context the obligation is only placed upon the party to the collective agreement—the union or organisation—in respect of action which would be a breach of the collective agreement. So it is that agreement and only that agreement which affects the obligations of the union. It cannot be expected to enforce or uphold varying or shorter or inconsistent obligations applying in individual contracts of employment which are nothing to do with the collective agreement.
As for his question about international trade unionism, again the agreement with which he was concerned, I understand,


was the agreement made by the shore-based union in respect of dock workers who are required by their international obligations, as he puts it, to refuse to unload the ship. If the union concerned had entered into a legally enforceable agreement, including a no-strike clause, it would in doing so, presumably, have chosen to disregard its obligations, however they may be defined, in the international trade union movement. But one might then wonder about its wisdom in making an agreement inconsistent with the international brotherhood of which the hon. Member spoke when it would be subject to the obligation to comply with the legally enforceable agreement into which it had entered. It would be binding on it to the extent that it had agreed to make it binding and only to that extent.

Mrs. Castle: But could not the Government's Bill mean that it could have a no-strike clause imposed upon it under a procedure agreement?

The Solicitor-General: That is entirely right, but the union would be free, would it not, to make the collective agreement into which it had entered consistent with its international obligations? It could also, possibly, be subject to an agreement containing a clause of this kind under Clause 39 if previously the situation had been one of persistent and chronic strike action, which called for the inclusion of such a clause in such an agreement.
The reaction of the hon. Member for Norwood, I understood, was friendly and receptive——

Mr. John Fraser: indicated dissent.

The Solicitor-General: —because he said it replaced something which he regarded with less enthusiasm than the Amendment itself. It is on that basis that I commend the Amendment to the House.

Question put and agreed to.

Subsequent Lords Amendments agreed to.

Clause 36

PROVISION FOR EXTENDING SCOPE OF REFERENCE UNDER S. 35

Lords Amendment: No. 68, in page 28, line 42, after ("Commission") insert

("after consultation with the employer and with any trade union appearing to the Commission to be likely to be affected")

Mr. Dudley Smith: I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.

Mr. Deputy Speaker (Sir Robert Grant-Ferris): I suggest that it will be for the convenience of the House if we also discuss Lords Amendment No. 73, in page 32, line 18, leave out ("section 35(2)") and insert ("sections 35(2) and 36(1)").

Mr. Dudley Smith: These Amendments have the purpose of an official Opposition Amendment in another place that the Commission on Industrial Relations should be required to consult those likely to be affected by any proposals in process of being formulated for extending the scope of reference in Clause 35. Amendment No. 73 is consequential, ensuring that where a reference concerns a composite unit, the requirement to consult under Amendment No. 68 shall be in respect of each employer in that composite unit.
In another place the Opposition contended that Clause 36 might lead to the employer and trade unions concerned not being consulted by the C.I.R. about its proposals for extending the unit of employment, and the Amendment defines the extent of the requirement more precisely, thus ensuring that it is not interpreted too narrowly.
I accept that the Opposition do not agree with these general proposals in the Clause, but I hope they will accept that this makes the position easier and fairer, particularly for the trade unions.

Question put and agreed to.

Lords Amendment: No. 69, in page 29, line 6, at end insert:
(In the opinion of the Commission)".

The Solicitor-General: I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.

Mr. Deputy Speaker: It will be convenient to discuss at the same time Lords Amendment No. 84, in page 35, line 30, at end insert:
(In the opinion of the Commission)".

The Solicitor-General: These Amendments are in line with the last Amendments with which the House dealt. When


the Commission on Industrial Relations is making a proposal which might affect a union or person not before it, and it fails to consult such a body or person, the words
In the opinion of the Commission".
in Clause 36 and Clause 45 will be relevant. They will ensure that if the Commission makes its honest judgment of the people who should be given notice of the proposals, either the original ones or as a result of the extension of the reference, then the opinion of the Commission should prevail so as to prevent the possibility of it being challenged on a technicality or formality. They are, therefore, drafting Amendments to make the position clearer.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 37

ACTION BY COMMISSION FOR PROMOTING SETTLEMENT OF QUESTION REFERRED UNDER S. 35.

Lords Amendment: No. 70 in page 30, line 1, leave out from ("be") to ("parties") in line 3, and insert:

(" (a) those appearing to the Commission to be ").

Mr. Dudley Smith: I beg to move. That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.

Mr. Deputy Speaker: It will be for the convenience of the House if we also discuss Lords Amendments No. 71, in page 30, line 6, leave out (" any other persons ") and insert:
('such other persons (if any)')
and No. 72, in page 30, line 7, leave out (" who ") and insert:
(' as in the Commission's opinion ')".

Mr. Dudley Smith: These three Amendments are linked and their combined effect is to correct an inadvertent grammatical error in the provision in a way which will give the C.I.R. the maximum freedom of choice in the naming of the appropriate parties to further proceedings under the Clause. There is no political significance in this group of Amendments, which is designed to make a non-controversial correction.

Question put and agreed to.

Subsequent Lords Amendments agreed to.

It being Twelve o'clock, further consideration of the Lords Amendments to the Bill stood adjourned, pursuant to the Orders [25th January and 28th July].

Lords Amendments to be further considered this day.

CIVIL AVIATION BILL

Lords Amendments considered.

Clause 3

GENERAL OBJECTIVES, AND GUIDANCE BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE

Lords Amendment: No. 1, in page 3, line 12, leave out "and".

12.5 a.m.

The Minister for Trade (Mr. Michael Noble): I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.

Mr. Deputy Speaker (Sir Robert Grant-Ferris): I suggest that with this Amendment the House should take Lords Amendment No. 2, in line 18, at end insert—
and;
(d) subject to the preceding paragraphs, to further the reasonable interests of users of air transport services;".

Mr. Noble: The purpose of these Amendments is to make specific reference to consumer interests in this section of the Bill, a desire which was expressed in this House and in the other place.

Question put and agreed to.

Subsequent Lords Amendment agreed to.

Clause 5

SPECIAL PROVISIONS AS RESPECTS CERTAIN FUNCTIONS

Lords Amendment: No. 3, in page 5, line 24, leave out "1958" and insert "1971".

Mr. Noble: I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.

Mr. Deputy Speaker: I suggest that the House should discuss at the same


time Lords Amendment No. 4, in line 31, leave out "5" and insert "8".

Mr. Noble: These are minor and consequential Amendments arising solely because of the replacement of the Tribunals and Inquiries Act, 1958 by the Act of 1971.

Question put and agreed to.

Subsequent Lords Amendment agreed to.

Clause 6

GENERAL FINANCIAL DUTIES

Lords Amendment: No. 5, in page 5, line 38, after "revenue" insert:
(including any grant towards revenue made to it in pursuance of section 10(1) of this Act)".

Mr. Noble: I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.

This Amendment makes it clear that the reference to "revenue" in subsection (1) may include sums from public funds made in pursuance of Clause 10. The Authority will therefore be able to meet the duty of balancing its books, taking one year with another, from the outset.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 14

ACQUISITION OF LAND ETC.

Lords Amendment: No. 6, in page 12, line 14, at end insert:
; and subsections (1) and (2) of section 158 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1962 (which relate to telegraphic lines of the Post Office affected by the stopping up, diversion or improvement of a highway in pursuance of an order under section 153 of that Act) shall have effect as if references to an order under section 153 of that Act included references to an order under the said section 28 as applied by this section.

Mr. Noble: I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.

Mr. Deputy Speaker: I suggest that with this Amendment the House should discuss Lords Amendment No. 7, in line 38, at end, insert:
and for the references to subsections (1) and (2) of section 158 of the Town and Country

Planning Act 1962 and to section 153 of that Act there shall be substituted respectively references to subsections (2) and (3) of section 111 of the Town and Country Planning (Scotland) Act 1947 and to section 46 of that Act.
And Lords Amendment No. 8, in line 44, at end insert:
and in the application of subsection (6) of this section to Northern Ireland for the references to subsections (1) and (2) of section 158 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1962 and to section 153 of that Act there shall be substituted respectively references to subsection (2) of section 41 of the Roads Act (Northern Ireland) 1948 and to section 17 of that Act.

Mr. Noble: These are technical Amendments to enable the Minister of Posts and Telecommunications to have control over telegraphic lines. The Amendments bring the Bill into the same category as the Highways Act, 1971, the Town and Country Planning Act, 1962, and the provisions of the Post Office Act, 1969.

Question put and agreed to.

Subsequent Lords Amendments agreed to.

Clause 24

SUPPLEMENTARY PROVISIONS RELATING TO AIR TRANSPORT LICENSING

Lords Amendment: No. 10, in page 25 line 35, at end insert:
and the Secretary of State shall, when considering whether to give a direction in pursuance of regulations made by virtue of paragraph (b) of this subsection and when considering the terms of any such direction, have regard in particular to the duties imposed on the Authority by section 3 of this Act.

Mr. Noble: I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.
The imposition by the Amendment of a duty on the Secretary of State to have regard to these matters represents a significant step in underlining the Authority's independence. This is something which both Houses requested.

Mr. Bruce Millan: I welcome the Amendment. The question of appeals was discussed at considerable length in Committee and in the other place. We were not in the least bit happy with the Clause as it was originally drafted. This is an improvement, although it does not go anything


like as far as the improvement that which we on this side would have liked to have made. The cross-reference in the appeals section to the guidance and the duties imposed on the authority by Clause 3 represents a considerable improvement. I hope that in practice it will mean that appeals on licensing matters will not be as wide open as the Clause as at present drafted would seem to permit.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 26

REGULATION OF PROVISION OF ACCOMMODATION IN AIRCRAFT

Lords Amendments: No. 11, in page 27, line 16, leave out paragraph (d) and insert:
(d) for appeals against refusals, variations, suspensions or revocations of licences to lie to a prescribed body or person (which may be a court, a Minister of the Crown, a body or person constituted or appointed by or under the regulations or such other body or person as the Secretary of State thinks fit) and for applying the provisions of an enactment, with or without modifications, in relation to such appeals;

Mr. Noble: I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.
This is another Amendment on the question of appeals. There is, I believe, a need to examine in some depth with those principally concerned the precise grounds for appeal and to whom the appeal would lie. The Amendment gives the necessary width to do this at the appropriate stage.

Mr. Millan: I do not object to this Amendment because it gives a certain flexibility which is not in the Bill at the moment. But I must say that I think it is rather unsatisfactory that when this Bill is at this very late stage we should have an Amendment which leaves the whole question of appeals under the Clause very vague. We do not know now whether an appeal will be to the courts or to the Minister or to some specially constituted body.
There is, perhaps, a case for the Government thinking again about this, but I must say that I think it is very unsatisfactory that when one considers

the whole genesis of this Bill—the Edwards Committee's Report, the Labour Party White Paper and the tremendous amount of discussion that we had—we should be faced with a power on the part of the Minister, after the Bill has become an Act, to decide the question of appeal.
I do not want to sound churlish, but I think the Minister will agree that this is rather an unsatisfactory situation. However, I do not object to it because I think it will give everybody a chance to have second thoughts about it, but I think it is a pity that it was not more carefully considered before this late stage.

Mr. Noble: I take the hon. Gentleman's point. Perhaps I should have pointed out that this Amendment merely gives powers, but hon. Members will have a further opportunity of considering the Government's proposals. They will have to be set out in regulations at the appropriate time. Therefore, another opportunity does exist.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 27

DESIGN, CONSTRUCTION AND MAINTENANCE OF AIRCRAFT

Lords Amendment: No. 12, in page 28, line 14, at end insert:
and, if the advice was given in consequence of consultations required by virtue of this subsection, to publish particulars of the case forthwith in the prescribed manner".

Mr. Noble: I beg to move, That this House agrees with the Lords in the said Amendment.

This Amendment will require the Authority to publish forthwith particulars of any case on which they are obliged to consult the Airworthiness Requirements Board but decline to proceed in accordance with the advice given. This Amendment was requested by both sides of the Committee and I am glad to recommend the Amendment.

Question put and agreed to.

Lords Amendment: No. 13, in page 29, line 6, leave out "one member of the board as the chairman of" and insert
as the chairman of the board a member of it nominated by

Mr. Noble: I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.
This is another Amendment relating to the Airworthiness Requirements Board and again is in response to requests from hon. Members on both sides of this House and, indeed, in another place, that the Chairman of the Board should be nominated by it.

Mr. Millan: Again I welcome the Amendment which meets a point that the Opposition put in Committee, not in exactly the same terms but with the same purpose in mind. Taken with the previous Amendment, these two Amendments will be quite a considerable addition to the powers of the Airworthiness Requirements Board. Hon. Members who have followed our proceedings will welcome both these Amendments. We are grateful to the Minister for thinking again on these matters.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 29

REGULATION OF NOISE AND VIBRATION FROM AIRCRAFT

Lords Amendment: No. 14, in page 31, line 45, at end insert—
(5A) The duties imposed by subsections (I) to (3) and (5) of this section in relation to aerodromes in Scotland shall be enforceable by order of the Court of Session on an application by or on behalf of the Secretary of State under section 91 of the Court of Session Act 1868.

Mr. Noble: I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.
This is a rather technical Amendment to bring the remedies available in Scotland for the enforcement of the duties under this Clause roughly into line with those available in England and Wales.

Question put and agreed to.

Lords Amendment: No. 15, in page 33, line 13, leave out from "which" to "is" in line 15.

Mr. Noble: I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.
This permits the powers of Clause 29 to be invoked in respect of any aerodrome. This is something which many

hon. Members asked me to do. I had and still have some reservations as to how much we shall be able to do, but it meets the wishes of many hon. Members in this House and in the other place.

Mr. Millan: I welcome this Amendment which gives an additional flexibility to the Clause and does not exclude private aerodromes. This is the right step to take and I know that hon. Gentlemen on both sides who have these noise problems will very much welcome the Amendment.

Mr. Cranley Onslow: These are all very good Amendments but this is a particularly sensible one and on behalf of my hon. Friend the Member for Chertsey (Mr. Grylls) and myself I would like that to be recorded.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 30

MANAGEMENT ETC.

Lords Amendment: No. 16 in page 34, line 3, at beginning insert:
Subject to the preceding section

Mr. Noble: I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.
This is purely technical.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 33

PROVISION BY THE AUTHORITY OF ASSISTANCE ETC. FOR SECRETARY OF STATE AND OTHERS

Lords Amendment: No. 17, in page 37, line 13, leave out "the following subsection" and insert
subsection (2) of this section

Mr. Noble: I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.

Mr. Deputy Speaker: We shall consider at the same time the following three further Lords Amendments:
No. 18, in page 37, line 17, at end insert—
(1A). Without prejudice to the preceding subsection, it shall also be the duty of the Authority—

(a) to consider what aerodromes are in its opinion likely to be required from time


to time in the United Kingdom in addition to or in place of or by way of alteration of existing aerodromes; and
(b) to make recommendations to the Secretary of State arising out of its consideration of that matter;
and it shall be the duty of the Secretary of State to publish the recommendations (except any of them of which the publication appears to him unnecessary) in such manner as he considers appropriate for bringing them to the notice of the public".

No. 19, in page 37, line 18, leave out "the preceding subsection" and insert:
subsection (1) of this section".

No. 20, in page 37, line 33, after "section," insert:
and in performing the duty imposed on it by subsection (1A) of this section".

I should acquaint the House that there is a question of Privilege involved in Lords Amendments Nos. 18 and 20.

Mr. Noble: These Amendments were put down in order to give the Authority the necessary powers and, perhaps, the duty to help the Secretary of State when there is any question of the planning of airports. This is generally called the National Airports Plan, though this title is in many ways a misnomer.

Mr. Millan: I would certainly not object to this series of Amendments but I find it extraordinary that they should be to Clause 33. I had it in mind in earlier discussions that somewhere, subsumed in the general powers and duties that we were giving to the Civil Aviation Authority, there was a duty to look at the question of airport planning. I have never actually seen it stated explicitly in the Bill but I assumed that it was included in some of the general powers. That was the general assumption on both sides of the Committee in considering the Bill.
There is something to be said for setting this out specifically in the Bill because there is a certain amount of concern, for example, in the British Airports Authority that the Civil Aviation Authority may not give a great deal of priority to airport planning, and that would be a great pity. That being so, I find it difficult to understand that this Amendment should be to Clause 33 and not to a much earlier Clause in which we specify the general duties of the Civil Aviation Authority. I am not altogether happy that this important provision should seem to be tucked away later in the Bill as a kind of afterthought. Having

said that, however, I believe that it is an improvement which we should have in the Bill even though it is inappropriately placed.

Question put and agreed to.

Subsequent Lords Amendments agreed to [Special Entry.]

Clause 35

PROVISION BY OTHERS OF INFORMATION FOR THE AUTHORITY AND SECRETARY OF STATE.

Lords Amendment: No. 21, in page 40, line 5, at end insert "or an associated state".

Mr. Noble: I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.

This Amendment is purely technical, as is Lords Amendment No. 22, in page 41, line 12, at end insert "or an associated state", which goes with it.

Question put and agreed to.

Subsequent Lords Amendments agreed to.

Clause 41

BORROWING BY THE BOARD

12.15 a.m.

Lords Amendment: No. 23, in page 46, line 19, leave out "any purpose" and insert "performing its functions".

Mr. Noble: I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.
Would it be convenient, Mr. Deputy Speaker, to take at the same time the following two further Lords Amendments:
No. 33, in page 91, line 48, leave out from "and" to end of line 49 and insert
for the words from 'as' to 'discharging' there shall be substituted the words 'in sterling or other currencies as the corporation may require for performing'".

No. 34, in page 92, line 10, leave out "any purpose" and insert "performing their functions".

Mr. Deputy Speaker: Yes, if that be the wish of the House.

Mr. Noble: All three are purely drafting Amendments.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 53

ACCOUNTS AND AUDIT

Lords Amendment: No. 24, in page 53, line 7, leave out "and Corporate".

Mr. Noble: I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.

This is a technical Amendment.

Question put and agreed to.

Schedule 1

ADDITIONAL PROVISIONS RELATING TO CONSTITUTION, ETC., OF CLVIL AVIATION AUTHORITY.

Lords Amendment: No. 25, in page 65, line 21, at end insert:
or employed by the Authority in pursuance of paragraph 13A of this Schedule.

Mr. Noble: I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.

Mr. Deputy Speaker: We shall take at the same time the following two further Lords Amendments:—

No. 26, in page 65, line 26, at end insert:
; and before the Secretary of State approves in pursuance of this sub-paragraph the terms of a contract to be offered to a person employed in employment to which paragraph I of Schedule 9 to this Act applies it shall be the duty of the Secretary of State to satisfy himself that those terms, taken as a whole, are not less favourable to that person than the terms ogn which he is employed as aforesaid on the date when the offer is made.

No. 27, in page 66, line 5, at end insert:
13A.—(1) Notwithstanding anything in the last two preceding paragraphs, it shall be the duty of the Authority to make, to each person who at the passing of this Act and on such subsequent date as the Secretary of State may determine is employed by a relevant body, an offer of employment by the Authority on terms which, taken as a whole, are not less favourable to that person than the terms on which he is employed by the relevant body on the date when the offer is made; and an offer made in pursuance of this paragraph shall not be revocable during the period of three months beginning with the date on which the offer is made.
(2) In the preceding sub-paragraph "relevant body" means a body which by virtue of section 27(1) of this Act is to cease or has ceased to have functions conferred on it in pursuance of section 7 of the Civil Aviation Act 1949.

Mr. Noble: These changes have been made to give effect to assurances which I have already given that the staff of the Air Registration Board and civil servants transferred to the Authority will be offered terms and conditions at least as good as those which they had in the Air Registration Board or as civil servants. The third Amendment provides also for the staff of the Air Registration Board to be offered employment by the Authority. The success of the Authority will depend upon its staff, and I commend these Amendments, therefore, to the House.

Mr. Millan: I welcome these Amendments. I shall not be so uncharitable at this hour to quote back to the right hon. Gentleman the reasons which he gave in Committee for saying that they were unnecessary and undesirable when we attempted to make similar suitable provision. I simply welcome his conversion to the idea that the Amendments should be made, and I am glad to see them.

Question put and agreed to.

Subsequent Lords Amendments agreed to.

Schedule 3

LAND AND RIGHTS OVER LAND

Lords Amendment: No. 28, in page 71, line 10, leave out "was" and insert "is".

Mr. Noble: I beg to move. That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.
This merely corrects a small grammatical error.

Question put and agreed to.

Schedule 9

TRANSITIONAL PROVISIONS

Lords Amendment: No. 29, in page 86, line 49, at end insert—
3A.—(1) For the purposes of paragraph 10(2) of Schedule 1 to the Contracts of Employment Act 1963 and section 13(1) of the Redundancy Payments Act 1965 (which relate to changes of ownership of businesses), there shall be deemed to be transferred to the Authority on the appointed day the business of any body which by virtue of section 27(1) of this Act is to cease or has ceased to have functions conferred on it in pursuance of


section 7 of the Civil Aviation Act 1949; and a body whose business is deemed for those purposes to be transferred by virtue of this paragraph shall on the appointed day be deemed for the purposes of the said section 13(1) to terminate in connection with the transfer its contracts of employment with persons employed by it immediately before the appointed day.
(2) In the application of the preceding subparagraph to Northern Ireland, for the reference to the said Act of 1963 and the references to section 13(1) of the said Act of 1965 there shall be substituted respectively a reference to the Contracts of Employment and Redundancy Payments Act (Northern Ireland) 1965 and references to section 23(1) of the last-mentioned Act.

Mr. Noble: I beg to move. That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.
Subparagraph (1) of the new paragraph ensures that service of employees of the Air Registration Board who are later in the employment of the Civil Aviation Authority counts as continuous with service with the Authority for the purpose of the Contracts of Employment Act, 1963, and the Redundancy Payments Act, 1965. I am sure that the House will agree that this is right.

Question put and agreed to.

Schedule 10

MINOR AND CONSEQUENTIAL AMENDMENTS OF ENACTMENTS

Lords Amendment: No. 30, in page 88, line 15, after "19" insert
of the Ministry of Supply Act 1939".

Mr. Noble: I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.
This merely adds the words in the subheading to the text of the Bill and so is drafting.

Question put and agreed to.

Lords Amendment: No. 31, in page 89, line 31, leave out from "words," to end of line 33 and insert:
"approved under the Convention "there shall be substituted the words" which are either—

(i) approved under any international agreement to which the United Kingdom is a party, or
(ii) in the opinion of the Minister likely to be approved, before or within one month after the date when the regulations come

into force, under any international agreement to which the United Kingdom is likely to be a party before or within one month after that date;"".

Mr. Noble: I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.

This Amendment enables regulations for the payment of navigation services charges to Eurocontrol under an international agreement to be made in advance of the United Kingdom bet-coming a party to the agreement if the Secretary of State considers that the United Kingdom is likely to be a party before or within one month after the date when the regulations will come into force. It is a somewhat technical Amendment.

Question put and agreed to.

Subsequent Lords Amendments agreed to.

Lords Amendment: No. 36, in page 93, line 44, before second "the" insert "under".

Mr. Noble: I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.

Mr. Deputy Speaker: We may conveniently take at the same time Lords Amendment No. 37, in page 93, line 46, before "any" insert
or likely to be approved under".

Mr. Millan: I am in some difficulty here. I do not understand these Amendments and I think that there must have been a misprint somewhere. Amendment No. 36 refers us to the second "the" in line 44. I can see only one "the" in that line. The second Amendment also does not seem to make sense. I do not believe that we can agree to the Amendments, because they will make the paragraph a nonsense. I am sorry that I have not been able to give the right hon. Gentleman notice of this point.

Mr. Noble: I am sorry that I cannot give the hon. Gentleman the answer at this very short notice. In my list the Amendments were bracketed with No. 31.

Mr. Deputy Speaker: Order. May I help the House? The hon. Gentleman may be under a misapprehension. As far as we can make out from the Chair, the Amendment is correctly worded.

Mr. Millan: I should be grateful if someone could explain why that should be so.

Mr. Deputy Speaker: May I point out that the reference in the Lords Amendment is to the Bill as first printed by the Lords? Perhaps that is how the hon. Gentleman's difficulty arises.

Mr. Millan: I understand that the Amendments refer to Bill 194, which is what I have in my hand, and if the two Amendments are made to Bill 194 they do not appear to make sense. Perhaps the Minister can explain it to me from his copy. The first Amendment is completely defective, because there is no second "the" to insert any word before. I see that the hon. Member for Woking (Mr. Onslow) agrees with me. The second is also defective, because if we insert the words we have an absolute nonsense. Something must have gone wrong with the printing. I am sorry if this is an embarrassment to the Government.

Mr. Noble: I wish that I could help the hon. Gentleman more. I am told that the Amendments are correct in relation to the Bill to which they aim to be made. I agree that in my copy of the Bill line 44 has only one "the", but that may not be the copy of the Bill to which the Amendments are being made.

Mr. Onslow: I think that the hon. Member for Glasgow, Craigton (Mr. Millan) is under a misapprehension about the second Amendment, because it makes a sort of sense, but he must be right about the first, because there is only one "the" in the line. No doubt there is a Bill somewhere which has the necessary word. I only regret that my right hon. Friend has been able to obtain a copy but the Vote Office was not able to supply hon. Members with it.

Mr. Noble: The appropriate copy of the Bill has now arrived in my hands, and there are two "the"s in the line. If I hand my copy to the hon. Gentleman he will see that the Amendment was technically correct, and I believe makes sense.

Mr. Millan: I am sorry if I caused a little confusion, particularly at this time of night. Now that I have seen the appropriate copy I think that I understand that the Amendments may indeed make some sense. Not all Government

Amendments do, but I think that I have been under a misapprehension, and I apologise to the House.

Mr. Deputy Speaker: I thank the hon. Gentleman for his characteristic courtesy.

Question put and agreed to.

Remaining Lords Amendment agreed to.

INFLAMMABLE SUBSTANCES (ROAD CONVEYANCE)

12.25 a.m.

Mr. Merlyn Rees: I beg to move,
That an humble Address be presented to Her Majesty praying that the Inflammable Substances (Conveyance by Road) (Labelling) Regulations 1971 (S.I., 1971, No. 1062), dated 28th June 1971, a copy of which was laid before this House on 8th July, be annulled.
I hope, Mr. Deputy Speaker, that it will be for the convenience of the House if we take at the same time the second Motion,
That an humble Address be presented to Her Majesty praying that the Inflammable Liquids (Conveyance by Road) Regulations 1971 (S.I., 1971, No. 1061), dated 28th June 1971, a copy of which was laid before this House on 8th July, be annulled

Mr. Deputy Speaker (Sir Robert Grant-Ferris): Mr. Deputy Speaker (Sir Robert Grant-Ferris) indicated assent.

Mr. Rees: I am obliged.
We wish to probe to ascertain the Government's intention in the Regulations on the important matter of the carriage of dangerous substances through the streets of towns, possibly affecting many of our constituents. The Regulations to which the first Motion relates deal with the labelling of inflammable substances for conveyance by road.
When an accident occurs to a vehicle which is carrying poisons, it is important that doctors and firemen should know what is contained in the tank. I know that there is a great deal of training for firemen in this respect, because increasingly nowadays they are engaged not in putting out fires but in dealing with accidents, particularly on motorways.
Given the labelling, how is the fire service kept informed of the changing nature of the liquids that are carried? It is important not simply that there


should be labelling, but that it should be meaningful to those who function after an accident. In using the Ml a great deal, as do many hon. Members who have North of England constituencies, I have noticed that telephone numbers are often given alongside the label. I have often wondered how important those telephone numbers are and whether they are manned at all hours of the night. My first question, therefore, concerns the use to which the labelling is put.
Regulation 3 states that
These Regulations apply to any inflammable substance (that is to say, petroleum-spirit, carbon disulphide… .
I will not read the remainder; hon. Members are as capable of reading it as I am. How limiting is Regulation 3? The reason for my question is that Regulation 8 states that
In the case of a container which does not contain any acetaldehyde or carbon disulphide… .
Having had the limitation in Regulation 3, we then have Regulation 8, and I was surprised that Regulation 9(3) goes on to say that
The substances to which this Regulation applies are as follows
and it lists seven names which I am not capable of pronouncing. Therefore, Regulations 3, 8 and 9(3) appear to be in conflict. While I accept that Statutory Instruments and Orders must be legally correct, there comes a time when ordinary mortals who deal with this important matter have to read them.
Regulation 6, which will be of importance to trade unions whose members drive the vehicles in question, states that
The owner of a vehicle used for the conveyance of any inflammable substance … shall … affix a copy thereof in some place where it can conveniently be read".
That may be a way of expressing it, as is done in countless Orders, but it is important that it should be done in a fashion that enables the drivers of vehicles to know what is going on.
I recall that when I had responsibility in the Home Office regulations existed to deal with inflammable liquids. Vehicles had to bear at the highest point of the front and rear a label indicating the nature of the dangerous substance being carried. In addition, tank vehicles and packages containing inflammable

liquids were required to be marked with the name of the liquid contained. What changes do both sets of Regulations make in those requirements?
Regulation 3 of Regulations 1061 reads:
Subject to Regulation 9 below, every person engaged in the conveyance, or the loading or unloading in connection with conveyance, of any inflammable liquid shall secure so far as is reasonably possible that none of the inflammable liquid is spilt.
My first instinct is to say, "So what?". What does the phrase
so far as is reasonably possible
mean? We have moved beyond the driver to anyone who is dealing with inflammable liquids. I recall that the staff of the Home Office was preparing a circular to be sent to responsible bodies giving advice on what to do in the event of a spillage. What has happened to that circular?
Regulation 6 reads:
Subject to Regulation 9 below, a suitable and efficient fire extinguisher shall be carried in an easily accessible position on any vehicle conveying any inflammable liquid.
This may be meaningful to the people concerned, but it is important that they should know exactly what is meant by
suitable and efficient fire extinguisher.
I am not clear about Regulation 8, which says:
It shall be the duty of a local authority empowered under the Petroleum (Consolidation) Act 1928 to grant petroleum-spirit licences to enforce within their district the provisions of these Regulations …
A problem may arise with a vehicle which sets out from Sutton in Surrey to go to Leeds in Yorkshire. Does this Regulation mean that a local authority has power to enforce the provisions in respect of vehicles that are not registered with that local authority? Problems arise in many towns in the North, including those in the constituency of my hon. Friend the Member for St. Helens (Mr. Spriggs). Vehicles are rerouted round the outskirts of towns, and the heaviest lorries carrying the most dangerous substances pass through streets which were formerly entirely residential. Serious trouble could arise in the event of an accident.
With regard to the various regulations which are already in existence, as I recall the situation there were requirements in the Poisons (No. 2) Rules of 1968. Do those rules still apply and, if so, do these


new Regulations supersede them? Furthermore, I recall that the Ministry of Transport—now the Department of the Environment—made regulations concerning the construction of vehicles. I presume that such regulations have been drawn up by the Department of the Environment and I should like to know whether they still apply.
My hon. Friends and I have raised this matter at this late hour because we felt that these are important problems which should be aired in the House so that we may canvass the Government's views. We should welcome any information from the Government on this matter since the situation is worrying many people in the constituencies.

12.35 a.m.

Mr. Kevin McNamara: On the night of 30th/ 31st May this year a large tanker containing 5,000 gallons of ethanol, a highly inflammable and explosive liquid, was parked on waste land in Sculcoates Lane in my constituency. It sprang a leak through a faulty valve, and it was a potentially dangerous situation.
This tanker carrying ethanol was parked near several other loaded tankers, the one adjacent to it carrying acid and others containing similarly dangerous loads. If the tanker containing the acid had sprung a leak and both liquids—the acid and the ethanol—had mixed there would not have been just a potentially dangerous situation but, in the words of the Deputy Chief Fire Officer, "a major disaster". And this lorry was parked in a highly populated area.
On 19th May an empty tanker was parked on waste land in Sutton Street adjacent to a modern housing estate near the city centre. It had been carrying propane. Gas in the pipes forced open the safety valves and again there could have been a great tragedy.
I mention these two examples because they are important when dealing with these Regulations. I must give expression to the grave concern of my constituents on these matters. We have recently seen the devastating and tragic results of accidents occurring to tankers carrying dangerous loads in the city. These accidents have caused fatalities.
Although these Regulations are admirable and praiseworthy as far as they go, they do not deal with some of the problems involved. Although the Regulations govern conveyance by road, there is no suggestion in the Regulations about the place where vehicles bearing these labels should be parked.
From the examples I have already given, it will be seen that the Regulations should state that the lorry carrying this label should be parked not on waste land—because the owners do not have adequate parking for their vehicles or because the driver wants an "early off" but in a recognised park, securely watched, where vehicles can be checked and away from built-up areas. Indeed, my own city corporation in Hull, in conjunction with the Road Haulage Association and the Department of the Environment, have decided to establish such a park. They are very much aware of the disasters which, fortunately, they missed earlier this year.
The point is that the requirements for parking should not rest upon a particular intention of a local authority, no matter how praiseworthy and progressive it is, as my local authority is. It should be mandatory on employers with licences to convey these substances to have such parking facilities available for their lorries and their contents both at the start of the journey and at the destination. They should have rules preventing their drivers from parking in unauthorised places. Vehicles bearing the symbol should be away from the tremendous temptation they present both to children seeking to tamper or play with valves and things of that sort, and also, potentially, to vandals and people unthinking about the problems which exist.
Further, there should be in the Regulations an obligation not only on the owners of the vehicles but on the main contractors as well to satisfy themselves that the Regulations are obeyed. My union, the T. & G.W.U., which organises the great majority of the drivers of these vehicles, has no fear that the Regulations will not be observed by the well-established firms in the industry. It is the "cowboys", the small subcontractors, that it fears most. It fears that many of these Regulations, praiseworthy as they are, may well be ignored by some of the people involved.
It does not appear to me that the Regulations cover vehicles containing, for example, empty vessels—jars, bottles, drums, and so forth—which have previously contained substances. I give the example of a lorry load of empty drums which contain the residue vapour which might be highly dangerous, highly explosive and highly inflammable. Will the Regulations cover this sort of situation? It appears to me that they do not. Regulation 9 says:
Regulations 3 to 7 of these Regulations shall not apply in relation to the conveyance of any inflammable liquid (other than acetaldehyde) in a vehicle, if—
—and then follow subparagraph (a) and subparagraph (b), which states:
in the case of conveyance otherwise than in a tank wagon or tank trailer, the total quantity of inflammable liquid in the vehicle does not exceed 500 kilograms (1,102·5 pounds).
One can easily imagine the sort of situation where a lorry parked or even moving has a loose load. The drums fall off, there is a spark and then an explosion causing considerable damage.
I welcome these Regulations but they go only some way—not the whole way—to making our roads as safe as they could be. Hull City Council is going a considerable way to meet our problems locally. Because I would not want the same fears to arise in other areas, and because other areas might not be so lucky as Hull, I hope that the hon. Gentleman will tell us that the problem is being looked at urgently and carefully by his Department.

12.45 a.m.

Mr. Albert Booth: There are now over 40 pieces of legislation—Acts, Regulations and Statutory Instruments—dealing with the transport of chemicals by road. This leads me to make a simple request: that all these should be published in a single volume so that the many people who are concerned with the transport of dangerous chemicals by road can examine the legislation without having to refer to so many different publications.
The dangerous substances with which we are concerned are all listed and defined in the Petroleum (Inflammable Liquids) Order 1971, No. 1040. It lists, in all, some 206 inflammable liquids, including acetone, Bromobutane, Butyl nitrite, Diethyl ether, Flurobenzene, and

many others which I would not claim to be able to pronounce. I mention these to show that we are dealing not solely with petrol but with 206 substances which, subject to their being in combinations which can give off inflammable vapour below a temperature of 23 degrees, could be subject in any circumstances to control by Regulation.
The first of the Regulations which I wish to criticise is Statutory Instrument No. 1061, The Inflammable Liquids (Conveyance by Road) Regulations 1971. It includes within its provisions the requirement that
every person engaged in the conveyance … of any inflammable liquid shall secure so far as is reasonably possible that none of the inflammable liquid is spilt.
That is a perfectly reasonable provision. I admit that it might be more tightly defined, but the aim is clear and it is desirable practice.
It then requires that
no person engaged in the conveyance … of any inflammable liquid shall smoke or carry any naked flame.
It also provides that vehicles carrying these inflammable liquids shall not have portable lights capable of igniting inflammable vapour, and that a suitable fire extinguisher shall be carried.
All these are perfectly laudable Regulations. What is amazing and absolutely horrifying is that Regulation 9 promptly excludes 204 of these 206 inflammable liquids from any of these safety requirements, subject only to their being carried in a road vehicle, other than a tanker, in quantities not exceeding 500 kilograms.
Therefore, I cannot join my hon. Friends in welcoming the Regulations. These Regulations put at hazard citizens of this country by exempting from perfectly reasonable safety regulations the conveyance of 204 highly dangerous liquids.
The Inflammable Substances (Conveyance by Road) (Labelling) Regulations 1971, No. 1062, exclude the same liquids from the requirement to label if they are carried in quantities up to 500 kilograms. For reasons which have already been adduced, which I need not repeat, the ability to identify quickly in circumstances of accident and hazard the chemicals with which we are dealing can be a major factor in achieving a lessening of the hazard and preventing dire


consequences for people in the vicinity of an accident.
I do not ask the Minister to accept my word for the risk involved in the kind of accident which arises from the conveying of these substances. I ask him, however, to consider carefully the words of Dr. H. K. Black, Her Majesty's Chief Inspector of Explosives at the Home Office. He delivered a paper to the symposium on "Disasters—their prevention, control and social effects" in 1968 at the Dundee meeting of the British Association.
I want to quote a few of the accidents to which he drew attention because they appear to be totally relevant to these Statutory Instruments. He gave details of one accident at West Bromwich in 1962, in which
A mixed load of goods, amongst which were some organic peroxides in drums, and some hydrogen peroxide in glass carboys was found to be on fire in passing through the town; after being driven on to a waste piece of ground the load blew up. As a consequence 32 people were injured, and there was considerable damage to property. This accident provided evidence that the properties of organic peroxides were not sufficiently well known, for this was the first occasion on which it could be shown that, with one type of peroxide, a low-order explosion was capable of communication to all the load.
For that piece of knowledge 32 people were injured.
Another example that he gave was of an explosives accident at Marshall's Creek, Pennsylvania, which caused the death of five people. In this case
the tyres of the vehicle went on fire which then communicated to the load. It was only then appreciated that, following a tyre failure, fire might only be seen to occur maybe 15 or 20 minutes after the vehicle had stopped.
The last case that I want to quote—and I take it from another country to show that this is an international problem and has been recognised as such—occurred at Martelange in Belgium. On this occasion
a tanker vehicle was conveying liquid propylene and came into collision with the parapet of a bridge. It went on fire and an explosion killed at least nine people and injured many others …
Propylene is one of the substances which the Government are proposing to exclude from the safety regulations if it is carried in quantities of between 250 and

500 kilograms. It seems to me that the House cannot welcome these Orders.
Whilst inflammable liquids are conveyed by road it may not be possible to ensure complete safety. I think that there must be some element of hazard. All that we can do by regulations, by legislation in any form, and by the most careful policing of it is to cut down the risks involved in the carriage of these liquids, and take precautions to minimise the effects of accidents when they happen. The two Statutory Instruments before the House reduce the precautions that have to be taken and increase the risks, and therefore I believe that both Regulations should be rejected.

12.53 a.m.

Mr. Leslie Spriggs: I shall do my best to avoid repeating what has been said because I think that we have all been following very closely the publications of the authorities who have been writing and speaking on these two subjects over the last few years.
I follow my hon. Friend the Member for Barrow-in-Furness (Mr. Booth) in saying very firmly and, I think, very fairly, that we should not accept these Regulations, and nor should the Minister. In reply to a Question that I put to him the Minister said:
The Standing Advisory Committee on Dangerous Substances is considering a number of proposals for improving the arrangements for conveyance by road."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 22nd July, 1971; Vol. 821, c. 1655.]
As the Committee's report is apparently not ready, I should have thought that the Department would have withheld its hand. We recognise that if any precautions can be taken in relation to the conveyance of petroleum and dangerous substances they should be taken. I hope that when I have made my short contribution the Minister will announce his decision to withdraw these Regulations.
I want to deal first with S.I. 1061. I am amazed at the weakness of these Regulations, in terms of the number of exemptions. Paragraph 3 of the Schedule provides that
The receptacle must be so constructed and closed that none of the contents can, under normal conditions, escape from it.
Can the Minister tell us how many roads over which this kind of heavy traffic travels every day and night are normal


roads? If he will visit St. Helens and examine our road surfaces he will see what this heavy traffic is doing to them. He can also listen to the complaints of my constituents about those damaged road surfaces.
Paragraph 4 provides that
The receptacle must be so constructed that no part of its interior surface can, under normal conditions, be so affected by contact with the contents as to make the use of that receptacle dangerous.
What are "normal conditions"? If it is the intention of the Department to provide safety measures for the conveyance of petroleum, the safest way would be to order the construction of receptacles that will stand up to abnormal rather than normal conditions.
In view of the danger of this highly inflammable liquid I cannot see why a load should be exempted because it does not exceed the maximum of 1,102·5 lb. If there is an accident many people could be severely burnt, or burnt to death, with a load like that. It can set large properties on fire; it can set whole buildings going. I want to know why the opportunity to provide safeguards against serious accidents on our roads, in our streets, at the docks, and elsewhere, was not taken by putting forward stronger Regulations. For that reason I invite the Minister to accept our criticism in the spirit in which it was offered from the Opposition Front Bench and withdraw these Regulations.
It would be wrong of me to sit down without dealing with the question that I raised in the House on the date that I referred to a few moments ago. I am looking forward to the Report of this Committee. It is remarkable that in this Instrument, we should be asked, apart from the exemptions for safety regulations, to accept that receptacles constructed for the carriage of dangerous substances should provide for normal conditions. This is a weakness. It would be far better if they provided for abnormal conditions.
I have had a great deal to do with labelling, including dangerous cargoes. Even the most securely tied label can be destroyed in an accident. So, in a safe system, the label should not be used as an alternative to the indelible marking, but only as a secondary method. I wonder whether Regulation No. 6 could

be of use where a driver is unconscious or worse.
Can a driver's knowledge of these Regulations be used at all times? If not, the markings on such vehicles should conform to a national hazard identity system. It should be available to and clearly understood by the emergency services. The hazardous potential of such an incident would be rapidly ascertained and the prescribed first aid action taken.
All persons concerned with accident prevention agree that an accident is an event waiting to happen and, given the right conditions, it will happen. Schedule 3 provides an alternative to the indelibly marked vehicle or tank. As I said earlier, the label should not be used as an alternative to marking such vehicles indelibly. More care should be taken to obtain the opinions of, for example, the Institute of Industrial Safety officials and officers of emergency services, including the fire brigade.
Where dangerous substances are being conveyed, it is vital that receptacles are constructed in such a way that they will withstand the toughest transport conditions. Schedule 4 is important in this respect. To lower the standards would only mean a lowering of the safety standards.
I hope that the Minister has listened to our submissions with care. As we have made clear, this is not a political matter. This is an Instrument which, if allowed to pass unchallenged, might result in safety standards on the roads being lowered. I urge the Minister to withdraw these Regulations and to replace them by others with teeth that will provide the provisions we are seeking.

1.7 a.m.

The Minister of State, Home Office (Mr. Richard Sharples): I wish to make it clear at the outset that I in no way underestimate the importance of these Regulations or the dangers which face many people, particularly in industrial constituencies, where dangerous substances of the kind we are discussing are carried by road.
I will answer as many questions as I can, and a number of hon. Members have asked about technical matters. It might be convenient if, first, I make


some general remarks about these Regulations compared with the 1968 Regulations. In many respects they are identical, but first I will deal with the main changes.
First, the exemption limit of 250 kg. in the 1968 Regulations has been increased to 500 kg. This is designed primarily to ease the difficulties of the small common carrier who may from time to time need to carry quantities of more than 250 kg. as part of a general load.
The second change is that the provision in the 1968 Regulations that containers containing not more than one kilogram of an inflammable liquid need not display either the "inflammable" label or the name of the substance contained therein has been extended to cover individual metal containers containing not more than five litres of inflammable liquid.
The third change is that containers in which what are called potable spirits—that means in common language spirits such as whisky, gin and rum—are conveyed are no longer required to display the "inflammable" label, and provision is made for both containers and tank vehicles containing such spirits to display the commonly accepted name of the substance instead of the correct chemical name, which I have discovered for the first time this evening is "ethanol mixture".
Fourth, containers and tank vehicles conveying inflammable waste may now display the words "disposable waste" instead of the name of the substance.
Fifth, the exemption from the container and vehicle labelling requirements provided under the 1968 Regulations in respect of packages complying with certain specified requirements, which were set out in Schedule 3 to the 1968 Regulations, has now been extended to apply to metal aerosols enclosed in a wrapping of polyethylene film by a process of shrinking and sealing by heat.
Sixth, a new provision has been included in the 1971 Regulations requiring containers and vehicles conveying certain inflammable liquids which are also corrosive to display the "corrosive" label in addition to the "inflammable" label.

All these changes have been recommended by the Home Office Standing Advisory Committee on Dangerous Substances, following consultations which have taken place through all the normal channels. The Home Office Standing Advisory Committee was set up by the previous Government in 1965 and it has been carrying out a fairly long programme of examination of the whole of this subject. The Committee decided the following order of priorities. First, it would examine the question of inflammable liquids. That has been done to a large extent, and the 1968 Regulations were largely to deal with this question. Second, it dealt with corrosives. I introduced Regulations a short time ago to deal with corrosives. The third priority was organic peroxide, and the fourth priority was toxics.
As part of that plan of operation, the Committee has so far recommended controls for the labelling of vehicles and containers for inflammable liquids under the 1968 Regulations.
At the moment the Committee has under consideration proposals for, first, the labelling of containers and vehicles for the conveyance of organic peroxides. This was announced in a debate in February, 1968, by the then Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department. He said at that time it was hoped that the Regulations would be introduced within a matter of months. To illustrate the complexity of this subject, I can say that these Regulations have not yet been introduced, although I very much hope that they will be introduced—I use now the words used by the Under-Secretary in 1968—within a matter of months.
The Committee has under consideration proposals for, second, the operation and construction of vehicles for the conveyance of inflammable liquids. These proposals would be susceptible of extension, with minor modifications, to corrosive and organic peroxides. The third set of proposals relate to the operation and construction of vehicles for the conveyance of liquefied petroleum gases. This is of particular importance in relation to the kind of accident to which the hon. Member for Kingston upon Hull, North (Mr. McNamara) referred as having occurred in his constituency. One of the reasons this has been given priority is that accident.

Mr. McNamara: The accident occurred in the constituency of one of my hon. Friends.

Mr. Sharples: Anyway, it occurred in the City of Hull of which I know the hon. Gentleman is a distinguished Member.
All these matters will be within the scope of the 1928 Act and, as I say, it is expected that draft Regulations concerning them will be prepared within the next few months.
May I deal with as many as possible of the questions which were raised by hon. Members. I should like to say how grateful I was to the hon. Member for Leeds, South (Mr. Merlyn Rees) for giving me prior warning of some of his questions. He asked me how the ordinary fireman who goes out to deal with an accident of this kind is kept informed. The position is that we in the Home Office send out circulars to all those concerned, giving detailed guidance about the action to be taken in dealing with particular substances in accordance with the labels on the vehicles. We are producing, shortly I hope, all this guidance in the form of a single booklet. The guidance is given by us to the various fire authorities and through the normal channels in the fire service this is given to members of the various fire brigades.
The hon. Gentleman also referred to Regulation 3 of Statutory Instrument No. 1062. This repeats word for word the substance of Regulation 1 of the 1968 Regulations. He also asked about Regulation 6 and inquired where a notice would be put so that it could be read. The answer is that normally a notice would be put up in a depot, and the intention is that those persons concerned directly with the handling of the substances should be able to read it. Once again, this was taken from the 1968 Regulations, namely Regulation 4.
I was also asked by the hon. Gentleman about the exceptions, and I think I covered that point when I pointed out the differences between these Regulations and the 1968 Regulations.
The hon. Gentleman then referred to the list of the seven substances which are mentioned in Regulation 9 and asked why they are separate. The answer is that those seven substances—I will not attempt to pronounce their names—are

corrosive as well as inflammable, and therefore they have to bear both the "corrosive" and the "inflammable" labels.
The hon. Gentleman referred to Regulation 3 of Statutory Instrument 1061. This again repeats word for word what was in the 1968, and indeed in the 1957 Regulations.
In reply to the hon. Gentleman's question about fire extinguishers—I think this arises on Regulation 6—we do not advise any particular make or classification of fire extinguisher. The purpose of the fire extinguisher carried in the vehicle—this is the advice that we give—is to prevent a fire which may start in the engine or cab of a vehicle from spreading to the load. It is not practicable to carry in the cab of a vehicle a fire extinguisher capable of dealing with a dangerous load, which may weigh as much as 10 tons or more, but it is important to be able to deal with any fire in a cab quickly and prevent it spreading.

Mr. Booth: If the purpose of the fire extinguisher is to deal with a fire arising from the engine, why exclude from the requirement to carry a fire extinguisher vehicles which are carrying loads up to 500 kilograms? One could understand the argument if the fire hazard were coming from the inflammable cargo. If the fire hazard is coming from the engine, how can there be logic in excluding those vehicles carrying a smaller inflammable load?

Mr. Sharples: There always was an exemption. The previous exemption was 250 kilograms. It has been extended to 500. The principle of the requirement has not been altered in any way. What has been altered is simply the exemption limit.
The hon. Member for Leeds, South asked me about the responsibilties of local authorities. Licensing is a matter for the local authority in which the vehicle has its depot and starts its journey. When the journey is through different local authority areas or from one local authority area to another, responsibility lies upon any authority through which or to which the load may be passing as well as the local authority in the area from which it originated. He also asked about the poisons rules. They are not affected by this.
The hon. Member for Kinston upon Hull, North asked me about parking regulations. This is a most important subject. The Standing Advisory Committee is preparing regulations to deal with this specific problem. I cannot say when these regulations will be brought before the House but I appreciate, particularly from what the hon. Gentleman said, the urgency of this matter.

Mr. McNamara: I am most grateful for what the hon. Gentleman said because it is of great importance. I wonder whether in his other capacity at the Home Office he would instruct local police forces to be more vigilant in supervising where tankers are parked to ensure that this sort of hazard is not created where it could be avoided and where there might be suitable parking for tankers away from built-up areas.

Mr. Sharples: Neither the Home Secretary nor I can give instructions to local police forces, but I will see that this point is drawn to the attention of those concerned.
The hon. Member for St. Helens asked about labels, and suggested the invariable use of a label fixed to a vehicle in such a way that it could not be removed. One of the difficulties with this, and one of the reasons for the provision of the alternative, is that liquids or substances of this kind may be carried in general-purpose vehicles which may be used for other things. That is the reason for the flexibility. He also asked me about the receptacles and normal loading. The Regulations are taken word for word from the 1968 Regulations. I will certainly look at the question again when they are revised again.

Mr. Spriggs: I made my plea to the hon. Gentleman because heavier and heavier loads of dangerous substances are being carried by road and in view of this we should not follow the example of the earlier Regulations. Surely we should move with the times and with the growth of this industry on the roads.

Mr. Sharples: If the Regulations need to be altered it will be right for the Standing Advisory Committee to consider the point.
One of the points that has struck me since I have been looking at these matters

is that it is not very satisfactory to go on dealing with them under the 1928 Act, which was designed for entirely different purposes. The difficulties in bringing forward Regulations like these are first, that every substance must be named, and, second, that we are confined to the substances contained within the overall provisions of that Act, when things were very different.
What we have done in the Home Office is to set up a review to look at the whole question of the ways in which the system of control of dangerous substances requires to be rationalised and modernised, and what fresh legislation is needed for the purpose. We have made a certain amount of progress, and are considering the controls required on the ground to govern the manufacture, importation, keeping, use and conveyance of those substances over which my right hon. Friend exercises control in the interests of public safety.
What we want to do is to consider how those controls can best be enforced—for instance, which aspects are so technical as to call for the expertise of the Explosive Inspectorate; which are appropriate to the police because, for example, they have a security aspect; and which are predominantly fire risks, suitable for enforcement by local authority fire brigades. From that we are working back to establish what enabling legislation will be needed, what additional substances need to be controlled, and how that might best be achieved.
The House will appreciate that it is a fairly complex operation upon which we have now embarked. I cannot say that we shall be able to produce any short-term results. I think that for a time we shall have to go on working under the provisions of the 1928 Act, that the Advisory Committee will go on functioning, and that we shall go on producing amending Regulations for the time being. I appreciate that there is an urgency about this, and that the matter is very complex. For the longer term I believe that we shall need new legislation to deal with modern substances, substances which were never intended to be covered by the 1928 Act. I think that that is the right way to tackle the matter.
I recommend the Regulations to the House. I have listened carefully to everything that has been said, and I appreciate


the strong feelings on the matter held by hon. Members.

1.28 p.m.

Mr. Merlyn Rees: The Minister said that he recognises that there is concern about the problem of the carriage of dangerous substances. We see from the way that the Regulations are drafted that they emanate from the Standing Advisory Committee of experts; they hardly emanate from political decisions of the Cabinet. While we accept that, I ask one thing on behalf of my hon. Friends, that in all the changes the hon. Gentleman intends he will keep an eye on the increase of weight for exclusion purposes. Without being necessarily on the side of bigness in business, we can say that it is sometimes with some of the smaller carriers that many of the problems arise. I am sure that the Minister will keep an eye on that aspect.
We were glad of the news about what the hon. Gentleman intends to do on parking, which is a problem in other cities besides Hull. We hear time and time again about the parking of vehicles in our cities, and if they have the kind of load we have been discussing that causes additional problems.
Above all, we are glad to hear the Minister's announcement that there will be a rationalisation of the law. It is the basic law that now needs to be looked at. Much of the legislation on which the Regulations are based is very much out of date. When we hear dates quoted in the 1870s for the Explosives Acts—which do not apply directly here—it is time we looked at the question again.
In view of what the Minister said, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the Motion.

Motion, by leave, withdrawn.

FALMOUTH (CONTAINER TERMINAL)

Motion made, and Question proposed, That this House do now adjourn.—[Mr. Hawkins.]

1.30 a.m.

Mr. David Mudd: In addressing myself to this important subject, I do not overlook the substantial and very welcome support I have received for an Early Day Motion

on this topic, including the support of hon. Members with port interests on both sides of the House. But to set my basic case in its true perspective, I shall state what I regard as being two vital national and international considerations—first, Channel safety, and second, the need to stimulate cargo handling growth for United Kingdom ship owners and United Kingdom ports.
In his important Adjournment debate on 28th July this year, my hon. Friend the Member for Brighton, Kemptown (Mr. Bowden) called for greater control and greater safety surveillance in the congested waters of the English Channel. In his reply, my hon. Friend the Under-Secretary of State for Trade and Industry referred to measures which, he said, could and would be introduced. But he went on to say:
We hope that once this system starts to operate, there will be a substantial drop in the number of ships using the lanes in the wrong direction ".—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 28th July, 1971; Vol. 822, c. 748.]
With the greatest respect to my hon. Friend, I suggest that he was then talking in terms of first aid at a time when thought should be given to the application of major surgery. What is needed in the interests of Channel safety is to find an effective way of reducing the number of ships in the Channel at any one time, particularly those deep-draught loaded giants jam-packed with valuable and potentially lethal cargoes.
I refer now to Thames Television's pertinent and responsible "This Week" programme on 27th May, 1971, which dealt in some depth with the problems and dangers in the Channel. As the programme showed, the Dover Straits are reaching a state of violently congested constipation, with about 800 ships passing daily in both directions, and about three accidents a week.
Such a toll of accidents would be bad enough were it restricted to small coasters, but this constant toll of accidents extends to supper-tankers and the ever-increasing number of giant container ships which threaten to make the "Torrey Canyon" look like a child's super-toy and which have the lack of manoeuvrability and lack of stopping power of a demented bull in a supermarket on a Saturday afternoon. As this


situation degenerates and becomes more serious, as constantly it does and will, practical methods must be found to keep these dangerous and unmanoeuvrable ships out of these congested waters in the first place.
The second major need is to create a new international stimulus to the ports of the United Kingdom to offset the effects of Common Market entry. On page 413 of his important survey, "British Shipping and World Competition", Dr. S. G. Sturmey warns of the diminution of the traditional trade to the United Kingdom if the United Kingdom and Europe were to become a mere generic destination for ships upon British entry into the E.E.C. The Common Market, he goes on to say, is unlikely to add any great new opportunities to British ocean shipping.
Here, then, is the first contention of my argument. If the United Kingdom is to be immersed in the Common Market, convenience will dictate the consigning of ships and cargoes to Continental ports rather than to those of the United Kingdom unless and until we can reach the situation in which the facilities of the West Coast of the United Kingdom at least equal those to be found on the western and north-western coasts of Europe.
Secondly, we must not lose sight of the fact that once international shippers are committed to destination routes to a united Europe, they will not readily begin to reallocate themselves to alternative destinations. The point is, therefore, self-evident that the maximum British containerisation trans-shipment facilities must be established and fully operative before world shipping begins to home itself on the ports of Western and Northwestern Europe.
That belief is not personal to myself. It has been reinforced by no less an authority than Mr. J. P. Rosegaarde Bisschop, Director of the Netherlands Container Association. He has gone on record as prophesying that when the mammoth third generation container ships go into service—and we are within perhaps five years of seeing the dawn of third generation traffic—there is every possibility that they will seek and utilise a port on the west coast of England rather than use the North Sea.
Therefore, if we are to look towards an alternative port on the West Coast of England, my submission is that the only port that can reasonably be considered is the Port of Falmouth. Accordingly, I ask: what can the Port of Falmouth offer to answer the threefold demands of safety, ease of access and strategic positioning to attract the Transatlantic cargoes?
I therefore summarise some of the many definite advantages of the Port of Falmouth for the development of such a containerisation facility. First, as a custom-built port utilising industrial waste land, the cost per virgin berth would be infinitely less than the cost of buying, demolishing, rebuilding and extending London, Southampton, Rotterdam or Hamburg. Therefore, in terms of money invested for a direct return, Falmouth is the best buy for port development.
Secondly, Falmouth is a deep-water port at all states of tide. It has no necessity for locks and the various other navigational hazards which create delays and potential dangers to deep-draught shipping. The deep water at Falmouth allows direct and prompt access for the arrival and departure of all ships, with the economic attraction of there being no delays to the vital speed of turn-around times and the added safety attraction of unrestricted room for manoeuvre.
Any Transatlantic ship using the Port of Falmouth rather than Rotterdam would knock 33½ days off the time for the return round trip to the United States, thus increasing ship availability by 3·936 round voyages every year, thereby attracting the maximum utilisation of ships and cargo space. Falmouth is the only undeveloped deep-water port in the United Kingdom which is able to accommodate deep-draught ships without! hindrance, interference or danger to other shipping.
The development of a container terminal at the Port of Falmouth would improve the financial revenue of the port and the port facilities to such an extent that soon it would be translated into improved and increased services to all the other forms of shipping that currently and traditionally use Falmouth, thus assisting the economy and the employment prospects of an area of high potential but, alas, so far, of very little development.
I must ask two questions which are perhaps against my own basic case. First, is there any need for a further container terminal in the United Kingdom and, second, would the emergence and establishment of Falmouth lower the profitability of other container ports? For the answers to those key questions, I turn to the publications of no less an authority than the National Ports Council itself. First, the Council's deep sea trade forecast for 1973, reported in its Port Unit Transport Statistics for 1969, makes it abundantly clear that even the vast impetus in the provision of additional berths elsewhere would still make a trans-shipment terminal at Falmouth a useful adjunct, without taking traffic away from existing major United Kingdom ports.
This is underlined still further in the Council's Annual Report for 1969, which, after stressing, quite rightly the vital national importance of the increased exports of manufactured products, goes on to stress that the potential of the major British container ports has hardly yet been tapped. Falmouth would certainly attract trade to the United Kingdom that does not otherwise exist, although obviously shippers are unwilling to commit such statements to paper while they are contracted to Continental ports.
In conclusion, therefore, I re-assert my personal reasons for wishing the Falmouth container terminal scheme well. First, it will contribute substantially to the decongestion and subsequently to the safety of other ships using the English Channel. Second, the scheme will provide an important outlet for overseas currency earning facilities to the United Kingdom. Third, the spin-off estimate of both finance and employment will be a valuable contribution to the economic and employment prospects of a very difficult area of Britain.
Fourth, it will provide a vital new opportunity for British shipping at a time when it must be threatened with the imminence of the Common Market. Fifth, it cannot be claimed that the establishment of the Falmouth facility will offset the potential of other ports when, on the admission of the National Ports Council, that potential is presently both untapped and in any case the provision is likely to be inadequate by 1973. Sixth, the establishment of Falmouth can only satisfy a genuine existing European

demand which would otherwise be lost to the British economy, British industry and British work people.
While accepting that it is the rôle—nay, the duty—of the Ports Council and the Department of the Environment to act in the national interest and in the interests of commercial viability and the preservation of amenity, I hope that my hon. Friend will at least let me glimpse the subject headings on the criteria yardstick against which this exciting scheme will soon be measured.

1.44 a.m.

Mr. Robert Hicks: I should like to congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Falmouth and Camborne (Mr. Mudd) on raising the subject of (his important development, which could have many desirable consequences, not least for the economy of the West Country, particularly Cornwall. Most of Cornwall is in the south-west development area and the remainder within the Plymouth intermediate area.
My hon. Friend mentioned possible spin-off effects. May I remind my hon. Friend the Minister that in pursuing their development area policies the Government place great emphasis on improving the infrastructure of the regions. In the context of Cornwall this means, above all, improved communications. We are confident of a stepping up in the rate of progress of road building in the West Country. I regret to say that we are less confident about the future of the railway to the west of Plymouth. I am informed that at least 8 per cent. of the traffic generated by this proposed port development would be rail-fed. This most certainly would play a significant part in helping retain our rail links in Cornwall—in other words, helping to retain and improve the basic attraction of the South-West Region. For this reason and others outlined by my hon. Friend, I have great pleasure in supporting him.

1.46 a.m.

The Under-Secretary of State for the Environment (Mr. Eldon Griffiths): If anyone in the House had any doubt about the wide interest in this imaginative project, that doubt would have been ended by the contribution of my hon. Friend the Member for Falmouth and Camborne (Mr. Mudd). I wish to congratulate my hon. Friend on the vigorous way in which he has drawn attention to the


potential advantages of such a scheme in Falmouth harbour. I had already taken note of the terms of the Early Day Motion which he put down last month and which attracted a large number of signatures. I can certainly sympathise with the natural desire of local interests in Falmouth to encourage a development which, in their view, will benefit the economy of the South-West Region generally. I well understand their desire to seek additional employment in an area which, as I know well from personal experience, has a high unemployment level, particularly marked in the winter months.
The Falmouth Container Terminal Company's Private Bill received Royal Assent on 17th February, but the company still has to obtain authorisation of the project by my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for the Environment under Section 9 of the Harbours Act, 1964. I understand that the company applied to the Secretary of State on 13th May and, in accordance with the Harbours Act, my Department is responsible for consulting the National Ports Council which is now in process of considering the application. Its recommendation must be received before my right hon. Friend can reach a decision, and we have not had its recommendation. For that reason it is not possible, indeed it would be quite improper, for me to pass any judgment on whether or not the scheme stands a good chance of being authorised by my right hon. Friend. However, it might be helpful if, as my hon. Friend suggested, I set out some of the matters about which we shall need to be satisfied before reaching any final decision.
I emphasise that, however imaginative this or any other project may appear to the promoters, the Secretary of State has a statutory duty to satisfy himself on all these matters before giving a favourable decision. First and foremost we shall need to be satisfied, on the advice of the National Ports Council, on the economics of the proposal. In short, will this project be viable in the sense that an adequate return can be earned on the large investment involved? The answer turns primarily on what demand there is or is likely to be, for container facilities at Falmouth.
We should need to have firm evidence of this demand: which shipping lines

would actually use Falmouth and on what routes would their container services operate; what are the quantities of traffic which are forecast for these routes; what size of ships would be used; to the extent that the case for the provision of an entirely new container port at Falmouth rests on the expectation of the emergence of a new generation of very large container ships which would take advantage of the deep water at Falmouth, what evidence is there that such ships are in fact likely to be in service within the time scale encompassed by the present proposals?
Then, again, we have to ask and be satisfied whether prospective users would be prepared to undertake contractual commitments relating to the use of the facilities and the rates which they would have to pay to ensure that the total revenue was adequate. There is also the question of raising the necessary capital, and again the Secretary of State will need to know how precisely it is proposed to raise the very substantial funds involved. On the engineering side, we shall need to be satisfied that the facilities proposed are fully capable of meeting forecast demand and how they are to cope with the double handling of trans-shipment traffic. I can tell my hon. Friend that these are only a few of the questions on which we would need to be satisfied before reaching a conclusion.
I want to turn now to two or three specific points he raised. My hon. Friend suggested, for example, that by siphoning off large container ships to Falmouth the general safety of shipping in the English Channel would be improved. I appreciate his thinking in this matter but I am not quite sure that I follow his logic. First, the giant ships that he mentioned are not container ships at all. They are super tankers and large bulk carriers and these, of course, would not be affected by the Falmouth plans. They will remain in the Channel whatever may happen at Falmouth.
Then again, if the deep sea container ships go to Falmouth, so as to trans-ship into smaller vessels bound for Europe or other United Kingdom ports, then the total number of vessels in the Channel will not decrease. It might very well increase for that reason. As I can testify from recent experience in the Channel myself, it is often the number of ships


in the Channel at any one time, rather than their size or tonnage, which may give rise to the navigational hazards to which my hon. Friend rightly drew attention.
Secondly, my hon. Friend argued that the project will earn foreign currency. If that were so, I should certainly be very glad, but I must remind him that this argument can be valid only if it is demonstrated that additional export traffic can be generated at Falmouth which would not otherwise be attracted to some other United Kingdom ports.
My hon. Friend also suggested, and was supported strongly by my hon. Friend the Member for Bodmin (Mr. Hicks), that this project would add significantly to the jobs available in the South-West Region both when the port is ready to operate and during the construction period. I appreciate my hon. Friend's anxieties on this point and such jobs would certainly be welcome. But they would not by themselves justify major capital expenditure for which there was no convincing long-term case on economic grounds.
I turn specifically to the question of containers. I am not sure that I can quite agree with the suggestion that we have, as it were, only just touched the fringes of container traffic. The United Kingdom already handles more container traffic than any other Northern European country. In 1970, we handled nearly as much container traffic as the rest of Northern Europe put together. If, however, we do decide that it is right to add to the container facilities in the United Kingdom, we shall have to consider first whether it is right to build an entirely new container port, and if so whether Falmouth is the right place for it. We shall also have to consider the fact that major container terminals already exist or are being planned at, for example, Seaforth in Liverpool, at Southampton, at Tilbury, at Greenock and at Felixstowe.
Moreover, while I am as anxious as anyone else that this country should keep in the forefront of those countries which are providing up-to-date port facilities for container ships, it is vital not to exaggerate the significance of container traffic in relation to our total cargo carryings. For example, in 1969–70 total container traffic in and out of United Kingdom ports amounted to 12 million tons

against a total of 107 million tons of general cargo and 214 million tons of bulk cargo.
I should also recall to my hon. Friend, without in any way underestimating the significance of container vessels, that there are many other important developments in cargo carrying. There are the huge bulk carriers for liquid and dry bulk cargoes, the roll-on/roll-off and drive-on/drive-off ships. There are what are known as LASH-lighter aboard ship—and BACAT—barges aboard catamarans—and so on. It would be a mistake therefore, at a time when the extent to which more container traffic will expand is by no means certain, to over-provide facilities of a specialised nature for which insufficient traffic could eventually be found.
In conclusion, I turn to my hon. Friend's point about the Common Market. He argued that construction of a container terminal at Falmouth would offset the disadvantages which he imagines will otherwise be suffered by the shipping and ports industries as and when we enter the Community. He claims that ships and cargoes would be consigned to the Continent rather than to the United Kingdom and that this would become an established arrangement.
I have already pointed out that the United Kingdom handles more container traffic, including deep-sea traffic, than any other North European country and that expanded port facilities for this have already been authorised. The Government see no reason whatsoever for fearing that deep sea container ships carrying cargoes destined for Britain are likely to be diverted to Continental ports. What matters here is not the Common Market but that our ports should offer the kind of service which alone will persuade shipowners and shippers that it is in their commercial interest to continue to use our ports.
But the Common Market will, in the Government's judgment, offer far greater opportunities to our shippers, shipowners and ports industries as a whole. This applies to Falmouth as to everywhere else. Indeed, we are convinced that our economy as a whole will do very much better inside the Common Market than outside. To that extent, the best hope for Falmouth, Cornwall and, indeed, the whole South-West Region is that we


should be partners within an expanding and prosperous Community from which we should derive more resources for regional policies, including the benefit of the South-West.
To sum up, I very much welcome the widespread interest shown in these proposals and the eloquent way in which both my hon. Friends have supported them tonight. I assure them that the points made in the debate, and in particular Falmouth's advantages as a natural deep water harbour, will not be overlooked. It is certainly no part of the Government's philosophy to discourage any new private enterprise project which

can be shown to have real prospects of benefiting the community. The onus in the end rests on the sponsors to make their case and to satisfy the National Ports Council and the Secretary of State, if they can. However, I give the assurance that, as soon as we have received the advice of the National Ports Council and any other information that the Secretary of State may require, there will be no delay in making the decision and informing the company and my hon. Friends.

Question put and agreed to.

Adjourned accordingly at Two o'clock a.m.